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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to determine how the role and identity of the Nonaligned
Movement (NAM) changed during and after the Cold War. The demise of the
Movement in the post-Cold War era, predicted by some scholars, is discussed.
This study examines whether the Movement merely offered an alternative grouping
during the Cold War. The issue that becomes evident with respect to the Cold War is
to show the terror it brought about and how the Third World became the battleground
of the Superpowers.
The question as to what extent the role played by the Movement defused the Cold
War is investigated. It is shown that the Movement sent emissaries to Washington
and Moscow to resolve the German Crisis in 1961 and to reduce the arms race.
A historical overview of the Movement is offered, which determines the role of Afro-
Asianism in the birth of the Nonaligned Movement. It is explained that the 1955
Bandung conference gathered leaders from independent African and Asian states -
with different foreign policies - which created energies that in the following years
greatly affected Third World politics and the shaping of nonalignment. This study
traces also the role of different gatherings of the Movement up to the Durban Summit
of 1998. At issue are also participating countries in the 1961 Belgrade Summit, which
are described, as well as the growth of the Movement's membership.
Different goals of the Movement are examined. Some, like nuclear disarmament, the
right to self-determination, peaceful coexistence, and the right for the Palestinians to a
homeland, were adopted during the Cold War and still remain valid. Others, like
protection of the environment, and the struggle for human rights, were implemented
during the post-Cold War era. The détente allowed the Movement to launch a New
International Economic Order. An attempt is made to show the failure and success of
the Movement in this respect.
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Opsomming
Die doel van hierdie studie is om te bepaal hoe die rol en identiteit van die
Onverbonde Beweging (NAM) tydens en na die Koue Oorlog verander het. Die
ondergang van die Beweging in die na-Koue Oorlogse era soos deur sommige kenners
voorspel is, word ook ondersoek.
Die studie het probeer vasstelof die Beweging 'n alternatiewe groepering tydens die
Koue Oorlog teweeg gebring het. Die kwessie met betrekking tot respect tot die Koue
Oorlog bewys dat terreur meegebring word en hoe die Derde Wêreld die slagveld van
die Supermoondhede gemaak het.
Daar word ook gepoog om vas te stel tot watter mate die Beweging 'n rol gespeel het
in die ontlonting van die Koue Oorlog. In die verband word onder andere verwys na
die Beweging se pogings om die Duitse Krisis (1961) te ontlont en die wapenwedloop
te beëindig deur die stuur van afgevaardigdes na Washington en Moskou.
In 'n historiese oorsig van die Beweging word die rol wat 'n Afro-Asiatiese
gevoel/gees in die stigting van die Onverbonde Beweging gespeel het, ondersoek.
Die studie toon aan hoe die Bandung Konferensie van 1955 leiers van onafhanklike
state van Afrika en Asië, wat uiteenlopende buitelandse beleidsrigtings gehad het,
bymekaar gebring het. Hierdie uiteenlopendheid het 'n dinamika geskep wat Derde
Wêreldse politiek en die aard van onverbondenheid wesenlik beinvloed het in die jare
na die Konferensie. Verskeie byeenkomste van die Onverbonde Beweging tot en met
die Durbanse spitsberaad (1998) word ontleed. Die samestelling en verloop van die
spitsberaad in Belgrado in 1961 en die groei in die lidmaatskap van die Beweging
kom onder andere onder die loep.
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Verskeie van die Beweging se doelwitte wat tydens die Koue Oorlog beslag gekry het
en steeds geldig is, word onder die soeklig geplaas. Kernkrag ontwapening, die reg
op selfbeskikking, vreedsame naasbestaan en die Palestyne se reg op 'n eie
staat/tuisland is voorbeelde in die verband. Ander doelwitte van die beweging wat
veral in die na-Koue Oorlogse era geimplementeer is, soos die bewaring en
beskerming van die omgewing en die stryd om menseregte, word ook ondersoek. Die
loodsing van 'n Nuwe Internasionale Ekonomiese Orde deur die Beweging wat deur
die détente van die na-Koue Oorlogse era moontlik gemaak is, word ook bespreek en
die sukses en mislukking daarvan geëvalueer.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
At the end of the Second World War, the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union
and the Western Powers began to disintegrate. The competitive and conflicting
interaction that had previously characterised the relationship between the Soviet
Union and the United States re-emerged. The Soviet Union controlled seven Eastern
European countries whose absorption had been prepared for during the last years of
the war. Josef Stalin, the Soviet leader, was neither prepared to withdraw nor to
introduce evolved human values of democracy and liberalism into Eastern Europe.
The United States declared universal war on Stalin's communist expansion through a
policy of containment. This policy assumed that the Soviet Union would expand by
every possible means and that such pressure must be met with force on all fronts.
Consequently, the Soviet Union responded to containment by calling the Truman
Doctrine capitalist encirclement. Both superpowers recruited allies throughout the
world, creating alliances based on ideology.
In this bipolar world, new nations emerged, first in Asia and then in Africa, who in
their firm determination to maintain a distance from the two major blocs, gave birth to
the Nonaligned Movement (NAM).l A point to be raised concerns the people who
write about the NAM. They are mostly from nonaligned countries and are socialist
scientists; very few scholars of American tradition, with the exception ofRL Jackson,
LW Martin, DC Thomas, AW Singham and S Hune2, have really studied the NAM.
I "Non-Aligned" and "non-alignment" are only used throughout this study, for title of books with these
spellings.
2 The late Professor AW Singham was born in Burma (also called Myanmar) of Sri Lankan parents.
He spent his childhood in Burma and Sri Lanka. He went to the United States in the mid-1950s
to study and obtained his Ph. D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
He taught at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica before returning to the the United States
at the University of Michigan, Haward University and Brooklyn College of the City University of
New York. His colleague, S Hune is a third generation Canadian of Chinese descent who has
lived most of her adult life in the United States, where she obtained her Ph. D. in History.
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2As western countries do not find much interest in the NAM countries, there is almost
a completely one-sided historiography of this Movement. The most frequently
discussed subjects in the literature of this Movement are its historical evolution and
Afro-Asian politics in the United Nations.' There are, for example, the studies by D
Kimche, an Israeli diplomat and former Mossad Chief, and GH Jansen, an Indian
political scientist. GH Jansen shows how since the Second World War, the newly
independent countries of Asia and Africa have come together and had dealings with
one other after a century of isolation imposed by imperial systems. This Afro-Asian
recovery began prior to the conferences of Bandung (1955) or Belgrade (1961). One
of the starting points was the Asian Relations Conference of New Delhi in 1947,
which deliberated anti-colonial politics and suggested "neutralism" in the event of
war. The cooperation between the Afro-Asians in international affairs, which
continued through the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations, was characterised by
an independent policy. Jansen's study explains how this Afro-Asianism gave birth to
nonalignment and the problems which occurred within the Afro-Asian group due to
the search by the Soviet Union and China for allies in their ideological struggle." D
Kimche examines the history of the Afro-Asian Movement, discussing the causes of
its birth and decline. At the same time, he conducts a number of case studies of India,
Indonesia and Tanzania to show their role in the shaping of Afro-Asianism.' scholar
The Bandung Conference has also received the attention of scholars such as Y
Alimov, DC Thomas and RA Mortimer." Y Alimov specifically emphasizes the fact
that the NAM is a new, unique phenomenon in the system of international relations.
As AW Singham and II Kovalenko show, how the Movement developed
organisationally. These authors do not agree that a lack of a permanent secretariat
and a charter are a hindrance to the Movement. This organisational problem is also
3 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, pp. 2-3.
4 GH Jansen: Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States.
5 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement.
6 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement; DC Thomas: The Theory and
Practice of Third World Solidarity; RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International
Politics.
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3discussed by MS Rajan, an Indian political scientist, who finds it unnecessary to re-
restructure the Movement. For him, it is the moral influence of a cause that counts.'
II Kovalenko, V Benevolensky, socialist scientists, and AW Singham, a political
scientist, and S Hune, a historian, concentrate on the different gatherings of the
Nonaligned Movement from the 1961 Belgrade Summit to the 1986 Harare Summit.
AW Singham and Shirley Hune provide an invaluable credit for giving an overview
of the international situation prior to each summit or conference. Thus their
documentary analyses took into account political, economic and social events that
were taking place in the world system at that time. Their study describes the period
from the First Summit Conference of heads of state or government of nonaligned
countries held in Belgrade in 1961 to the Fourth Summit in Algiers in 1973 as a
period in which the Movement was taking form and establishing itself as a coalition.
After 1973 the Movement enters a period of high international activity and becomes a
major actor in world politics by calling for a New International Economic Order
(NIEO). The problems faced by the Movement, such as organisational and internal
conflicts, limited the effectiveness of the Movement in the 1970s. In tum, AW
Singham and S Hune examined the struggle of the Movement for self-determination.
In this regard, Singham and Hune's study illustrates how the questions of Palestine
and Namibia were brought at the United Nations.
In addition, the Government of India published the major documents of the
Movement up to 1982 in a volume, Two Decades of Non-Alignment. This
documentation is extremely useful in that it also provides detailed indexes on different
declarations of the Movement, such as the Final Communiqué of the 1955 Asian-
African Conference or the 1970 Lusaka Declaration on Peace. However, none of the
above studies goes beyond 1986.8 It should be noted that each Summit Conference
published a set of documents and on the meeting itself, but the volumes on the early
7 MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement.
8 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: The Non-Aligned Movement; V Benevolensky: The Non-
Aligned Movement; AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments.
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4summits are difficult to obtain. Recently, the South African Department of Foreign
Affairs published the Basic Documents of the XI/h Summit Conference of Heads of
State or Government of the Nonaligned Movement held in Durban in 1998. This
document deals with an analysis of the then international situation, economic issues as
well as social issues. The shift in emphasis was that the Movement discussed
humanitarian problems, such as refugees, repatriated and internally displaced persons,
the situation of children, elderly people, international drug control and human rights.
There has been a trend to confuse the idea of neutrality with nonalignment or to use
the terms interchangeably. G Liska, a student of the American tradition,
misunderstands the nonaligned concept of anti-bloc politics. However, for JW
Burton, neutrality, a term commonly used before the Second World War implies non-
involvement in international relations while nonalignment involves abstention from
the Cold War.9
Some scholars have been concerned also with the theory and practice of
nonalignment.l'' Some have used quantitative methods to separate the practice from
the theory. The vote in the United Nations (UN) became an important source of data.
An example of this kind of research is Jackson's study of the nonaligned countries at
the UN.II Similarly, the British scholar P Willets has utilised this methodology to
describe both the coalition and the break up of coalitions within the nonaligned
system.V Like AW Singham, a political scientist, it is my belief that this type of data
collection and analysis has a limited value in understanding the complexities of a
movement like the NAM.13 Moreover, R Jackson, II Kovalenko, V Benevolensky,
9 JW Burton: Nonalignment and Neutrality.
10 L Mates: Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy.
II RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers.
12 P Willets: The Non-Aligned Movement.
13 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 387.
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5MS Rajan and R Allison deal with divergent American and Soviet policies toward the
NAM and nonaligned perceptions of the superpowers."
II Kovalenko and V Benevolensky, socialist scientists, found the Soviet Union to be a
"natural ally" of the Movement. However, R Allison analyses why Soviet leaders had
little interest in sustaining nonalignment in the 1950s and the 1960s and how
thereafter they elaborated strategies to use the uncommitted countries in the
competitive struggle between East and West. The Soviet conception was different
from the spirit of nonalignment: the nonaligned states were not to participate in
Western alliances, instead, these states were to rely on Soviet protection.l '
In this bipolar world, MS Raj an, an Indian political scientist, proposes China's
membership of the NAM even though this country is a nuclear-weaponed power and a
Permanent Member of the Security Council. This membership might promote the
NAM goal of détente between the Cold War blocs and pressurise the superpowers to
hasten the process. It might also help other objectives of NAM, such as
decolonisation, racial equality and Third World economic development, because
China itself claims to be a Third World country and works with other nations in
international forums.16
MS Rajan's essays show how the NAM stands for greater "democratisation" of
international relations. For the Movement, decision-making on issues of vital concern
to all countries of the world can no longer be the prerogative of a small group of
countries, however powerful they may be. Thus the NAM believes that all countries
should be independent, sovereign and equal among themselves, irrespective of their
size, or economic and military strength.l"
14 MS Raj an: The Future of Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement; R Allison: The Soviet
Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment.
15 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 3.
16 MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement, p. 80.
17 Ibid.
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6A number of case studies can be referred to that relate to Yugoslavia, India and
Algeria." L Mates, a Yugoslav author, former diplomat and the Secretary-General of
the Belgrade Conference, highlights the ideological nature of Yugoslavia's nonaligned
policy.i" P Jevremovic, a political scientist, disagrees with Mates' thesis of the
absence of a utilitarian component in Yugoslavia's option for the policy of
nonalignment, since it was security reasons that had led Yugoslavia to join the
nonaligned nations when it was expelled from Cominform and thereafter became a
"diplomatic superpower". 20
According to A Lassassi, a former political student, Algeria was among the most
diplomatically active members of the Movement. One assumption of his study is that,
with the rise of Algerian nationalism, Algeria continued to struggle against permanent
economic, social and cultural subordination. This struggle coincided with the goal of
nonalignment. This attitude in the Algerian context has its roots in the Algerian anti-
colonial struggle. A Lassassi also explains the connection between the FLN (National
Liberation Front) and nonaligned policy. The attention and support directed by
Algeria toward the liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America is
interpreted as a strategy to create unity and to confront injustice because they were
colonised for a long time. The study examines the Algerian relationship with the
superpowers and concludes that Algeria rejected the ideological dispute between
them. However, its anti-American policy is perceived as solely the result of
America's own attitudes toward issues with which the Algerian government was
concerned. The Algerian diplomacy of protest reflects, according to this author, a
plausible conception of Algeria's nonalignment and independent policy, which can
only be realised through change in the international system.i'
18 W Zimmerman: Open borders, Nonalignment and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia; A
Lassassi: Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy; RR Ramehandani: NAM and Third
World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era.
19 L Mates: Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy.
20 P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in International Studies, p. 279.
21 A Lassassi: Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy, pp. xii-xiii.
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7The plea for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) created in tum a literature
on the NAM. C Murphy's idea is that the NIEO ideology developed as an
understandable response to real problems experienced by Third World states as a
result of the creation and operation of Bretton Woods system. This study shows five
distinct phases in North-South conflict, from the creation of the Bretton Woods
system in the 1940s until after 1975.22 DC Thomas' study pays special attention to the
Third World struggle to challenge the North-South division of labour through their
quest for a NIEO and how these actors failed to achieve this goal as a result of global
economic restructuring, the Second Cold War and the increase in militarised conflicts
throughout the southern hemisphere.v' RA Mortimer's study emphasizes the creation
of the NAM and the Group of 77 and shows how these groups launched the NIEO.
The techniques used by the Third World to claim equity, such as the "Oil Weapon",
are described. Moreover, different results of the UNCTAD (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development) gatherings are addressed.24
The role of the Movement in the 1990s is not well documented. Available studies
emphasize the need for strengthening South-South cooperation and synchronisation of
points of view on international problems in the new world order. RR Ramehandani
examines aspects of the NAM, Third World state formation and underdevelopment
problems in a comparative frame of the sub-Saharan states and India, and revisits the
ups and downs of the fifty years of India-sub-Saharan economic cooperation to
project the findings onto emerging post-Cold War paradigms. On the other hand, C
Mahesh, a South African student, outlines issues in which the NAM should playa
leadership role in this changing world, such as UN peace-keeping operations, global
environmental issues and an increasing unwillingness on the part of the major
22 C Murphy: The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology.
23 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity.
24 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics.
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8economic powers to abide by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/
World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules.25
The emphasis in this study, The Changing Role and Identity of the Nonaligned
Movement, relates to the changing objectives of the NAM, before and after the Cold
War (from its inception up to the 1998 Durban Summit). The study concentrates,
mainly on the anti-war alternative advocated by nonalignment, but also on the
Movement's other goals such as self-determination, cooperation among all nations and
economic development as well as environmental issues and human rights. In order to
understand better the rise of nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement, it is
necessary to focus our attention on the Cold War. For this reason, the second chapter
of this study describes the Cold War with all the fears it brought to humanity. This
description will entail determining how the superpowers used the Third World as a
battleground as well as attempting to show how the Third World used the
superpowers to further their domestic as well as foreign political agendas.
The leaders of anti-colonial movements realised that the Allied victory in the Second
World War had not solved all their problems. For this reason, they wanted to benefit
from the fatigued condition of the colonial powers to promote their independence.
Thus three groups of countries appeared after the Second World War: the former
allies divided into two camps between whom arose the Cold War confrontation, and
the third force, represented first by the liberation movements in the colonies, and
followed thereafter by the newly independent states that refused to join either of the
two sides of the Cold War, in a policy called nonalignment." The third chapter of
this study will therefore examine the historical roots of nonalignment and the
emergence of the Third World. For this purpose, special attention will be given to the
Bandung Conference of 1955. This first important meeting of leaders from
25 RR Ramehandani: NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era.
M Chetty: A New Role For the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era; Rhodes
University Electronic Thesis Collection at http://www.ru.za/library/thesis/2000/chettv. on
08/11/2001.
26 L Mates: Nonalignment and Current Policy, p. 33.
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9independent Asian and African states created political energies that in the following
years significantly influenced Third World politics and the shaping of nonalignment.
A historical overview of the Nonaligned Movement is described up to the Durban
Summit of 1998, the third summit conference in the post-Cold War era.
It is also interesting to see how role-players in this bipolar world handled the creation
of an alternative force. Did the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrate
different reactions due to their difference of ideology? Some specific cases in which
the Nonaligned Movement contributed to bringing peace to the world are addressed in
the fourth chapter. At issue is a discussion of the duty chosen by the Movement to
tackle some acute problems provoked by the Cold War. The Nonaligned Movement's
strategy was to encourage negotiations between the United States and the Soviet
Union or to create a nonaligned communication link between them. To what extent
were these strategies successful?
By the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the demise and
marginalisation of the NAM was envisaged by some observers. The question thus
arises whether the Movement was only an alternative to the Cold War. The fifth
chapter will examine main problems faced by the Movement since its origin. The
most important of these is economic cooperation. The newly independent states
located in the South (two-thirds of the world) are poorer than their former colonisers
and the United States in the North. North-South cooperation became therefore the
main division in world economics after 1991. The fifth chapter explains the NAM's
struggle against the major powers' domination in decision-making on world issues of
vital interest. For this reason, the struggle for the democratisation of the international
institutions will be addressed as a perspective on the Movement's efficacy.
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CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING THE COLD WAR
The Cold War constituted a unique situation characterised by an ideological, political,
economic and military confrontation between two superpowers, the United States and
the Soviet Union, after the Second World War and which continued well into the
1980s. This confrontation was not a conventional war, but the superpowers
confronted each other indirectly in the Third World and in unusual terrains such as
technology and the arms race. Thus the Cold War brought the whole world into a grip
of terror that lasted nearly 50 years and influenced the whole spectrum of
international relations. It is therefore essential to understand this unique international
situation in order to understand the rise of the Nonaligned Movement.
In general, ideology played an important role in the Cold War. Considering American
strength in 1945, the United States wanted to play an active international role in order
to create a world in "accordance with American interests with freer trade and
democracy, with evolved human values, such as free parties or self-determination". I
From a communist ideological viewpoint, the Soviet Union in tum wanted to
overthrow the Western way of life based on capitalist liberalism. However, in the
interwar years, the Soviet Union was militarily too weak to effectively challenge the
West. But after 1945, Moscow gained both the military power and the political will
to export revolution - first to Eastern Europe, where its troops were already present
by V-day, and then to states in the developing world.'
The two systems of the superpowers, capitalism and communism, were incompatible
social systems. It was inevitable that the two superpowers would compete since they
both possessed a universal drive to recreate themselves on a global scale. Capitalism
needed economic growth and constantly expanding markets; Soviet communism
needed to expand to legitimise the revolution.' The primary American interest during
I G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, pp. 61-62.
2 M Bowker: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, pp. 243-244.
3 Ibid., p. 246.
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the twentieth century had been to keep key centres of military-industrial capability
from falling under hostile control. After 1945, this interest required that Western
Europe and Japan be protected against an ambitious Soviet Union.4 Thus the
elimination of each other was necessary and imperative. The two superpowers were
therefore obliged to enter a military struggle for pre-eminence.
2.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR
The tension between the USA and Russia was not just purely a result of the Second
World War, or even the Communist victory of 1917. These two countries did not at
the outset come into conflict because one was communist and the other capitalist.
The first confrontation was on the plains of north China and Manchuria in the late
nineteenth century when both countries were expanding their colonial influences:
America westward and the Russians into Asia.'
Until this confrontation, no significant conflict had marred the relations between the
USA and Russia. Whenever conflicts did occasionally arise over settlements in
California and Alaska, the Russians retreated before the demands of the American
expansionists.f The two countries had therefore satisfactory relations as the first trade
contacts between Russia and the young American republic are usually considered to
have been established toward the end of the War of Independence.' The first trade
agreement was signed in 18038 and diplomatic relations were established between
1808 and 1812.9 What is more, negotiations for the Alaska treaty between Secretary
4 JL Gaddis: The Evolution of Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Containing the Soviet
Union, p. 2.
5 W LaFeber: America, Russia and the Cold War, p. 1.
6 Ibid, pp. 1-2.
7 NN Bolkhovitinov: The Beginnings of Russian-American Relations, p. II.
8 Ibid., p. 96.
9 Ibid., p. 187.
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of State, William S. Seward and Baron Edward Stoeckl, the Russian Minister to the
United States - the Russians wanted to unload Alaska and Seward as the most ardent
expansionist in America history wanted to acquire Alaska - were simple, direct,
friendly, intimate."
However, in the late 19th century, Americans began finding many faults with their
former friends. First, the Russian empire was centralised by an oppressive and brutal
bureaucracy. In contrast, the American commonwealth of states was decentralised,
with states joined in a federation enjoying considerable freedom. The Russian empire
condemned political opponents to Siberian prison camps and accelerated massacres
against Russian Jews. As a result, anti-Russian feelings started spreading across the
United States. Americans also disagreed with Russia on a new colonial economic
policy. While both countries wanted to benefit from an open world marketplace, the
Russians imposed political control rather than creating a commercial empire. Russia
tried to control its influence and lands in Asia by closing these markets to the other
businessmen with whom they could not compete. Thus, Russians were eager to
colonise and close off Manchuria. I I
Consequently, the United States tried to contain Russian expansion, from the 1890s
until 1917, by supporting Japan whose rapid population growth and imperialist
ambitions could also gain from an open Manchuria policy. The United States was
unhappy with Russia's policy in Asia and even though the Czar allied with England
and France against Germany in the First World War, this meant little to American
business. For the Americans, the Allies' victory meant domination by Russia on the
continent of Europe and even less chance of economic concessions in Asia.12
10 JG Whelan: Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior, p. 31.
II W LaFeber: America, Russia and the Cold War, pp. 2-3.
12Ibid.,p.3.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
13
Another reason for the deterioration of American-Russian relations was the threat of
Russian Communism. During the First World War, Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik
movement used the extreme poverty in Russia as a lever to seize power from Czar
Alexander. Lenin and the other founders of the Russian Revolution were convinced
that capitalism was on the eve of collapse as predicted by the theories of Karl Marx
and Frederick Engels. Instead, the wide publication and public denouncement of
capitalism by the leaders of the revolution led to disgust in capitalist countries.l '
The Bolsheviks were not only against the war, but also promised "bread, land and
peace" to the desperate population in Russia.l" Furthermore, Bolshevik propaganda
caused many strikes among Allied forces. As a result, France was obliged to dismiss
the Chief Commandant of its troops and appointed General Philip Pétain to reorganise
the French Army. Due to the ideologically based hatred of war and imperialism and
the clear lack of finances, the Russian revolutionary government abandoned the
European war effort in late November and a peace treaty with Germany was ratified
by the Congress of Soviets, legally the highest body of the country, in March 1918.15
The Russian withdrawal meant that the failure of the Allied forces would implicate
Americans since the latter were fighting on the side of the Allies.
The Western powers were dismayed by the Bolshevik revolution and the ensuing
peace treaty with Germany. In Russia, the ownership of land that had been seized by
Russian peasants was legitimised, private trade was forbidden, and all industry was
nationalized. Russia was the first state to implement Marxist doctrine, and the Allies
felt obliged to intervene as this was a direct attack on the "capitalist way": England
sent troops to northern Russia to support anti-Bolshevik armies; French, Japanese,
Canadian and American troops tried to intervene too; the Polish army invaded the
Ukraine and seized Kiev. But the Allied intervention failed to stop the Bolsheviks.16
13 W LaFeber: America, Russia and the Cold War, p. 3.
14 Y Denis: Le monde d'Aujourd'hui, p. 24.
15 BA Ulam: Expansion and Coexistence, p. 73.
16 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 5.
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For the long term, the intervention confirmed the Soviet leaders belief that "capitalist
encirclement" was directly aimed at strangling the communist regime. 17
Another source of mistrust between the Soviet Union and Western countries was the
Versailles Peace Conference. In 1919, the Allies tried to isolate the Soviets by
creating buffer states such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in Eastern
Europe.l'' At the same conference, President Woodrow Wilson projected American
values into the heart of world politics by the establishment of the League of Nations.
A League of Nations was founded with the aim of guaranteeing political
independence and territorial integrity. Russia was excluded, first because of its
ideology and, then because it had signed a separate peace treaty with Germany.i"
The Second World War became another source of misunderstanding. During this
war, European countries forged their alliances on the basis of strategic interests rather
than a common ideology. In time, when Adolf Hitler, became the German
Chancellor, he intended to avenge the humiliation brought on Germany by the
Versailles Treaty, to occupy Eastern Europe, and to destroy communism. France and
Britain stood by passively while Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, which had been
demilitarised during the Versailles Treaty, and annexed Austria.f" Itwas clear that in
order to destroy communism, the western countries would have to support Hitler.
However, Germany had high expansionist ambitions.
The Soviet Union's relations with the Western powers totally disintegrated after the
Munich conference of 1938, at which Hitler's claims to Czechoslovakia and the
Sudeten regions were recognized. As BA Weisberger, an American historian, argues,
the Munich agreement - the formal pact to give Germany Czechoslovakia's
17 W LaFeber: America, Russia and the Cold War, p. 3.
18 Ibid., p. 4.
19 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 8.
20 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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Sudetenland border region - was a profoundly tragic experience for the world. For
the Russians, it seemed that French and British reactionaries had decided to tum the
frenetically anti-Bolshevik Hitler eastward. To the former, a Balkan peninsula of
Nazi satellites was a better bargain than a deal with Communism." This indolence
allowed Hitler to invade Poland. Surprisingly, the communist Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany, two ideologically opposed governments, announced a non-aggression pact
in 1939. The unlikely partnership of Hitler and Stalin agreed to divide Poland and the
Balkans between themselves. Thus, Hitler had no enemy who would attack from the
East and could concentrate his war efforts on the Western front. 22
During this period, Russian-American relations were problematical. The Soviet
invasion of Finland provided a strategic buffer for Stalin, but confirmed to America
that the Soviet Union brutalised its small neighbours.r' The United States did not
immediately enter the Second World War, but when Hitler defeated and occupied
France, American President, Franklin Roosevelt, began financing Britain's war effort.
England was expecting an invasion from Germany and it had a proven historical and
economic collaboration with the USA - it was only a matter oftime before the United
States would be drawn into the war.24
Despite Britain's disgust with the Soviet Union's ideology, British Prime Minister
and noted anti-communist, Winston Churchill, welcomed the Soviet Union as a
partner in the war on the side of the Allies, after the German invasion into Russia.
Yet, as the Nazis drove deeper into the Soviet Union in 1942, the United States and
Britain twice reneged on a promised bridgehead in Eastern Europe.i'' Instead of
intervening, Britain and the USA discussed reports of a separate Soviet peace with
Germany and the need for launching this as an interim military operation in Western
21 BA Weisberger: Cold War Cold Peace, pp. 200-201.
22 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 10.
23 W LaFeber: America, Russia and the Cold War, pp. 6-7.
24 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 10.
25 W LaFeber: America, Russia and the Cold War, p. 8.
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Europe in the event of a Russian collapse." They discussed these plans with Soviet
officials in order to distract Stalin from his territorial demands. This approach was
also a way of weakening communism. They only cooperated with the Soviet Union
because France was weak and they feared that Germany could be revived. An
encircled Germany would be easily invaded.I'
2.1.1 Stalin and the Problem of Security
Although ideology played an important role in the Cold War conflict, the tensions that
erupted between the Soviet Union and the United States were partially the result of
different conceptions of the postwar world order. The Soviet Union controlled seven
Eastern European countries whose absorption had been prepared during the last years
of the war. Stalin was neither prepared to withdraw nor to introduce evolved human
values of democracy and capitalism-liberalism into Eastern Europe. As a result,
Soviet power extended over half of the European continent and communist expansion
became a threat to Western countries.f
Stalin and the other Soviet leaders often stressed the fact that Soviet policy in Eastern
Europe was motivated by considerations of national security. As G Lundestad argues,
there is little reason to doubt this was the case. During the preceding 30 years alone,
Russia had been attacked by Germany twice. Besides this, there had been Western
intervention in the Russian civil war and the war with Poland. The First World War
had caused the fall of the Czar's regime. The Second had nearly resulted in the
collapse of Stalin's rule.29 In reality, the devastation had been enormous: in the First
World War 1 700000 Russians were killed, 4 900 000 wounded and 2 500000 jailed
by the enemy. During the Second World War, nearly one-third of Soviet former
26 LE Davis: The Cold War Begins, p. 33.
27 Ibid., p. 24.
28 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 189.
29 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 62.
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wealth had been destroyed, thirty-two thousand factories were in rums, 65 000
kilometers of railway track were rendered useless, an estimated 27 million people
died, 1 710 towns were destroyed, and 70 000 villages and hamlets were burnt to the
ground.r" Thus for Stalin, security came through eliminating opponents and
protecting the Soviet Union by exerting his control over world communism. The only
problem was that security for one country tended to be insecurity for another.i'
Before the United States entered the Second World War, rumors had affirmed
commitments between Britain and the Soviet Union for postwar territorial
arrangements in Eastern Europe.32 These rumors led Britain and the United States to
state some principles known as the Atlantic Charter. In this agreement, both countries
affirmed to seek no political or territorial aggrandizement before the end of the war.
Moreover, any nations affected by hostilities had to choose the form of their
government and determine their own postwar frontiers.f But the Charter signed later
by the governments at war against Germany, including the Soviet Union did not
produce a definition of any specific American goals or interests in this part of the
world.34
Efforts by the Soviet and British governments during 1941-42 to settle territorial
questions were not the only causes for concern about Eastern Europe among
American officials. At the Yalta conference in 1945, the areas of agreement and
disagreement among the Allies concerning Poland were obvious. There was a dispute
about the shape of postwar Poland. The British wanted to install the pro-Western
government that was in exile in London; the Soviets wanted the rival pro-Soviet
government that had been set up in Lublin, in South East Poland.35 As Stalin insisted
30 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 23.
31 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 63.
32 LE Davis: The Cold War Begins, p. 12.
33 Ibid.,p.I5.
34 Ibid., p. 384.
35 BA Weisberger: Cold War Cold Peace, p. 31.
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on clarity on the question of security, Roosevelt agreed to the Soviet's territorial
demands in Poland dating back to 1941. Stalin wanted to keep what he had seized,
both on the grounds of security and because he claimed the territory had been unfairly
detached from the Soviet Union in 1920.36 Roosevelt advocated the establishment of
a government in Poland that would command the support of the three great powers
and would include members of all Polish political groups. In contrast, Stalin stated
that Soviet strategic security required friendly relations between Poland and the
Soviet Union. During a war, Red Army lines of communication and supply in Poland
had to be protected. Poland had to be established as a bulwark against Germany,
since Poland had always been a corridor for German attack against the Soviet
Union.37
At Yalta, the United States, British, and Soviet governments defined a particular type
of political future for Eastern Europe. They agreed to enforce in liberated Europe the
principles of the Atlantic Charter, through the formation of representative
governments and the holding of free elections. However, in the weeks following the
conference, it became clear that the implementation of these principles would be
difficult in the ex-German satellites of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Stalin
wanted to ensure that Russia would never be invaded from Europe again. As the Red
Army liberated territories, Stalin had instructed his henchmen to set up pro-Soviet
regimes. Even where the communists were in the minority, Stalin's tactics were the
samer" Stalin insisted that communist exiles who spent the war in Moscow occupied
the key ministries of economic planning, justice, and the interior. This ensured that
control of the police and internal security was in the hands of his accomplices.
Slowly, the communists worked at eliminating the opposition, edging each satellite
country towards their goal of one party communist rule, under Soviet hegemony."
36 BA Weisberger: Cold War Cold Peace, p. 31.
37 LE Davis: The Cold War Begins, pp. 177-178.
38 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 26.
39 Ibid., p. 28.
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By the end of 1945, conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over
Eastern Europe escalated. American officials read Soviet actions in this part of the
world as Soviet intentions to expand outside of Eastern Europe, and as Soviet
methods of world domination.l'' They linked the Eastern European case to the rest of
the Soviet Union's behaviour. For instance, there was the matter of Azerbaijan.
During the war, the Soviets had, by agreement, occupied the northern half of Iran.
They were scheduled to withdraw in stages as 1945 came to an end. But the Soviet
people delayed their departure from the northern province of Azerbaijan, because
separatist rebels there were conducting uprisings, which endangered the security of
the area. Iran protested that this was a fragile excuse to continue the Soviet military
presence." This unresolved conflict provoked a re-examination by American
officials of all their ideas about the Soviet Union and the future of Soviet-American
relations.
2.2 THE NATURE OF THE COLD WAR
Between 1945 and 1947, Soviet influence increased in Eastern Europe and the
satellite states were created. In Bulgaria, a Communist majority was returned to the
parliament at the end of 1946. InHungary, Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy was ousted
in favor of a Communist in the spring of 1947. In Poland, Peasant Party leader
Stanislas Mikolajczyk complained to the British and American ambassadors in 1946
that 13 members of his executive Committee and 791 party members were in jail, and
at least 95 had been executed. In Yugoslavia, the only candidates for the parliament
were members of the loyal communist, Josip B. Tito. In Rumania, a coalition
"National Liberation Front" was gradually turned red.42
The situation further deteriorated with a speech by Stalin in which he took an
uncompromising Marxist-Leninist line, claiming that capitalism made war
40 LE Davis: The Cold War Begins, p. 333.
41 BA Weisberger: Cold War Cold Peace, p. 53.
42 Ibid., p. 52.
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inevitable.43 On the other hand, Churchill, in a speech delivered at Fulton, Missouri,
called on the English-speaking world to unite in an alliance against Soviet
communism. The United States response was built on the latter philosophy. Thus in
1947, American President Harry Truman launched a crusade against Communism.
Soviet pressures were to be met with force.44 For this purpose, the United States
adopted a strategic embargo designed to refuse goods that could be used to build up
the Soviet military. Thus the Truman Dcoctrine was born. As a restrictive policy was
impossible, the United States sought European and Japanese consent.Y
Through this Truman Doctrine, the United States took over from Britain - which had
economic problems - the responsibility for protecting Greece and Turkey from
communism.f" In addition, the Marshall Plan was launched to recover the European
economy weakened by the war. The objective of the Marshall Plan was ultimately to
restore Europe's economies through American aid. Initially, this aid was offered to
both Eastern and Western Europe. However, the Soviet Union rejected the Marshall
Plan for Eastern European countries, an action that resulted in further anti-communist
implications.Y
The Soviet Union responded to American involvement in Europe by creating the
Kominform and Comecon. First, the Kominform was an office created to organise
and harmonise the policies of communist parties." Secondly, the Comecon was the
Soviet Union's own counterpart to the Marshall Plan. Beginning in 1949, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union formed the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA). The countries of Eastern Europe
43 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 29.
44 Y Denis: Le Monde d' Aujourd'hui, p. 52.
45 AE Stent: Economic Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Containing the Soviet Union, p.
60.
46 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 190.
47Ibid.,p.191.
48 Y Denis: Le Monde d' Aujourd'hui, p. 54.
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began to adopt long-range development plans based on the Soviet's model and to
direct their trade toward the Soviet Union.49 Two separate camps were therefore set
up in political, economic as well as military opposition, but without a general
confrontation.
This confrontation between the superpowers was characterised by a nuclear arms race
with the possibility of escalation into a series of regional crises, which included Berlin
(1948-1949 and 1958-1963), Korea (1950-1953), Cuba (1954-1962) and the Middle
East. For instance, regarding the arms race, the United States had acquired an atom
bomb before the end of the Second World War. By 1949, the Soviet Union had also
acquired this technology and the first bomb was built. Moreover, American nuclear
scientists built a super bomb - a thermonuclear device that was roughly a thousand
times more powerful than the atom bomb - which was finally ready for testing in
1952. Surprisingly, in 1953, the Soviets tested their own thermonuclear bomb. Thus
the arms race continued into the decades that followed. 50
The United States was involved in the above crisis to prevent Soviet expansionism.
From the 1960s, however, there were a number of reasons that prevented the world
from falling into a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet
Union. As both superpowers had acquired the atom bomb, no leader could think in
terms of winning a nuclear war. Therefore, military strategists no longer planned for
victory, but for the avoidance of war. The fear of escalation also encouraged leaders
to act with greater caution. The result of any breakdown in nuclear deterrence would
have been global destruction." The superpowers could not risk a nuclear war. On the
contrary, the Cold War was fought in a conventional military manner in the Third
World. The NAM tried to avoid being used in this manner. The Movement was thus
a way of managing the rules of the Cold War.
49 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 191.
50 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, pp. 144-148.
51 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
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The Cold War confrontation of the Stalinist years was replaced by negotiations.
Nuclear threat was replaced by general agreements over the managements of the arms
race of a divided world. Thus a "hotline" was set up in 1963 to improve
communications between the Kremlin and the White House,52 the Non-Proliferation
Treaty was signed in 1968, and in the 1970s the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties
(SALT) were signed, along with a whole series of other agreements on crisis
management and prevention. 53
Gorbachev's reform or perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness or
transparency), and his surrender of communist rule in Eastern Europe were considered
too much and too fast. But they did lead to liberation within the Soviet Union and to
a Commonwealth of Independent States, which replaced the Soviet Union in 1991.
When Communism fell, the Cold War simultaneously came to an end. In contrast,
some consider the end of the Cold War to have occurred when the Berlin Wall came
down in 1989. Communism did not fall only because the Reagan administration
began a new phase of rearmament in the late 1980s on such a colossal scale that the
Soviet Union, due to its economic problems could not follow, but also simply because
Western society existed as a viable, alternative system. At least from the 1960s, the
political freedoms found mainly in the West, the consumer society and the youth
culture were envied by an increasing number of people in the East. 54
2.2.1 Pacts or Increase in Tension
In its narrowest sense, the term "alliance" can be taken to mean only those
relationships in which there is a treaty obligation of protection against attack. But to
so limit the definition would leave out virtually all security commitments formed in
recent years. If "alliances" were defined in their broadest sense, however, one would
52 RW Stevenson: The Rise and Fall of Détente, p. 120.
53 M Bowker: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, p. 251.
54 Ibid., p. 253.
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almost need to include any country with which the United States has a defence
relationship, clearly a scope too broad for meaningful evaluation. 55
To be effective, alliances have to reflect a certain solidarity with other like-minded
nations based on a real community of interest and outlook. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States)
treaties of 1951 fulfilled these conditions. This first group of alliances, named
Truman! Acheson alliances, was designed to achieve the first stage of containment,
that of the protection of non-communist centres of world industrial capacity. 56
Firstly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created in 1949 by means of a
treaty signed by 12 Western countries, including the United States.57 In 1948-49 the
United States had opposed including countries in NATO that did not border on the
Atlantic Ocean. Italy was the only exception. In 1952, the link to the Atlantic Ocean
was weakened even more by the inclusion of Greece and Turkey. In 1955, after the
French National Assembly had rejected the plans for a European army with German
participation, West Germany became a member of NATO. 58
NATO resulted in a European effort to involve the United States in the containment of
a rehabilitated Germany when it became clear that that nation would have to be rebuilt
quickly if Europe was to resist Soviet pressures. As the Europeans were America's
"real and natural allies", officials of the Truman administration were willing to give
an American guarantee of European security, not primarily because they considered it
necessary for deterrent purposes, but because of its psychological value in
55 TL Deibel: Alliances for Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Containing the Soviet Union,
p.101.
56 Ibid.,p. 106.
57 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 192.
58 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 84.
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maintaining the self-confidence Europe needed to continue with its economic and
political rehabilitation. 59
President Truman requested $1.45 billion for military aid, most of it for NATO allies.
In this act, the United States demonstrated its willingness to arm its allies against
communist expansion.I" Ultimately, when in 1950, North Korea's attack on South
Korea seemed to demonstrate that the Soviets really might begin a third world war,
NA TO was transformed from a political, confidence-building measure into an
alliance-in-being with substantial numbers of American troops and an organisation
headed by an American military commander. 61 An attack on Western Europe would
inevitably involve the United States. Moreover, the expansion of NATO and
transference of the pact model from Europe to Asia was encouraged by the Korean
War. This war rendered the evaluation of Soviet intentions even more negative than
previously. Through an accelerated rearmament, the United States also acquired an
instrument to pursue even more comprehensive commitments in ever new regions.f
As early as during the Second World War, it had become evident that Australia and
New Zealand would in security matters, orient themselves towards Washington and
away from London, due to American involvement in the Pacific War. In 1951 the
Truman administration was ready to consider this type of scheme. The intention was
to work out an agreement between the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia,
New Zealand, and perhaps Britain and Indonesia as well. The US army was still
sceptical about commitments on the Asian mainland."
59 TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Alliances for Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Containing the
Soviet Union, pp. 106-107.
60 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 194.
61 TL Deibel: Alliances for Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Containing the Soviet Union,
p. 107.
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There was particularly strong opposition to including Japan. After the peace treaty
with Japan was signed in 1951, the United States and Japan made a separate defence
agreement which gave the United States the right to have bases in Japan. A second
agreement was made with the Philippines. Then the United States, Australia and New
Zealand entered into the ANZUS pact in September 1951. Britain was not a party to
ANZUS.64 Historically, Britain has played a leading role in this region, now this was
gradually changing. The United States took over the role of former colonial powers
and was determining policy in this region.
2.2.2 The Role of the Korean War
Korea was the first example of how superpowers used the Third World as a "battle-
ground" for the Cold War conflicts. It was a former colonial country under
superpower control. After the outbreak of this war, the United States entered into
treaties and made commitments in a number of different regions and the number of its
defence bases rose sharply.
For many centuries, Korea was governed as a unified area (from AD 665 to 1945). In
1885, China and Japan agreed to maintain the independence of Korea, but each was to
have the right to send troops into the country upon giving notice to the other. In 1894
the Chinese sent troops into Korea to assist the King of Korea in crushing a revolt.
Notice was sent to Japan with reference to that agreement. The Sino-Japanese War of
1894-1895 occurred because the Japanese feared that the Chinese intended to conquer
Korea, so the Japanese also sent troops. The Japanese, with their modem weapons
were easily victorious.f
The close geographical proximity 0f the Japanese home islands and Korea resulted in
Japanese determination to assert herself in Korea so as to ensure the more effective
64 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 82.
65 GW Southgate: Europe: 1870-1945, p. 97.
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defence of Japan herself. In addition, it was hoped to exploit Korea economically.
But full Japanese rule was imposed in 1910 after a Korean nationalist had killed Ito,
the Japanese resident general. The early Japanese governors-general were military
men, distinguished by their narrow, intolerant attitude to their subjects. The first
decade of annexation witnessed the most rigorous phase in which draconian
punishments were enforced for resistance to Japan. 66
The prospects for Korea regaining its independence lay in the defeat of Japan during
the Second World War: only two powers could achieve this, the United States and the
Soviet Union. It was unclear as to what the fate of Korea would be at the end of the
Pacific War, since Korean affairs would be subsumed in the profound questions
involving the future of Japan and the eventual intervention of the Soviet Union, with
much depending on the character of American-Soviet relationship at that time. In the
United States, it was widely held that the Koreans would not be ready for
independence when the war ended: memories of the closing phase of the Yi dynasty
did not inspire confidence in Korean ability for effective government and the era of
Japanese dominance had been so repressive as to necessitate a period of readjustment.
The application oftrusteeship offered the most satisfactory solution/"
Earlier in the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the American President, had also given his
tacit approval to a State Department Plan for a four-power trusteeship for Korea
consisting of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that might
last for twenty or thirty years. It would probably not be necessary to station troops in
Korea during that period."
When Harry Truman took office in April 1945, he found a confusing assortment of
contradictory policies and unfinished business. Like most Americans, Truman knew
little about the postwar plans for Korea. Roosevelt's desire to bring the Soviets into
66 P Lowe: The Origins of the Korean War, pp. 1-2.
67 Ibid., p. 9.
68 MS Gallichio: The Cold War Begins in Asia, p. 4.
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the Pacific War and his apparent refusal to involve American troops on the mainland
meant that the Soviets would have the dominant voice in Korea's future.f"
American contemplation of Korea intensified in the course of July 1945, aimed at the
deeper considerations of the most effective method of terminating the Pacific War.
The State Department planners believed that significant American participation in the
trusteeship was essential for a free and democratic Korea. First envisaged as a means
of balancing competing American interests on the peninsula, American participation
in a four-power trusteeship gradually evolved into a means of preventing Soviet
hegemony in Korea.7o For this purpose, General George Marshall and his colleagues
in the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the United States must occupy at least part of
Korea in order to increase American power in the postwar balance between American
and Soviets interests in the Far East. The ss" parallel was already being envisaged as
a possible division but no decision was taken in July to propose it formally.Ï'
The acquisition of an atom bomb offered Truman a chance to avoid a repetition of
events in Eastern Europe. Convinced a Japanese surrender could be achieved without
Soviet assistance, Truman sought to steal a march on the Soviet Union by landing
troops in Korea. Altogether, it seems that Truman wanted to prevent a unilateral
occupation of the peninsula by the Soviet Union. Truman and his advisors decided to
abandon trusteeship in anticipation of a rapid end to the Pacific war that would
forestall Soviet occupation.f
When the first atom bomb was dropped, the American State Department planners
were still discussing the means of control that would be employed to administer
Korea. The Soviet Union, which had declared war on Japan only a day before
69 MS Gallichio: The Cold War Begins in Asia, p. 24.
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Nagasaki was bombed, marched through Manchuria and entered Korea. But with the
war coming to a sudden end, the United States proposed to the Soviet Union the
division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel.Ï:' This line would ensure that the
United States obtained control of two important ports and the capital of Korea. 74 The
United States occupied the South, while the Soviet Union the North. Stalin was
satisfied with this agreement and was not tempted to violate it. Really, he adhered to
the agreement because he wished to maintain satisfactory relations with the United
States if possible and perhaps because he felt sooner than later Korea would fall into
the Soviet sphere in any case.75 The Soviet Union had sponsored Korean liberation
groups and there were 100 000 Koreans - many of them devoted to Stalin - in Central
Asia, ready to go back. Stalin could then control the peninsula with Soviet-trained
. 76proxies.
Between 1945 and 1947, the situation in Korea polarised as the two power blocs,
North and South, became established. Both sides constantly expressed their desire for
national unity, but in practice, re-unification became an ever remoter goal. As in
Europe, the difficulties of postwar reconstruction plunged much of Korea into
economic chaos and hardship." The United Nations became more involved in
Korean affairs from the beginning of 1948 as a consequence of the acceptance by the
UN General Assembly of the American proposal that elections should be held in both
parts of Korea to achieve a national assembly and then a unified government for
Korea. The Soviet Union made clear its firm opposition to this proposal, maintaining
that UN intervention was unnecessary and that Korea could advance to independence
through the withdrawal of foreign forces and agreement reached among the Koreans
themselves.Ï'' Elections eventually went ahead only in the South, and with the
73 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 83.
74 MS Gallichio: The Cold War Begins in Asia, p. 77.
75 P Lowe: The Beginnings of the Korean War, p. 20.
76 MS Gallichio: The Cold War Begins in Asia, p. 25.
77 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 85.
78 P Lowe: The Korean War Begins, p. 43.
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Communists boycotting the polls. Rhee Syngman and his right-wing supporters won
a majority of seats in Korea's new constitutional assembly and he became president of
the new Republic of Korea. A month later the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea was proclaimed in Pyongyang."
During 1949 the border between the two Korean regimes became tense as both sides
made incursions across it. Radio propaganda from the North constantly predicted
imminent invasion. In the South left-wing activists by the thousands were arrested
and imprisoned. Meanwhile, the Red Army maintained left only a few advisers in the
North and in 1949 the United States withdrew from the South, as its officials were
involved in the Berlin crisis.t"
In June 1950, Stalin, who had originally opposed a North Korean attack on the South,
now feared the risks of American intervention in view of the underdeveloped North
Korean military, and agreed on the attack of North Korea, because of the
Communists' victory in China. In January 1950, the formation was under way in
Moscow of an alliance between the Soviet Union and the newly established People's
Republic of China. Moreover, Stalin's approval to attack must have been at least in
part a response to the new defence policy announced by Secretary of State, Dean
Ackeson on January 12, 1950, that placed South Korea outside the American defence
perimeter in the Pacific.81 Furthermore, the Soviet Union had acquired an atom bomb
in 1949. Stalin felt then more confident that the United States would hesitate to
intervene in a distant war. The attack was interpreted by the United States as a step to
throw the United States and its Allies out of Asia. To the extent that Stalin was
pulling the strings of Kim Il Sung, the communist leader of North Korea, this
judgment was justified. On the other side, the attack was justified by another material
advantage. Some documents reveal that Stalin was ready to help North Korea. These
79 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 85.
80 Ibid.
81 K. Weathersby: To Attack or not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War at
ttp://cwhip.si.edu/cwihplib.nf, on 24/0512002.
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stated that the matter "needs large preparations" and "must be organised so that there
would not be too great risk". Stalin then requested that Kim provide the Soviet Union
with at least 25,000 tons of lead per year. 82 G Kennan argues also that the evident
determination of the United States to keep its military forces in Japan, and to keep
Japan in the Western alliance system was "among the various considerations that
might have impelled Stalin to authorise" the Korean attack". 83
The United Nations, called on by the United States for the first time, voted to send
troops to assist one country attacked by another. At first, North Korea was victorious.
But when American troops led by MacArthur pushed Kim to the North, Pyongyang
fell to a combined force of United Nations and South Korean troops, the only
communist capital to fall to the West in the Cold War. Consequently, Chinese
People's Volunteers were also obliged to intervene on behalf of North Korea.84
The Korean War ended in 1953 with heavy consequences. The United States lost 54
000 men; the other nations of the UN force lost more than 3,000 men, the South
Korean Army lost 415 000 men; the North suffered nearly a million deaths and a
further 100 000 were wounded; the Chinese lost 112 000 men. There were terrible
civilian losses from American bombing of the North and at least 5 million refugees
were left homeless in the South. Seoul, Pyongyang and many other cities had been
flattened. The world, during the Korean War, came close to a second Hiroshima, but
both sides showed restraint. Yet, the Japanese economy grew;85 China was elevated
to the status of a world power from being able to stop the fall of North Korea, and the
United States halted the spread of communism.i" However, Korea remained divided
82 K. Weathersby: To Attack or not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War at
ttp://cwhip.si.edu/cwihplib.nf, on 24.05.2002.
83 G Kennan: Memoirs 1950-1963, vol II, p. 39, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Containing the Soviet
Union, p. 108.
84 'hI Jeremy: T, e Cold War, p. 95.
85 Ibid., p. 104.
86 Y Denis: Le Monde d' Aujourd' hui, p. 54.
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at the 38th parallel: an example of how the independence and sovereign integrity of
small countries became compromised by the involvement of superpowers in the Third
World. The United States' presence in Asia increased and a new strategy of alliances
was adopted.
2.2.3 The Strengthening of Pacts
As a result of the Korean War, the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) placed
even greater emphasis than its predecessor on building up a bulwark against
Communism in Asia. For this purpose, the United States established other security
pacts to guarantee the safety of the member states against any attack, whether from a
resurgent Japan, a belligerent Indonesia, or an expansionist People's Republic of
China.87 Through the Taiwanese and South Korean alliances, SEATO (South East
Asian Treaty Organisation) and CENTO (Central Treaty Oganisation), John Foster
Dulles, American Secretary of State, connected NATO with the Pacific defences he
had earlier negotiated, politically, by tying the developed European and Pacific
powers into SEATO and CENTO, and geographically, by completing the arc of allies
from South Korea, Taiwan, and four Indochinese nations through Pakistan to Iran,
Iraq and Turkey. In reality, Dulles' core strategy was not global alliances, but massive
retaliation.f" The more countries that were included in these agreements, the stronger
the West would become and the smaller the chances of communist aggression would
be. Definite zones had to be drawn up. If the Soviet Union or one of its allies
overstepped these regions, the West, led by the United States, would respond in
military terms.89 This strategy shows that the Asian continent was encircled by two
opposing powers, which made for an uncertain situation.
In 1953, an alliance with Korea was signed to reinsure the precarious armistice, which
had just ended the Korean War, by making it clear that the United States would come
87 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 199.
88 TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Containing the Soviet Union, p. 111.
89 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 82.
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to Korea's defence in case of a second armed attack.ï" Taiwan too had long been
eager for closer contact with the United States. In this respect, the United States
stepped up its verbal support for Chiang Kai-Shek, the KMT -leader who fled to
Taiwan, after the 1949 Revolution in China. The American fleet was withdrawn from
the Formosa Straits, which would make it easier for Chiang to carry out operations on
the mainland. In September, the Communists began to bombard the island of
Quemoy, which was located just off the mainland and far from Taiwan, which
controlled it. Despite initial reservations on the part of President Dwight Eisenhower,
Washington agreed to enter into a security agreement with Taiwan in December
1954.91 Although the Eisenhower administration was vague as to precisely which of
the offshore islands it intended to defend, thé treaty's purpose was to dissuade the
People's Republic of China from going too far in pressing its military case against the
Chiang regime on Formosa.92 China's attack was a reaction to the pending signing of
a security agreement with Taiwan. Thus one of the leading Third World countries
was drawn into the Cold War struggle as a result of the domestic issue of Taiwan.
The above-mentioned SEATO came to fruition as an American scheme to hold the
line against further communist gains in Indochina after the collapse of the entire
French effort and the negotiated partition of Vietnam at the 1954 Geneva
Conference.93 SEATO had fewer members than Washington had hoped for. India
and Indonesia had no desire to belong. The British protested against including
Taiwan. France would not accept South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. According to
the Geneva agreement, the latter three were to be neutral in any case, although, they
were partially covered by the SEATO pact. Finally, the members were the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
Thailand and Pakistan.94
90 TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Containing the Soviet Union, p. 111.
91 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 83.
92 TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Containing the Soviet Union, p. 110.
93 Ibid.
94 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 84.
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After the establishment of SEATO, the largest gap in the alliance system was in the
Middle East and western Asia, between Turkey in NATO and Pakistan in SEATO.
Both South East Asia and the Middle East were regions where many new independent
states were to emerge. Both regions were characterised by local and domestic
conflicts. The United States thus had to build a strong presence and create a strong
role in these regions as a player in the Cold War. To some extent, the United States
perceived the British presence as a factor that contributed to making the countries
there more radical, thus making the establishment of a front against communism more
difficult. But in 1955, the Baghdad Pact was established with the United Kingdom,
Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq as members" This pact was initiated by the British
to maintain their presence in the region as Gamal Abdul Nasser had expelled them out
of Egypt'" and the United States was only indirectly linked to the new system. The
pact resulted in the polarisation of the Middle East. Those states that were not
included tended to be in a position of rivalry in relation to those that were members.
Washington wanted to maintain relations with the countries that at least partially
considered the Baghdad Pact to be an extension of British colonialism."
The new organisation brought about by the pact was not a success. The British felt
betrayed by the Americans. In July 1958, General Abdul Karim Kassem seized
power in Iraq and changed entirely the course of Iraqi foreign policy. The country
took the path of nonalignment and left the Baghdad Pact. That was a heavy blow to
the policy of blocs pursued by the Western powers in Asia. To save what remained of
the pact, its organisers, the United States, moved the headquarters of the bloc to
Ankara in Turkey and renamed the pact CENTO, the Central Treaty Organisation."
95 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 80.
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GH Jansen argues that Pakistan's reasons for joining both the Baghdad Pact and
SEATO were very simple: it wanted arms and political support against India - which
was a threat to it, especially because of their dispute over Kashmir. 99 The United
States and India had held differing views on several issues during the Korean War;
they disagreed over the peace treaty for Japan, and not least over the establishment of
SEATO, which brought the United States into a close relationship with India's rival,
Pakistan.IOO In addition, Thailand's reason for joining SEATO was a direct fear of
Communist China. A leftist Thai leader, Pridi Panomyang, had been granted asylum
there. The Philippines were also afraid of China, but their worries were not very
serious. Perhaps they hoped to gain economic assistance from the United States.i'"
Thus some Third World countries wanted to benefit from the Cold War by solving
their own problems.
Due to this American involvement in the Third World, the Soviet Union reorganised
all its military alliances into the Warsaw Pact of 1955, in order to coordinate and
control its satellites forces.102 In the 1950s, the Soviets had advocated a system of
collective security in Europe and Asia as a basis for destroying the Western-inspired
pacts, NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS, and the bilateral pacts that the United States had
concluded with South Korea, the Philippines and Japan.103
Was it possible to avoid this Cold War, which brought countries into threatening
alliances, changed countries into a battleground for the superpowers and prevented
them from enjoying their sovereignty? It is not easy to speculate on the possibility of
the prevention of the Cold War. However, this conflict resulted, as explained above,
by a situation created mainly by the Second World War. As the end of the war
approached, it became clear that only the United States and the Soviet Union could
99 GH Jansen: Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States, p. 134.
100 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 88.
101 GH Jansen: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian States, p. 135.
102 DC Thomas: Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 194.
103 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Nonalignment, p. 184.
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fill the vacuum left by the fascist regimes. At the outset, Americans had not thought
about the balance of power in Europe; they continued to be committed to certain
principles - the respect for the right of all peoples to determine freely the composition
of their governments at the conclusion of hostilities and to convince their allies to
postpone the resolution of the difficult political and territorial questions in Europe
until after the war, without thinking very carefully about why they were doing SO.104
In 1945, when the Soviet Union began creating minority governments, American
officials could have defined clearly for the Soviet Union what they hoped the political
future of Eastern Europe would look like and could have spelled out precisely why
they opposed Soviet actions. They could have undertaken to diminish Soviet fears of
a resurgent Germany by keeping their forces in Europe after the war. 105 If this did not
produce Soviet agreement to the holding of free elections, the United States could
have used all its available influence, for instance lend-lease aid and postwar
reconstruction assistance, to ensure the establishment of truly representative
governments. American officials could clearly have informed the Soviet Union that
the United States did not want to threaten Soviet security interests in this part of the
world.l'"
On the other hand, Stalin also had choices to make. As he did not have more than one
party, he could easily have imposed on his country a peaceful co-existence with
Western countries. Communism would then have expanded by democratic means and
not by the violence advocated by Marx or Lenin. As I Jeremy argues, Stalin did not
give up the concept of world revolution; 107 Soviet actions in Europe therefore would
not have been the indicative of Soviet intentions around the world. As a result,
having no mutual way of filling the vacuum, conflict was inevitable.
104 LE Davis: The Cold War Begins, p. 371.
105 Ibid., p. 393.
106 Ibid., pp. 373-374.
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In reaction to this fact, the aim of the new nations that emerged first in Asia and then
in Africa was a firm determination to keep at a distance from the two major blocs.
Standing outside the two alliances gave them a stronger feeling of not being
dominated again by powerful centres of military and economic might. The
interposition of an important zone playing the role of no man's land did, in fact,
restrain the extent and the intensity of the superpower confrontation in the Third
World. Numerous confrontations resulted, but a general confrontation with massive
alignments was avoided.lo8
108 L Mates: Security through Non-Alignment, inBulletin of Peace Proposals, p. 169.
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CHAPTER 3: THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT:
OVERVIEW
A HISTORICAL
The historical roots of the Nonaligned Movement lie in the decade immediately
following the end of the Second World War. The end of hostilities did not, as many
had expected or desired, regenerate a world of peace, cooperation and prosperity. The
outbreak of the Cold War confrontation was the pivotal key player for the formation
of the Nonaligned Movement.
As II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov, socialist scientists, argues, it would be a
mistake to believe that external factors alone are responsible for the emergence of
nonalignment; internal social, political and economic factors also played a part. There
was above all the resolve of the colonial and dependent countries to do away with the
vestiges of foreign domination and gain complete freedom and independence; break
out of poverty, eradicate illiteracy and oppression, raise the working people's living
standard and rebuild society on new democratic principles.' This chapter outlines the
historical process of the newly- independent countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America as they launched a middle ground within this bipolar world order toward
nonalignment. The difference of this policy and neutrality are defined as well as
different goals assigned to the Nonaligned Movement up to the 1998 Durban Summit,
the third in the post-Cold War Era.
3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF AFRO-ASIANISM
The Nonaligned Movement took its origins in "Pan-Africanism" and "Pan-Asianism",
which became thereafter the Afro-Asian Movement. Firstly, "Pan-Africanism" is
generally taken to mean that set of political ideas asserting that Africa is a single
entity which must unite. All the peoples of the continent are fundamentally similar.
Most of them bore the burden of colonialism. The idea of Pan-Africanism first arose
1 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 21.
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as a manifestation of fraternal solidarity among Africans and peoples of African
descent? Itwas introduced to Dr William Dubois, an Afro-American intellectual, by
a West Indian barrister named Henry Williams, who summoned the first Pan-African
Conference in London in mid-July of 1900. In July 25, 1900, a memorial was
addressed to Queen Victoria protesting the treatment of Africans in South Africa and
the then Rhodesia.'
Pan-Africanism was in practice and right from the start, a set of ideas geared to
combating the aggressive policies of colonisers in Africa. The first Pan-African
Congress' resolution in 1919 embraced a variety of themes, but one emerged
particularly clearly. The delegates insisted above all, on the right of the colonised
peoples of Africa for self-determination, their right to own their own lands, and their
right not to be exploited by investment capital. The Congress demanded that the
former German colonies in Africa be placed under international control, a demand
which was later distorted by the League of Nations when it imposed its system of
mandates on countries such as Cameroon, Namibia, Tanganyika and Togo. As a
consequence, a group of African intellectuals, "Liga Africana", emerged in Lisbon
and were looking for reforms. This Liga was the political ancestor of what was later
to become the Committee of Nationalist Organisations in the Portuguese colonies, of
which the PAIGC of Guinea Bissau, the MPLA and Mozambique's FRELIMO were
all members."
Secondly, "Pan-Asianism'' gained its momentum partially from the Japanese victory
over the Russians in 1905. Asian countries gained self-confidence in their struggle to
eliminate foreign rule. Under the direction of Sun-Yat-Tsen, a Pan-Asian front
created out of the Black Dragon Secret Society played a dynamic role in China's
politics. This organisation sought to end European penetration in China and the rest
2 E M'Buyinga: Pan-Africanism or Neo-Colonialism, p. 28.
3 C Legum: Pan-Africanism, p. 25.
4 E M'Buyinga: Pan-Africanism or Neo-Colonialism, pp. 30-31.
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of Asia. Japanese nationalists began thereafter to seek an association for a united
Asia. Indian nationalists also rallied around the cause of Pan-Asianism.i
It is clear that the relationship between Pan-Africanism and the Arabs and Asians is
that of sharing the common experience of the white superiority of colonialism, and of
discrimination," and of wanting to eliminate this foreign rule to gain independence
and unity. These movements, however, remained largely isolated from one another
until after the Second World War, since the colonial powers had maintained their
colonies with links only to the relevant metropolis in Europe. However, despite this
isolation, intellectual elites from Africa and Asia found opportunities for meeting in
European universities. 7
The Bolshevik victory in 1917 also provided the Afro-Asian Movement with an
ideological weapon with which to attack Western colonialism.f Lenin's dictum
against colonialism impressed African and Asian anti-imperialists. Both the
communists and the far-left radicals of Western Europe served as important catalysts
in bringing together the Asian and African nationalists in Europe," For example, in
the Brussels Conference of Oppressed Peoples in February 1927, the Asian and
African participants decided to cooperate in their struggle for independence. In this
sense, the Brussels meeting was the father of Afro-Asian solidarity, and the
forerunner of the conference at Bandung." Among the delegates were Afro-Asian
leaders, such as Jawaharlal Nehru from India, Ho Chi Minh from Vietnam,
Muhammad Hatta from Indonesia, Madame Sun Yat- Tsen from China and Leopold
Sedar Senghor from Senegal.
5 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 37-38.
6 C Legum: Pan-Africanism, pp. 90-91.
7 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 2.
8 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 32.
9 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 3.
10 Ibid., p. 5.
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Many Pan-African congresses were also organised by Dr William Dubois. The
majority of participants were Americans and Indians, but African students in Europe
also took an interest in Dubois' activities, including Jomo Kenyatta and Dr Namdi
Azikiwe of Nigeria. I I This momentum in Afro-Asianism appeared to weaken in the
1930s because of the 1929 Depression and the fascist regimes.l ' and colonial
administrations. For example in Asia, Japan's conflict with China weakened the Pan-
Asian ideals which had been generated mainly by both China and Japan. In addition,
in India Nehru spent long periods in prison, while the Indian National Congress was
occupied increasingly with its own struggle against the British. In Indonesia, the
three leading nationalists, Ahmed Sukarno, Hatta and Soetan Sjahrir spent most of the
1930s in a detention camp.':' However, G Jansen noted that conferences and
manifestoes, strikes and campaigns of civil disobedience became part of the accepted
pattern of life in Egypt and the Arab countries, also in India and Burma (also called
Myanmar), Indonesia and Indochina.I4
The advent of the Second World War brought about fundamental changes in
European colonial power. People in Africa and Asia began to perceive the weakness
of their colonial masters as German armies occupied France. The introduction of
African and Asian troops in this war further undermined Europe's hegemony in its
colonies, by destroying the myth of the Europeans' invincibility." As a consequence,
an Asian conference was held in New Delhi in 1947. The idea of holding a
conference had been fermenting for some time in the minds of several Asian leaders
such as Nehru. Even if this conference brought no tangible results, it marked the
break with Asia's subservience to Europe and provided the opportunity for the leaders
of Asia to assemble and get to know one other. Opening the conference, Nehru said:
"Perhaps one of the notable consequences of the European domination of Asia has
been the isolation of the countries of Asia from one another... As that domination
II D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 9.
12 GH Jansen: Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian states, p. 25.
13 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 8.
14 GH Jansen: Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian states, p. 25.
15 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 51.
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goes, the walls that surrounded us fall down and we look at each other again and meet
as old friends long parted ... But in order to have "One World", we must also in Asia
think of the countries of Asia co-operating together for that larger ideal. ,,16 Thus the
New Delhi conference accelerated the process of inter-Asian cooperation, which was
to lead to Bandung and to the birth of Afro-Asianism.l ' The Africanism was brought
together with Asianism since Africa and Asia had a common heritage of colonial
subjugation and the concomitant struggle for national independence. IS
3.2 BANDUNG OR THE EMERGENCE OF THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY
The Bandung Conference captured the imagination merely by its size. Twenty-nine
delegations came to Bandung in April 1955. According to DC Thomas, the Asian-
African conference was composed exclusively of the poorer and less-developed
countries of Asia and Africa whose people together constituted more than half the
world's population. It was a conference of the non-white nations of the international
community.!" Equally impressive was the reputation of many of the leaders who
came to Bandung: Prime Minister Nehru of India, the senior statesman of Asian
independence; Prime Minister Chou En-Lai, extricating China from diplomatic
isolation; Egyptian and Indonesian Presidents Nasser and Sukamo, representatives of
an emergent neutralism; Princes Nordom Sihanouk of Cambodia and Faisal,
traditional leaders advancing toward growing international roles alongside renowned
nationalists like the Burmese U Nu and Mohammed Ali from Indonesia.2o Did the
combination of personalities heighten the accomplishments of the conference? What
was the aim of this conference? Were the discussions the assertion of independence?
Were they a reaction to the Cold War? Were they the ambition and vision of
16 Asian Relations Organisation, New Delhi, India, 1948, p. 8, in II Kovalenko: The Non-Aligned
Movement, p. 10.
17 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 33.
18 Ibid., p. 18.
19 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 103.
20 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, pp. 6-7.
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individual leaders who wanted to playa strong international role? What was Africa's
role in this gathering? I will be answering these questions.
3.2.1 Motivations, Agenda and Identities of Participants
The preparatory meeting for this conference of newly independent and developing
countries was held in Bogor, Indonesia in December 1954, and was attended by the
prime ministers of five Asian states: Ceylon (as Sri Lanka was known at the time),
Burma, India, Pakistan and Indonesia: They had previously met in Colombo and in
Kandyand it was at these early meetings that the idea of an Asia-Africa conference
was conceived. Mr Ali Sostroamidjojo, the then Prime Minister of Ceylon proposed
that the group of Colombo should hold an Asian-African conference to discuss some
common concerns." At Bandung, it was the first time that a group of former colonial
territories had met together without any of the European powers and, to all those
taking part, this was an assertion of their independence.v'
Two interrelated factors had helped to decide Nehru's mind regarding the need for
having the conference at all. One was the policy of military pacts pursued by the
American Secretary of State, Dulles; the other was the lengthening shadow of
Communist China over Asia. The American policy of containment of the communist
bloc had been largely directed by the events in the Far East. The United States had, in
the preceding two years, gone to the brink of war three times over Asian questions -
in Korea in June 1953, in Indochina in April 1954 and in the Formosa Straits in the
autumn of 1954. By the mid-1950s the United States had created a vast system of
alliances throughout the world, which included forty-two sovereign states. As tension
increased, so did the pressure which Dulles brought to bear on the non-committed
nations, especially those of Asia. Thus, the holding of a conference would be the
reply of the non-committed to the efforts of the West to establish a system of military
21 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 95.
22 B. Vickers: Political History of the Non-Aligned Movement at http://.igd.org.za/nam, on
08/11/2001.
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alliances.v' Secondly, there was in Asia the growing power of Communist China,
which gained new significance after the Vietminh victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954
and the creation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This communist
encroachment created new political tension in South East Asia.24
The Colombo participants saw the conference as an opportunity to lay a firmer
foundation for China's peaceful relations with the rest of the world, not only with the
West, but also especially with themselves and other areas of Southeast Asia peripheral
with China. In Nehru's view, a country's particular ideology should not affect its
membership in the international community and therefore China should participate as
an equal member.f They had also three important objectives: first, avoiding war,
especially between the United States and China; second, developing China's relations
independently of the Soviet Union; and finally, containing Chinese and Vietnamese
military power and influence at the southern borders of China and the eastern
boundaries of Cambodia and Laos, and combating subversive communist activities in
their own countries.26
These countries had also individual objectives. For example, India sought to establish
an "area of peace" between the two superpowers and would seek endorsement of
"peaceful coexistence" by uncommitted countries of Africa and Asia. India sought
also to keep Cambodia and Laos from establishing links with the SEATO, or the
United States. Indonesia attracted attention to the promotion of its case in the dispute
with the Netherlands over the western Guinea issue, while Pakistan saw an
opportunity for building up its position for leadership in the Arab world by
championing Arab grievances against Israel." The Chinese attached importance to
the Bandung Conference because they saw it as an opportunity to be accepted and
23 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 59.
24 Ibid.
25 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 66.
26 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, pp. 61-62.
27 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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recognised by Asia. Furthermore, the Chinese sought to reassure non-communist
Asians that they had nothing to fear from her, despite the communist victory in
Vietnam.28
The participants agreed to discuss economic cooperation, which included the peaceful
use of atomic energy, cultural cooperation, human rights, self-determination and the
question of Palestine. They also considered the problem of dependent peoples,
including discussions on Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco and the problem of peace and
cooperation, including disarmament and weapons of mass destruction/"
However, as far as specific issues were concerned, the alignments within the context
of the Cold War proved stronger than any feeling of Afro-Asian togetherness. The
United States had urged its friends to take a positive and constructive attitude at the
conference, and to resist only proposals that were anti-American. These friends were
listed as the Philippines, Japan, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan,
Ethiopia, Libya and the Central African Federation.3o Regarding Chinese influence,
Iran spoke of subversion and ideological interference; for Pakistan, ideological
domination was a new and more insidious form of imperialism. 31
Another example of the influence of Cold War alignments was that of the idea raised
by Sir John Kotelawala, the then Sri Lankan Prime Minister, to condemn a new form
of colonialism, that of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. This issue provoked many
reactions from socialist countries.Y Chou En-Lai immediately reserved his right to
speak on that issue the following day. Nehru and others anxious to maintain unity
lobbied with Sir Kotelawala through the night to drop his proposal. The Chinese
28 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 101.
29 Ibid., p. 103.
30 GH Jansen: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian states, p. 186.
31 Ibid., p. 284.
32 Ibid., p. 203.
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leader did not accept the assertion of a "new colonialism" by the Soviet Union, while
Mohammed Ali of Pakistan found it unrealistic to condemn French colonialism while
ignoring Soviet imperialism. Iraq and Turkey supported Pakistan's position. Finally,
the participants agreed to condemn all types of colonialism."
The participants at Bandung were heterogeneous and deeply divided in their foreign
policy orientations, due to their colonial past but also due to the bi-polar post 1945-
world system that emerged. For instance, Turkey was a member of NATO and thus
involved in the political and military organisation of Europe. Japan was a highly
industrialised state, having little in common with the developmental needs of the rest
of the Bandung participants. China was the world's most populous state, whose
potential national power placed it much closer to the situation of the great powers than
to that of the Third World. This heterogeneity was only less pronounced among the
remaining 26 participants. Several were formal members of the Western system of
alliances (Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Thailand and the Philippines), while North Vietnam
had a comparable relationship to the communist bloc.34
In contrast to the above, specific African problems received little attention, with the
exception of the issues of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. No particular reference was
made to any of the numerous colonies south of the Sahara.35 What is more, no
African delegation participated on a subcommittee dealing with colonialism, although
most of Africa south of the Sahara was still colonised.36 In regard to Africa, Ethiopia
was the only non-Arab independent African state represented; Ghana, the then Gold
Coast sent observers.f The Ethiopians, Libyans and Liberians generally followed the
pro-West camp, while the delegate from the Gold Coast was hardly heard at all. 38
33 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 112.
34 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, p. 8.
35 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 72.
36 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 1l3.
37 C Legum: Pan-Africanism, p. 39.
38 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 72.
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This was a negative point for the Afro-Asian group. However, in the 1960s many
African countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Liberia, would join the group after the
acquisition of their independence. The equation of Afro-Asian feeling with
nonalignment, as Nehru had envisaged, did not happen at Bandung."
Significantly, at Bandung, the participating countries refused to form a third bloc and
it is important to understand the reasons for this. As L Mates, a political scientist and
diplomat, argues, no single country held such a dominant position as to be able to
claim to be the centre of the bloc, and it is difficult to imagine an organised bloc
without a centre similar to the central powers in the two existing alliances.
Furthermore, a bloc is an organisation based on power politics. It is unlikely that
these countries could impress the outside world with their material power, either
military or economic, and so the creation of a military-political alliance based on little
material power would be entirely unconvincing. Thus, there were no real grounds for
forming a bloc, even had these countries wished to.40 The bloc as military alliance
requires institutionally mature and stable countries. The countries in a bloc must
share a common danger, or assumption that such danger exists, and there must be a
possibility of reaching a consensus on concrete actions in foreign affairs, so that the
bloc organisation could act effectively on day-to-day issues.41 In the case of the
participants at Bandung, it was impossible to unite such scattered countries with
different views.
3.2.2 Achievements of Bandung
Bandung was not entirely negative. As RA Mortimer, a political scientist and B.
Boutros-Ghali, the ex-General Secretary of the United Nations argued, the aspiration
39 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 73.
40 L Mates: Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy, p. 221.
4L Ibid., p. 223.
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to forge a common Third World consciousness emerged from Bandung.T For
instance, China was brought more into the Asian orbit. The real significance of
Bandung was that 29 nations of Asia and Africa had assembled together to discuss
their common future. Bandung symbolised the emergence of a force that could no
longer be ignored. As these new states were admitted at the United Nations, a
fundamental change occurred in the method of forming majorities and minorities in
voting in the organs and bodies of world organisation. Various issues on the agenda
were no longer resolved by an agreement between the two blocs, because there had
appeared a third, independent voting force which was constantly growing. It was no
longer realistic to expect that the world would split up into two military camps."
Bandung informed the world that the newly independent states of Africa and Asia,
though small or medium-sized and developing, were determined not to allow the
major powers alone to decide the future ofhumankind.44
The Asian and African delegations came to the conclusion that effective cooperation
for world peace required that membership in the United Nations be universal. They
asserted that the United Nations as a living organism should grow and evolve in order
to be fully representative of the diversity of the world community. The delegates
appealed for a fair representation of Afro-Asian states in the Security Council. Thus
the Afro-Asian states touched on the question of the democratisation of the United
Nations. Full support was also declared for the fundamental principles of human
rights - as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human
Rights that they should be a common achievement for all nations. They also
supported the principle of self-determination for all peoples and nations.Y A result of
42 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, p. 9 and
B. Boutros-Ghali: The Renaissance of Non-Alignment at http://southrnovement.alphalink.com.au.
43 L Mates: Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy, p. 232.
44 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 67.
45 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 121.
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the Asian-African conference was the adoption by the United Nations of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."
In this regard and in view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the
persistent denial to the people of North Africa of their right to self determination, the
Asian-African conference declared its support for the rights of the peoples of Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence, and urged the French
government to bring about a peaceful settlement of this issue without delay.47
Regarding peace and cooperation, the conference concluded that universal
disarmament and a ban on the production, experimentation and use of nuclear
weapons was imperative to save human civilisation. Delegates acknowledged the
desirability of intra-Asian and African economic and technical cooperation, but they
also acknowledged the difficulty of implementing such goals of self-reliance."
The Conference also announced ten principles of international relations:
First: Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations.
Second: Respect for the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of all nations.
Third: Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large
and small.
Fourth: Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another
country.
Fifth: Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
Sixth: a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the
interest of any big power.
46 NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned
Movement, p. 8.
47 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, pp. 110-111.
48 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
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b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries.
Seventh: Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the
territorial integrity or the political independence of any country.
Eighth: Settlement of all international disputes through peaceful means, such as
negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful
means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations.
Ninth: Promotion of mutual interest and co-operation.
Tenth: Respect for justice and international obligations."
These principles require a brief comment. It is important to notice that the Bandung
Declaration was formulated by both socialist countries such as the People's Republic
of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and capitalist countries such as
Japan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Turkey. Moreover, the conference brought
together countries that had declared themselves nonaligned like Afghanistan, Egypt,
India, Indonesia etc, and those linked to the superpowers by military agreements of
alliance such as Pakistan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Japan.i" Thus this
declaration reflects the idea of belonging to different groups and its principles were
formulated to apply for all time and to all nations."
Firstly, the nonaligned countries at Bandung succeeded in having the Bandung
Declaration confirm the principles of peaceful coexistence: these are the seven
principles of the United Nations. In the order in which they appear in the Charter of
the UN, these principles are: equality and self-determination of nations, cooperation
between states to realise the United Nations' objectives, sovereign equality of states,
49 B. Vinchers: Political History of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at http://www.igd.org.za/nam.
on 08/11/2001.
50 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 40.
51 NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, inG Mills: South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned
Movement, p. 9.
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and conscientious fulfilment of the commitments assumed under the UN Charter.
These principles of peaceful co-existence make incumbent on all countries, as the
Declaration itself said, "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one
another as good neighbors, and to develop friendly cooperation". 52 Thus the
participants at the Bandung Conference made the decision to live in harmony in a
growing hostile Cold War international climate.
Secondly, the nonaligned states, for the first time and on a broad basis, confirmed
what later became known as "the nonalignment principle". At the time of Bandung
Conference, the superpowers were creating military blocs. A general argument
referred to in the context of the treaties creating those blocs was "the right to
individual or collective defense". 53 Those aligned with the United States insisted that
respect for this right should be among the ten principles of the Bandung Declaration
(Principle 5), invoking the UN Charter Article 51 in so doing. Those countries that
were opposed to participation in such blocs managed to ensure that a safeguard
principle was included: the principle intended to protect young states from the use of
the preceding principle that could be used to encroach on the independence and
sovereignty of Afro-Asian countries. The former principle was in essence a demand
being made of the imperialist superpowers, including bloc members: "abstention
from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of
any of the big powers". The latter principle was directed primarily at other countries
participating in military blocs: "abstention by any country from exerting pressure on
other countrics'v" It was therefore not sufficient to denounce the interference of the
stronger in the affairs of the weaker and the use or threat of force, but also to assert
52 Charter of the UN, New York, p. 1, in II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-
Aligned Movement, p. 40.
53 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 41.
54 NA Conferences. Basic Document, 1961-1975, compiled and published by Bandaranaike Center
for International Studies, Colombo, 1976, p.v, in II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.):
The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 41.
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that small and generally threatened countries should have a recognised right to defend
themselves. 55
Soon after Bandung the policy of blocs and the policy of nonalignment with blocs
became so incompatible that the countries that had taken part in the conference were
again divided. Turkey remained in NATO, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan
remained in SEATO; and Iraq, in the Baghdad pact. 56
At the same time, India, Egypt and other countries proceeded along the path of
nonalignment and independence in world politics. Yugoslavia, which was interested
in nonalignment, joined the African and Asian countries. In 1956, Nehru and Nasser
met with Tito on the Brioni Island in Yugoslavia, and together they charted the path
towards nonalignment as a political trend in international activity, which was
ultimately to be broader than an Afro-Asian movement.Y The first conference of
Nonaligned Heads of State, at which 25 countries were represented (from Asia,
Africa, Latin America and Europe) was convened at Belgrade in September 1961.
However, smaller and less powerful countries, such as Cuba, Cyprus and Indonesia,
also played a critical role in the evolution of the Nonaligned Movement.58
3.3 FROM BELGRADE TO BELGRADE: FORMATIVE YEARS,
INSTABILITY AND CONSOLIDATION (1961-1989)
The Belgrade Summit was attended by 26 participating countries and 3 observers.
The working definition of a nonaligned state as accepted at Cairo in June 1961 was
that such a state pursued a foreign policy of national independence based on peaceful
55 L Mates: Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy, p. 243.
56 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 37.
57 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
58 B. Vickers: Political History of the Non-Aligned Movement at http://www.igd.org.za/nam. on
08/11/2001.
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coexistence, supported national liberation movements, and abstained from the
multilateral military alliances (NATO, Warsaw Pact, CENTO and SEATO) and
bilateral alliances with the great powers. 59 These criteria are discussed below and
show that the Movement did not want to be involved in East-West conflict. 60 This
summit conference took place in a period of nuclear testing and increased East-West
tensions over Berlin, Laos, and Cuba. In the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, the then
prime minister, had been murdered and the American Central Intelligence Agency
was implicated as being responsible for his assassination. Wars of national liberation
continued in Vietnam, Algeria and Angola.?'
According to the criteria of nonalignment mentioned above, 16 of the 29 states that
attended Bandung Conference qualified for Belgrade: Afghanistan, Burma,
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sri
Lanka (Ceylon), Sudan, Yemen and the United Arab Republic which in 1961
represented both Egypt and Syria. Half of the Bandung participants were out: in
terms of alignment there were the Soviet allies, China and North Vietnam on the one
hand, and the members of the Western multilateral alliances on the other plus South
Vietnam, Laos, Jordan, Liberia, Libya and Japan. However, there were six new
independent African states: Morocco, Tunisia, Guinea, Mali, Somalia and
Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire). The seventh was Algeria, the only
non-independent state to be invited, which was represented by its provisional
government-in-exile, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA).
The last three participants were Cyprus, Cuba and Yugoslavia. RA Mortimer, a
political scholar, considers the Belgrade participants as a radical group, more inclined
to challenge the Western powers in the developing world.62 I will discuss in this
study that his assertion was correct.
59 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, p. 13.
60 See infra, p. 66.
61 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 81.
62 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, pp. l3-14.
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Considering the strained situation III the early 1960s, the Belgrade conference
delegates made a separate Statement on the Danger of War and Appeal for Peace.63
For this purpose, they made a plea to eliminate foreign military bases and to work for
a universal and complete disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons tests.
Moreover, they emphasised the need to oppose colonialism, neo-colonialism and
racial discrimination and apartheid. The national liberation movements were to be
supported. Furthermore, they pressed for an end to economic inequality and for the
development of effective economic and trade cooperation among developing
countries." The United Nations and its General Assembly were pointed out as the
logical venue for the practical attainment of the objectives set by the nonaligned
agenda. In the decades that were to come, the Belgrade delegates would indeed exert
a meaningful influence in the world organisation." In sum, the Belgrade summit
formulated the goals of nonalignment.
Within three years after this conference, 30 independent states, mostly from Africa,
emerged and joined the Movement. As a result, the voice of the NAM was
increasingly heard at the United Nations and at the major international forums. The
significance of the Cairo Summit in 1964 was the expansion of the NAM's support for
the national liberation movement by defending the legitimate right of a people to take
up arms, if necessary, to obtain independence. In addition, the inalienable right of the
Palestinians to their homeland was made a central objective of the Movement's
activities. The Movement broadened peace efforts by calling for the creation of peace
zones."
Six years were to pass before a third nonaligned summit conference was held. In the
Third World more militant nationalist governments, like that of Mouamar Qaddaffi in
Libya, began to make their appearance. The situation had deteriorated in Palestine,
63 Two Decades of Non-Alignment, p. 9.
64 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 26.
65 P Jevremovic: The Nonaligned Movement, in International Studies, p. 281.
66 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 94.
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Cyprus, several Latin American countries and throughout southern Africa and the
Portuguese African colonies. Owing to this deterioration, the United States made a
massive assault on the Third World in order to control social and political change.
For instance, intensified efforts were made to defeat the Communist Vietnamese by
means of air war. In addition to these external pressures, many nonaligned countries
had to deal with international matters. India, for example, had border conflicts with
China and Pakistan. Activists leaders like Modibo Keita of Mali, U Nu of Burma, and
Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Ceylon were replaced by conservative regimes. However,
the NAM continued to work at the United Nations, its traditional forum, dealing with
peace, disarmament and economic development. 67
The Lusaka Summit was held then in 1970 after a long break of six years. President
Nasser of Egypt did not attend this summit. He was mediating in inter-Arab conflicts
over the Palestinians, and died a few weeks after the Lusaka Summit while still
engaged in this task.68 This conference ended the formative years of the NAM since
it initiated an organisational mechanism within the Movement to co-ordinate
activities.P" As a result, more and more meetings of the nonaligned countries were
held between two summit conferences, either at the level of ministers or high
officials, with general or special topics on their respective agendas. The only
permanent organisational form was the Coordinating Bureau introduced at the fourth
summit conference in Algiers (1973). The centre of its activities was to be the seat of
the United Nations in New York. After the Lusaka Summit, it became customary to
hold summit conferences once every three years. Since that summit, the definition of
nonalignment has been modified at every conference, most often by adding new
elements and expanding the list of priorities of the Movement, depending on the
changes taking place in international relations.Ï"
67 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, pp. 95-96.
68 P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in International Studies, p. 282.
69 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 27.
70 P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in International Studies, p. 283.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
55
Moreover, a concept of and programme for mutual economic co-operation among the
nonaligned, later to be known as self-reliance, was initiated. For the first time,
national liberation movements attended the summit. Consequently, intensive efforts
were made to accelerate the process of decolonisation, and solidarity with the newly
liberated countries in the consolidation of their independence.i'
The 1976 Colombo Summit emphasised to the developed countries the senous
economic situation in the South. The world was not just divided into the East-West
conflict, but also the North-South division based on nonalignment and economic and
social problems. This situation required more involvement by the rich North. This
summit meeting went the farthest in this respect with its projects of cooperation
between nonaligned countriesr" Another important result was the decision to set up a
News Agencies Pool to keep within bounds the West's dissemination of information
in the newly independent countries and to strengthen the national mass media.Ï'' The
Western press has largely ignored the significance of the work of the Movement.
This was a concern since the NAM should be taken seriously so that there can be
more vigorous public support by the governments of developed countries in
cooperating with the NAM.74
The following summit in Havana in 1979 took place in a complicated international
situation. Firstly, the United States sought to prevent the conference from being held
in Cuba and New Delhi due to their stance vis-a-vis the United States.75 Secondly,
the expansion of the Soviet Union created a divisive situation for the nonaligned
countries. This country provided military, political and economic support to certain
newly liberated countries which attained independence in the final, delayed stages of
71 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 27.
72 P Jevremovic: Nonaligend Movement, in International Studies, p. 284.
73 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: The Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 28-29.
74 NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned
Movement, p. 19.
75 MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment, p. 82.
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decolonisation, as well as to regimes ideologically close to the Soviet Union that had
come to power. It is on the basis of this relationship with the Soviet Union that the
so-called radical wing was formed within the Nonaligned Movement. The most
important member was Cuba, one of the founders of the Movement, which led a wide
circle of nonaligned countries and which believed that the Soviet Union could truly be
an ally and pillar of the Movement. Against this group was a silent majority, which
the former Yugoslavia tried to animate and invigorate."
The disagreements of both groups surfaced at the Sixth Summit Conference at Havana
in 1979 since, according to P Jevremovic, a political scientist, the rationality of
political messages was largely lost in verbosity." This conference produced the
longest definition of principles of the policy of nonalignment. The definition included
a long list of old and new enemies of nonaligned countries such as imperialism,
colonialism, neocolonialism, racism (including Zionism), all forms of expansionism
and hegemonism."
During the 1980s, the NAM loose momentum. The greatest threat was the battle for
leadership between Tito and Castro, or between those countries that could tilt toward
the Soviet Union. Another threat to solidarity was the division over oil between
OPEC and Non-OPEC Less Developed Countries." After the culmination of
radicalism the Nonaligned Movement entered a stage of consolidation and at New
Delhi (1983) and Harare (1986) it went back to its normal activities. For instance, a
significant achievement was the "Harare Declaration on the Strengthening of
Collective Action" in furtherance of the political and economic solidarity of the
nonaligned nations. Consequently, a Solidarity Fund for Southern Africa was created
to help frontline states to resist possible retaliation by South Africa since the
76 P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in International Studies, p. 282.
77 Ibid., p. 287.
78 Two Decades of Non-Alignment, pp. 405-406.
79 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 412.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
57
Movement had advised imposing voluntary sanctions against South Africa because of
its apartheid regime and its policy on Namibia.8o
Another summit meeting was held in Belgrade in 1989. Two months after this
meeting the Berlin wall was pulled down. The waning of the Cold War was soon
overtaken by the tum of events in the Soviet Union and East Europe. The Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact disappeared. The security system based upon the balance
of nuclear power of the two superpowers, which had given rise to the Nonaligned
Movement, disappeared. Despite Yugoslavia's political problems and the crumbling
of the country, Yugoslavia's chairmanship brought the summit to a successful end. It
was only later that within the Movement, people started feeling the lack of dynamism
that this country had been instilling in it for decades."
3.4 THE POST-COLD WAR ERA AND NEW AIMS
At the Tenth Foreign Ministerial Conference held in Accra, Ghana, in August 1991,
many participants worried about the future role and position of the Movement in a
changed world. Moreover, there were fears about possible negative effects upon the
developing world in economic matters since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
allies increased the number of countries needing assistance. Nevertheless, it was
decided to retain the name "the nonaligned policy and movement", although one of
the sides from which the Movement had distanced itself was gone."
As the Tenth Ministerial Conference stated, the end of the bi-polar world of the post-
Cold War era required the developing countries, especially the nonaligned countries,
to re-assert themselves, individually and collectively, in order to ensure an equal
participation in the creation of such new relations in the world as would preserve and
80 MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment, pp. 82-83.
81 P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in International Studies, p. 295.
82 Ibid.
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consolidate their independence and sovereignty and protect their political and
economic interests. At the same time, the member countries of the Movement should
identify positive aspects of the changes with the view to taking advantage ofthem.83
At the Jakarta Summit in 1992, these concerns were expressed once again. The
conference found imperative and urgent for the Movement to play its due role in
defining and shaping the emerging international realities, to adapt to change and to
articulate and implement appropriate strategies and approaches. The Movement
decided to participate in the building of the new world order, rather than to leave this
task to the larger political and economic powers.t" Thus at the Jakarta Summit the
NAM changed its approaches and orientation from one that was often viewed as
denunciatory and confrontational to one that was unmistakably conciliatory and
cooperative.f
3.4.1 Environmental Issues
A significant feature of the post-Cold War international system has been the
increasing prominence of common global environmental issues on the global agenda.
The Jakarta Summit stressed that the main environmental problems demanding urgent
action by the international community included the critical life-threatening issues of
climate change, the depletion of the ozone layer, together with the degradation of the
global life support systems, water and air pollution, soil degradation, drought,
deforestation, and the extinction of numerous animal and plant species, acid rain,
marine pollution, the proliferation and mismanagement of toxic products and illegal
traffic in toxic wastes, and the threat posed by the testing of nuclear weapons.t"
83 Tenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, p. 21.
84 P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in International Studies, p. 296.
85 N.S. Sutresna: The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries at http://www.dfa
deplu.go.id/english/gnb.html, on 08/11/2001.
86 Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, p. 27.
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The nonaligned and developing states participated in the negotiations within the Inter-
governmental Negotiating Committee (INF) in Washington, DC, in February 1991.
These negotiations were preliminary to the signing of a treaty at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). However, this 1992 Conference on the
Environment and Development, also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, reflected the fact that developed and developing states had different
agendas with respect to common environmental issues. The developed states wished
to address issues such as ozone depletion and climate change. The developing
countries, however, focused on the relationship between environmental degradation
and underdevelopment. While the Northern States did acknowledge the relationship
between the environment and development, and did pledge to make some financial
commitments, they did not commit themselves to specific measures to reduce their
industrial pollution yet continued to pressure developing states to protect their forests
and wildlife.87
At the 1995 Cartagena Summit, in Colombia, the NAM noted with some concern that
the financial commitments pledged by the developed states at Rio had not yet become
a reality. The Movement called on the developed states to implement Agenda 21,
which was an action plan for sustainable development, through the allocation of
increased financial resources and the adoption of measures to facilitate the transfer of
environmentally sound technologies on terms preferential to the developing states.
The Movement stated again that environmental issues should not be employed to
intervene in the internal affairs of developing states and that additional environmental
conditionalities should not be imposed on developing states.88
Climate change is however an evolving issue on the international agenda. Thus
during the Kyoto Conference in 1997, the Group of 77, which includes the
87 M Chetty: A New Role of the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era, pp. 56-57.
88 Ibid., p. 57.
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Nonaligned Movement, reiterated its stance that it wanted the developed states to take
the lead and make significant cuts to their greenhouse gas emissions. The
significance of the Kyoto Protocol within the evolving issue of climate change is that
it represented the first significant step by the developed states in taking the lead in
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. This positive development however has
been overshadowed by the intransigent position of the United States' Senate, which
announced that it would not ratify the Protocol unless it contained significant
commitments by developing states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.f"
3.4.2 Human Rights
Another issue discussed at Jakarta (1992) was the respect for human rights. The
concern for human rights has been increasing globally since the 1989 Belgrade
Summit. Most member countries of the Movement have clearly been giving
prominence to the respect for human rights, both collective and individual, in national
and international activities. Taking cognisance of the changes in various parts of the
world, and motivated by democratic principles, the Movement called for the full,
unrestricted and unconditional respect for basic human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the inalienable right of peoples under foreign or colonial
occupation to self-determination. The right of each people to establish its own
political system and institutions freely in peace, stability and justice on the basis of
the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in international affairs was also
reaffirmed.Ï"
At Jakarta, the Heads of State or Government urged the international community to
accede to or ratify the Convention on the Rights of Children and to incorporate the
provisions thereof in their respective legislation, with a view to ensuring its effective
implementation. In this connection they stressed that the holding of an international
89 http://www.enn.comlenn-features-archive/1998/03/032698/wwatch.asp, in M Cherty: A New Role
for the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era, pp. 70-7l.
90 Tenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, p. 39.
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sponsors conference on aid to the children of Africa, under the auspices of the OAU
and UNICEF, in Dakar, Senegal, in November 1992, constituted an important step
towards an effective exercise of children's rights." This is all evidence of a changing
agenda, due to a changing world with different problems.
In all, by the end of the Cold War, the Movement continued to deal with all problems
of international concern discussed at the United Nations. Moreover, its membership
continued to increase. From 25 at the first summit, the membership increased to 47 at
the second summit in Cairo, 53 in Lusaka, 75 in Algiers," and the membership
reached 113 in 1998, with 12 Observers and 27 Guest Countries, six Observer
International Organisations and 18 Guest International Organisations. (Observers are
eligible to join the Movement while Guests are interested spectators.") Both Russia
and China have begun to find their links useful, as did states seceding from the former
Soviet Union. For example of the latter's Asian states, both Uzbekhistan and
Turkmenistan are now members. All the former East European countries now have
links with the Movement. A number of Western-oriented countries continued to
maintain links as guests of the Movement, including Australia, Canada and New
Zealand."
3.5 NONALIGNMENT AND NEUTRALITY
There has been a great deal of ambiguity and debate on the concept of "nonalignment"
since it was propounded by Jawaharlal Nehru in his speech on 7 September, 1946 - a
year before India was declared independent. But one former Indian Foreign
Secretary, in 1946, felt that the genesis of nonalignment was found even before
Nehru's statement. This Foreign Secretary pointed out "the principle of nonalignment
91 Tenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, p. 32.
92 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 369.
93 NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned
Movement, p. 9.
94 S Morphet: The Non-Aligned and their 11th Summit at Cartagena in The Round Table, p. 457.
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was accepted by the Congress at Hariputra plenary session in 1939. Here India was
resolved to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with all nations and avoid
entanglement in military and similar alliances which tended to divide up the world
into rival groups and thus, endangered world peace". 95
An extract from Nehru's speech runs as follows:
"In the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow an independent
policy, keeping away from the power politics of group aligned one
against another. She will uphold the principle of freedom for
dependent peoples and will oppose racial discrimination
wheresoever it may occur. She will work with other peace-loving
nations for international cooperation and goodwill without the
exploitation of one nation by another. It is necessary that with the
attainment of her full international status India should establish
contact with all the great nations of the world, and that her relations
with her neighboring countries in Asia should become still closer. ,,96
A few months later, in January 1947, Nehru specified what he meant by the above
ideas, saying that India wanted to remain independent and free of allegiance to any
blocs, and to cooperate with all countries on equal terms"
This independent Indian foreign policy was initially described as ''positive
neutralism" (neutrality). Nehru, however, described it as a policy of nonalignment -
with the military-political blocs of states being drawn into military-political groupings
- and as a struggle for international peace and security, and national and economic
independence."
Was "neutrality", equivalent to "nonalignment"? G Liska, a student in international
relations of the American tradition, suggests that in many ways the Nonaligned
95 RS Yadav: NAM in the New World Order in India Quarterly, p. 62.
96 Keesings Contemporary Archives 1946-1948, p. 8169 India Office Bulletin, in L Mates:
Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy, p. 48.
97 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 22.
98 V Benevolensky: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 76.
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Movement was a contemporary form of the type of neutralism that manifested itself
earlier in Europe and yet it has some distinctive features. He even goes so far as to
suggest that nonalignment was nothing more than the need to satisfy the
psychological, political, and economic interests of the newly emerging colonial
elite.99
As JW Burton, an Australian scholar, argues, it is unfortunate that nonalignment was
originally termed "neutrality". Neutrality is the condition of a country at peace while
others are at war. In international law, the obligations of a neutral government are
abstention from any participation in the conflict and impartiality towards belligerents.
A neutral government must also restrain its citizens from engaging in acts regarded as
violations of neutral obligations, for neutrality affects not merely the State, but also
each of its citizens. In return, the independence and sovereign integrity of a neutral
state are respected by all belligerents. Neutrality properly refers to the policies of
countries such as Switzerland, because Switzerland assumed that in another war it
would seek to preserve its neutrality and so it attracts the term even in time of
peace.IOO For L Mates, a Yugoslav author and former diplomat, neutrality does not
exclude maintaining efficient military forces of an acceptable size. Neutrality
implies, however, abstaining from policies that might antagonise powerful states or
from expressing bias in controversies among them.l'"
According to Nehru, Nasser and Kwame N'krumah, had each selected a policy of
positive neutralism and nonalignment towards either the Communist bloc or the
Western coalition. Each wanted to maintain political independence and freedom of
action in the world of Cold War rivalries. But each maintained that nonalignment did
not mean moral neutrality.
99 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, pp. 381-382.
100 JW Burton: Nonalignment, pp. 21-22.
101 L Mates: Security through non-alignment, in Bulletin for Peace Proposals, p. 169.
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At Bandung, Nehru said:
"I belong to either (bloc) and I propose to belong to neither
whatever happens in the world ... I submit to you, every pact has
brought insecurity and not security to the countries which have
entered into them. They have brought the danger of atomic bombs
and the rest of it nearer to them than would have been the case
otherwise. They have not added to the strength of any country, I
submit, which it had singly. It may have produced some idea of
security, but it is a false security."I02
First, Nehru considered the nonaligned group as a camp of peace and goodwill. For
his part, Nasser refused to become the stooge or satellite of anybody, saying that his
policies may help the cause of peace and end the Cold War. For N'krumah, the
Ghanaian leader, nonalignment could be understood in the context of the atomic arms
race and the Cold War. Thus, nonalignment does not mean indifference to the great
issues of the day and is in no way anti-Western, nor is it anti-Bastern.l'" This is also
Nehru's view since this stance does not mean sitting on the fence, or "equidistance"
from all great powers and their alliances. "There is no question of sitting on the
fence. It is not a middle-of-the-road policy. It is a positive, constructive policy",
Nehru said.104 For Rajiv Gandhi, nonalignment symbolises the courage to be himself,
because it proclaims one's faith in a new kind of world - a world of equals - because
it is a compact with peace. lOS
In Africa and Asia, nonalignment has never meant neutralism or the desire to be left
alone or isolated. It is the assertion of the right of a nation to freedom of decision in
international affairs, and the right to make choices on the basis of the merits of each
102 Prime Minister Nehru: Speech at Bandung Conference, Political Committee at
http://www.fordham.edu/holsalllmod/1955nehru-bandung2.html, on 08/1112001.
103 LW Martin (ed.): Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. 95.
104 Jawaharlal Nehru: India's Foreign Policy, Ministry ofInformation and Broadcasting, Government
of India, Delhi, 1961, in Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 23.
105 R Gandhi: An Overview of Non-Alignment in Black Scholar, p. 38.
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individual issue, regardless of the interests of the Cold War alliances.i'" Again as
Nehru said in 1946 and as was reaffirmed by the leaders of Burma, Indonesia,
Yugoslavia and some other countries, nonalignment was an active policy, which in
given situations required opting out or abstaining, but which always, whenever major
problems were at stake, called for an active position and initiative. The concept of
nonalignment meant much more than a passive attitude. The aim of these countries
was not just to avoid involvement in a conflict, but also to mobilise their forces
against the outbreak and escalation of conflicts and against the formation and
strengthening of the blocs.IO?
According to M Brecher, one of Nehru's political biographers, beyond the above
points, nonalignment contributes to the maintenance of peace and relaxation of
tension; the nonaligned countries had economic motives for adopting this policy.
Brecher, "India's economic weakness and the basic goal of development provide
powerful inducements to the policy of nonalignment. The doors must be open to all
possible sources of aid, Western and Soviet, if desired economic targets are to be
achieved ... Nonalignment is considered essential to the fulfilment of India's economic
revolution, and avoids alienation of India's two powerful neighbors, China and
Russia ..."108
Thus it can be seen that nonalignment meant a different policy for different people at
different times. Further, nonalignment or positive neutralism did not mean the same
as the concept of traditional neutrality, as that concept was known to the European
nations before the world was polarised into two-bloc politics.l'" Traditional neutrality
was a passive, isolationist policy of non-involvement and was generally practised IlO
106 lW Burton: Nonalignment, pp. 56-57.
107 L Mates: Nonalignment, p. 105.
108 M Brecher: Nehru: A Political Biography by P Jevremomic: Nonaligned Movement, in
International Studies, pp. 276-277.
109 RR Ramchandani: NAM and Third World Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 27.
110 P Willets: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 20.
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by stable states. In contrast, nonalignment was practised by new states that rejected
the view that the Cold War is everybody's business and rejected the attempts to have
alien ideas imposed on them. Nonalignment could never stop the participating
countries from agreeing on a policy on major world problems, but their policies on
concrete issues that directly affected their national interests often differed and even
conflicted. II I
The nonaligned states, collectively and explicitly, have rarely given a concise
definition of nonalignment. One of the few occasions at which the Nonaligned have
done so was at the Cairo Preparatory Meeting in June 1961. The Foreign Ministers
proposed the following criteria for invitation to the Belgrade Summit Conference:
(i) an independent policy, based on the co-existence of states with different political
and social systems and non-alignment, or a trend towards such a policy
(ii) consistent support for movements for national independence
(iii) non-membership of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of
the Great Power conflicts;
(iv) in the case of a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or membership
of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately
concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts; and
(v) in case of the lease of military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not
have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts. 112
These criteria of nonalignment show how the nonaligned nations identified
themselves not only according to a lack of military alignment in the Cold War, but
also as characterised by peaceful coexistence and anti-colonialism. The first criterion
shows that the NAM adopted a flexible approach to the question of membership so
that it become not only a Third World or Afro-Asian movement, but also a movement
of countries in Europe and Latin America, be they communist or capitalist. AW
III L Mates: Nonalignment, p. 224.
112 The Non-Aligned Movement at http://www.nam.gov.za.
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Singham, a political scientist and Shirley Hune, a historian, argue that this aspect was
to strengthen the Movement as a permanent force in world politics.113 This flexibility
of membership is a very important statement, as NAM is still in existence after the
Cold War. The second criterion, that of supporting movements for national
independence shows that the movement is not passive. Member states had to support
people struggling for self-determination. But the Movement was opposed to the
recurring use of force in international relations, except in accordance with the UN
Charter. 114 In the last criterion, the NAM does not reject a collective defence as in the
case of the UN Charter, but rejects all the Great Powers' implications to avoid being
involved in the Cold War. But in terms of this principle it is not clear if all Great
Powers' conflicts represent the Cold War. Thus nonalignment must be not merely
nonalignment with respect to Great Powers, but with respect to other nonaligned
countries also. lIS
In all, neutrality involves abstention from all conflicts.i'" whereas nonalignment or
positive neutralism involves only abstention from the Cold War. Thus the countries
gathered at Belgrade were neither anti-Western nor anti-Eastern, but only sought not
to be involved in the Cold War. Nonalignment has not implied neutrality in the anti-
colonial struggle, nor in conflicts between the developing and the developed nations.
In this case, relations between nonaligned and Western countries were sometimes
conflicting. Indeed, the claim has often been made that nonalignment may involve
active participation in Cold War disputes, provided that each issue is decided on its
merits, rather than by regular support of a bloc leader.117
113 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 42.
114 MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment, p. 64.
115 JW Burton: Nonalignment, p. 20.
116 A Lassassi: Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy, p. 10.
117 P Willets: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 20.
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CHAPTER 4: THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE COLD WAR
The Superpowers tended to divide up the world into their own spheres of influence
during the Cold War, and to impose confrontation in all domains, from politics and
the economy to culture and ideology. More threatening was the arms race which
brought humankind to a real brink of terror. Nuclear escalation arose over Berlin,
Cuba, and the Middle East while the Third World became mainly a battleground
resulting from this confrontation. Some of these aspects were discussed at length in
the second chapter. Nonalignment, as P Willets, a British scholar, argues, was
adopted not only because the Third World was struggling against colonialism, but
also because nonaligned countries were not prepared to be involved in the Cold War.
One of the many things that the founders of the Movement, such as Egypt, Yugoslavia
and India, had in common was their opposition to Great Power alliances. Egypt was
opposed to the Baghdad Pact; India was opposed to the Baghdad Pact and to SEATO;
while Yugoslavia was opposed to the Warsaw Pact. I Accordingly, the answers to
these Cold War problems can be found in the careful analysis of the history of its
Nonaligned Movement and their relations with the Superpowers.
4.1 THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE NONALIGNED COUNTRIES
For both America and the Soviet Union, the emergence of the new states and their
adoption of nonalignment have posed challenging tests.' In respect of the Nonaligned
Movement, the United States adopted an ambivalent attitude - of distrust, even
confrontation on the one hand, and of declared support on the other, including holding
identical views on certain matters. These oscillations were primarily due to the fact
that, after the Second World War, all American foreign policy had to bow to the
priority of isolating and containing the influence of the Soviet Union.3 II Kovalenko,
a socialist scientist, describes this American fight against Communism as a means for
I P Willets: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 22.
2 LW Martin (ed.): Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. xvii.
3 P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in International Studies, p. 290.
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the United States to tum independent states into a political appendage of imperialism,
since it was unwilling to accept the independent foreign policy of the states of Asia,
Africa and Latin America in the modem world."
The new nations have also presented the Soviet Union with difficult problems of
adjustment. At the end of the Second World War, the Communists had no adequate
doctrine to deal with the success of national movements in colonial areas' In the
Stalinist era, Soviet strategy had focused on the creation of local Communist parties
rather than on relations with the Third World governments. By the 1960s, however,
Moscow increasingly realised that exclusive reliance on orthodox Communist parties
limited its opportunities for penetration of the Third World.6 There was a clear
danger that the lead in anti-colonialism might be taken over by a force independent of
Communism.Ï Soviet strategy shifted therefore, to support for nationalist regimes and
liberation movements. The new approach was also compatible with Soviet interest in
the NAM, smee ideology no longer prevented the Soviets from working with
nonaligned states like Algeria, which were deeply anti-Western but differed from
Soviet policy.! Due to the difference in ideology between the United States and the
Soviet Union, each manifested different reactions to the nonalignment. It is
interesting to see how role-players in this bi-polar world handled the creation of an
alternative force.
4.1.1 American Policies in the Third World
In the immediate postwar years, American attention was focused chiefly on Europe,
although there was a preoccupation with the Communist take-over of China. The
4 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 199.
5 LW Martin (ed.): Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. xix.
6 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, pp. 194-195.
7 LW Martin: Neutralism and Nonalignemnt, p. xix.
8 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, pp. 194-195.
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Truman administration gave principal priority to Europe and did not try to develop an
integral approach towards developing countries and thereby, nonaligned nations. As
far as Africa and South Asia were concerned, Americans regarded decolonisation with
favourable emotions, based on dubious analogies with their own history."
Thereafter, the United States, recognising that the nations of Africa and Asia could no
longer be considered as colonies, faced the danger that these new nations could aid
the Communist powers, either by joining them or by independently undermining
Western interests. Thus, in the early 1950s, nonalignment was not welcomed by
American officials, who described it as immoral and nonsense.i'' On the other hand,
military intervention by the Dwight Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) in Iran
(1953), Guatemala (1954) and Lebanon (1958), as well as the alliances of the Dulles
era, all intended to curtail Communism, were seen as menacing by states moving
toward nonalignment. CENTO and SEATO in particular, brought the Cold War to
the Third World. II
The Eisenhower administration saw in Bandung Conference a vehicle for the
extension of Chinese, and ultimately Soviet influence, and opposed the conference
from the outset. As stated earlier, Washington nevertheless encouraged friendly states
that attended, namely Pakistan, Turkey, and the Philippines, to refute criticism of the
West. In a frequently quoted speech of June 9, 1956, Dulles labelled the idea of
nonalignment or neutrality as "an immoral and shortsighted conception" equating it
with "indifference to the fate of others".12 He postulated a bipolar world in which
those not actively assisting the West in its fight against Communism were regarded as
9 LW Martin (ed.): Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. xvii.
to RS Yadav: NAM in the New World Order, in India Quarterly, p. 49.
II RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, pp. 210-211.
12 Ibid., p. 211.
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hostile, and the favoured form of assistance was an alliance.13 This was in the period
when Dulles was concerned with the creation of alliances in Asia to contain
communist expansion, especially with countries bordering on the Soviet Union.14
On the other hand, there were those in the United States who favoured a careful
approach to nonalignment. Among them was the then American ambassador to India,
Chester Bowles. Together with other bourgeois liberals, they regarded India's
nonalignment slogans as a desire on the part of the Indian government to refrain from
active participation in world affairs while the young states were being formed.
Furthermore, they regarded India as a possible model for tearing the socialist
countries of Europe and Asia from the Soviet Union in the future."
Summing up American policy toward the Nonaligned Movement during that period,
progressive Indian publicist, Hari Jaisingh, writes: "it was in the context of this anti-
Communist hysteria in the United States, led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, that the
nationalism of the newly independent countries, with its anti-imperialist stance, came
to be identified with Communism. No one in America, not even Eisenhower, dared
challenge these new forces of the ultras in America and everyone took cover under
some anti-communist organisation.t'"
The early 1960s saw anew stage in the United States' relations with nonaligned
countries. By that time some aspects of the American position required a new
approaches toward nonaligned concepts. This 1960s' shift, as II Kovalenko argues,
was connected above all with general changes in the world regarding armed forces.
13 Commencement address delivered at Iowa State College, 9 June 1956, reprinted, in the New York
Times, 10 June 1956, quoted from P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in
International Studies, p. 290.
14 V Benevolensky: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 13.
15 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 201.
16 Non-Aligned Conferences: Basic Documents 1961-1965, in II Kovalenko and RA
Tuzmukhamedov: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 204.
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During the 1950s, the defence potential of the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries strengthened considerably; the Soviet army acquired powerful nuclear
delivery vehicles, which directly threatened American territory and cast doubt on the
value of the military bases and blocs that were being created around the territory of
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. I?
Moreover, American allies among the former colonising countries did not support
Washington's effort to combat the Nonaligned Movement. They wanted to maintain
relations with their former colonies and the Nonaligned Movement was not a great
obstacle for them. Furthermore, membership of the Movement was increasing among
the young countries themselves. The influence of these new ideas began to carry
great political weight and therefore required a more careful approach to American
officials.I8
The United States renounced hostile pronouncements with respect to the Nonaligned
Movement and used a different tactics. Already in the late 1950, different
government and research bodies in the United States undertook an in-depth study of
the problems of preserving the position of capitalism in Asian and African countries
and worked out measures capable of resisting the pressure of communism on these
countries. The John F. Kennedy administration (1961-1963) quite explicitly
concluded that a policy of independence on the part of the new states would
adequately serve American interests. Kennedy expressed this opinion in his policy
statement of 1962 when he spoke about the need to gain new frontiers and to revise
some of the old-fashioned ideas of the world.I9
American president Kennedy and his supporters viewed the Nonaligned Movement as
largely objective in character. They regarded it principally as a desire on the part of
the young countries to be equidistant from the two world systems and not to be
17 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 205.
18 Ibid.
19 V Benevolensky: The Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 94-95.
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involved in their conflicts in the world arena. Consequently, the most influential
nonaligned countries, such as Egypt and India, received generous aid from the United
States.20 According to V Benevolensky, this aid was a means of the United States to
preserve and strengthen as far as possible the dependence on the emergent states and
to consolidate American positions at the expense of former colonial powers."
The Belgrade Summit seemed therefore preferable to Bandung, excluding the Chinese
and enhancing Yugoslavia's independence from Moscow. As a result, President
Kennedy sent an encouraging message to the conference. Nevertheless, the United
States' reaction was negative, since the summit failed to condemn Soviet violation of
the moratorium on atomic weapons testing or to take a firm position on the Berlin
wall. But the Belgrade Summit criticised the United States for example, because of
its base of Guantanamo in Cuba.22
Due to the American fiasco in the Bay of Pigs as well as the Cuban missile crisis, the
United States limited its enthusiasm for dealing with an organization of which Cuba
was a founding member. Furthermore, early Third World gatherings had been
exclusively Afro-Asian, but expanded at Belgrade to include Cuba, as well as
observers from Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador, posed a potential threat of the gravest
concern to American interests in Latin America.r'
The policy followed by Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1968),
differed sharply from one of "reconciliation" with nonaligned countries. Firstly, the
United States launched an attack on Indo-China, rousing the indignation of the whole
world, including the nonaligned countries. Secondly, the United States was
displeased at the results of the second nonaligned summit in Cairo, which deplored
20 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 206.
21 V Benevolensky: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 95.
22 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, p. 211-213.
23 Ibid.
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American influence in Indo-China, the Congo and Cyprus, and opposed the
deployment of foreign troops in the territory of other countries against the will of
those countries.t" The United States' attempt to lobby in several Latin American
capitals against attendance of this summit was a failure. This persistence and
enlargement of the NAM were cause of concern in Washington.f
In the late 1960s, when it became clear that the United States was to suffer defeat in
Vietnam and in the conditions of a changed alignment of forces in the world,
American administration was forced to revise all aspects of its foreign plicy, including
relations with the Soviet Union, to reconsider the terms of partnership with the West
European countries and Japan and to devise new forms of relations with the
nonaligned states. According to the Nixon Doctrine, the American tactic of the period
did not envision American withdrawal from those regions. American administration
intended to change the balance of world forces in their favour, particulary with the
help of the regimes dependent on it economically, and by tying developing countries
to Western powers. This tactic influenced some of the nonaligned countries, and the
positions they adopted, attempted to undermine the anti-colonialist nature of
resolutions passed by the nonaligned.r"
Some people believe that in Vietnam the United States was trying to teach the entire
national liberation movement a lesson, to demonstrate its strength and convince
nonaligned countries of the need to follow in the wake of American policy.27 Thus,
Richard Nixon's administration (1969-1974) underestimated the role of the
Nonaligned Movement in the modem world and ignored it as a foreign policy factor.
RL Jackson, an American analyst and former diplomat, in a rare study on the
Nonaligned Movement published in the United States admits the fact that the policy
24 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 207.
25 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, p. 212.
26 V Benevolensky: The Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 98-99.
27 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: The Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 207-208.
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of the United States, as well as of the industrialised countries, contributed to the
intensification of anti-West and radical feelings among nonaligned countries.f
As the Movement was hostile to American interests and was the largest political bloc
at the United Nations, President Gerald Ford (1974-1977) and Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger initiated a new tactic, which consisted of responding to attack by
counterattack in order to break the Movement up. Both groups confronted each
another at the United Nations without the expected results. The NAM's demise did
not happen, in contrast NAM radicals and the Soviets portrayed the United States as
the number one enemy of the Third World.29
Between 1974 and 1975, the nonaligned countries launched an offensive for their
rights with concerted demands for the New International Economic Order. 30 The
Ford administration, unable to oppose all the developing states' demands, declared
that their actions were simply a result of Soviet "subversion". Further, the Americans
tried to demand that the Soviet Union ends its support for the liberation movements
on the Indo-Chinese peninsula, in southern Africa and in the Middle East, arguing that
they were not in keeping with the "spirit of détente".3l Kissinger was forced by the
oil price shock and the Algiers Summit to recognize the Movement's impact and
adjust American policy to take it more fully into account. Speaking at New Delhi in
October 1974, he recognized nonalignment and declared that American relations with
the Movement would be another pillar of American foreign policy."
A more moderate approach was therefore adopted in the late Ford administration.
This administration was coming to an end and the American government was in the
28 P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in Internatinal Studies, p. 291.
29 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, pp. 214-215.
30 See infra 5.3.3, p. 130.
31 II Kova1enko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 209.
32 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, p. 214.
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process of regaining the executive authority lost temporarily as a result of the
Vietnam War and the Watergate crisis. In this transition period, the influence of the
"hawks" in the American government was reduced for a time, limiting direct military
intervention in the Third World.33 Regarding a new approach, the United States
consulted with selected nonaligned states in their capitals or in the United Nations.
This consultation was effected mainly before the 1976 Colombo Summit. As a result
of this rapprochement, the anti-American sections increased the number of
reservations on the issues such as Korea and the Middle East at this conference."
The Carter administration (1977-1981) continued a moderate American foreign policy
in respect of the Nonaligned Movement. President Jimmy Carter had begun
implementing such intentions as reducing tension with the Soviet Union, limiting
military growth, and promoting a multi-polar view of the world through developing
ties with other capitalist countries like Western Europe and Japan. Regarding the
Third World, he attempted to improve America's image with progressive and
moderate Third World countries by retreating from complete support of oppressive
military regimes through linking aid with human rights." Overall, the Carter
administration was aware that the NAM represented a diplomatic entity capable of
independent actions which could influence American foreign policy objectives"
Another result of American moderation was that President Tito of Yugoslavia was
welcomed at the White House in March 1978. Both Presidents shared the view that
the nonaligned countries could and should make an active contribution to the
resolution of international problems and to the more favourable evolution of
international relations. AW Singham interpreted the difference in the treatment by the
United States of Cuba and Yugoslavia, two original members, which were also the
oldest socialist countries within the Movement, as an intention to divide the
33 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 149.
34 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, p. 215.
35 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 169.
36 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: The Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 210-211.
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coalition.V For RL Jackson, an American political scientist, after the 1960s,
American policy toward the NAM was changing. But a change of mind in American
policy did not necessarily correspond to developments within the NAM.38 For
example, the Carter administration attempted rapprochement at the moment when, in
the Horn of Africa, Cuban troops and Soviet supplies assisted Ethiopia in its struggle
with Somalia during the détente period." This administration questioned, therefore,
Cuba's credentials as a nonaligned country and its capacity to be chair.4o These
Cuban-Soviet involvements in the Third World again aggravated American relations
with the Movement.
Under the Reagan administration (1981-1989), American policies and actions towards
the Third World and the nonaligned nations were considered by MS Rajan, an Indian
political scientist, so outrageous and pathologically self-righteous that they were
utterly self-defeating and self-deceptive." This administration also linked the
Nonaligned Movement to Soviet influence. As the latter had benefited from the
détente to increase its armaments and its influence throughout the world, the Reagan
administration adopted a strong strategy against the Movement. Moreover, the
Reagan administration stepped up its subversion of the Movement in the early 1980s
because the Movement's stance for a new economic order and its anti-imperialist
slogans were becoming increasingly advanced. The disbandment of the SEATO bloc
in 1977 and the liquidation of the CENTO bloc in 1979 following the anti-shah
revolution in Iran were severe blows for the American administration.42
One of the American strategies to weaken the Movement was an anti-Cuban
campaign launched by the American administration. Cuba was the then chairman and
37 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 179.
38 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, p. 224.
39 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 317.
40 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 163.
41 MS Raj an: The Future of Nonalignment, p. 103.
42 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 212-2l3.
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succeeded in mobilizing a radical anti-Western group in the Movement.43 The United
States mounted a campaign aimed at isolating Cuba from the other nonaligned
countries. The Cuban administration was described as a centre of international
terrorism, spreading its policy among other nonaligned countries and discrediting the
Movement's leadership."
At the United Nations, officials of the Reagan administration initially followed a
policy of not dealing directly with or even referring to the NAM in order not to further
improve and legitimize its status in the United Nations system. Instead, American
delegates attempted to work with regional groups or directly with individual
countries.Y The Reagan administration has also made it clear that the voting
practices of countries at the United Nations would be taken seriously and that the
United States aid policy would be guided by their voting pattern." But group
dynamics at the United Nations were by then too strong, and the integration of
regional groups within the structure of the NAM too advanced, to reverse these
trends.Y
Another American reaction was to counteract nonaligned support to member countries
with regard to their sovereign right, their own form of development, and foreign
relations. President Reagan announced in a speech that he was diverting additional
funds to the Caribbean and Central American regions, to assist local groups in
opposing liberation movements, which were being instigated by external interests,
largely Marxist-Leninist groupings. The nonaligned, on the other hand, argued that
the crisis in Central America was brought about by "the traditional repressive power
structure and by national economic structures that produce poverty, inequality and
misery", aggravated by "interference and interventions since the end of the 19th
century". Reagan's warning of retaliation against governments in the region and his
43 P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in International Studies, p. 286.
44 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 46.
45 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, p. 219.
46 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 49.
47 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, p. 219.
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claim of Central America and the Caribbean as the "fourth border" of the United
States alarmed many heads of states.48
Jackson's study includes the famous letter of October 6, 1981 sent by Ambassador
Jeanne Kirkpatrick to 64 Permanent Representatives of the nonaligned countries to
the United Nations, addressing the behaviour of the nonaligned countries at their
meeting, especially the discrepancy between their nonaligned behaviour and their
behaviour at the United Nations. This letter pointed out that a nonaligned
communiqué of September 28, 1981 criticised the United States no less than "nine
times by name and dozens of times by implication" while refraining from any mention
of the Soviet Union despite "continuing military occupation of Afghanistan,
Kampuchea, Chad - all with the support of the USSR". This declaration did not,
according to her, represent an "accurate reflection" of most governments' positions,
and that they should therefore, dissociate from this and future unbalanced NAM
positions.V
The Kirkpatrick letter was considered by RL Jackson, an American political scientist,
as the "first" instance of the United States initiating official recognition of the
organisation's role and the attention paid to it by the United States. Reaction to the
letter varied. For instance, Malawi, Saudi Arabia, Saint Lucia and Tunisia pointed out
their absence from the meeting. Others reported that they had dissociated themselves
from the nonaligned communiqué. However, this letter had two positive effects. It
helped to persuade the non-activist majority of the Movement that NAM's position
should be taken seriously in a wider context, including its relations with the United
States. It also demonstrated that the United States took the Movement seriously and
treated its positions as the considered product of mature and sovereign states.i"
48 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 326.
49 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN the Superpowers, p. 220.
50 Ibid., pp. 220-221.
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During the 1983 Delhi Summit, many observers took the View that India would
promote a more moderate and constructive nonaligned position than Cuba. The
expectation of officials within Reagan administration was that India would help guide
the Movement back to the normal approaches of nonalignment of a previous period.
Furthermore, it was anticipated that this kind of nonalignment would be less anti-
American. President Reagan himself sent a congratulatory letter to Mrs Indira Gandhi
indicating the long-term commitment of the United States to the principles upon
which nonalignment is based."
As the Delhi Conference of 1983 centred on how to counteract the activities of
imperialism and neocolonialism against the nonaligned countries, Washington tried to
influence the conduct of the conference itself and the drafting of its documents in a
direction that suited the United States. Even though the New Delhi Summit was less
anti -Western and less radical, this attempt failed. American reaction was to refuse to
purchase some traditional Indian goods, textiles in particular, while the Asian
Development Bank, in which Americans have considerable influence, refused to grant
loans to India.52
The United States was also unhappy with the condemnation pronounced on it by the
1986 Harare Summit. To show its displeasure against Zimbabwe, the new American
government cut off a substantial part of its aid during the summit.53 The
documentation used during this study does not indicate the American position after
Zimbabwe's chairmanship. But, MS Rajan, an Indian political scientist, indicates that
in the 1990s, the Great Powers were no longer hostile to the policy of nonalignment.
They tolerated this new foreign policy as during a détente period. 54
51 AW Singham: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 308.
52 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement,p. 216.
53 MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment, pp. 103-104.
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After the Cold War, the American attitude was not very positive. The former
American ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, tried to divide the
Movement. He asked African countries to reconsider their association with the
Nonaligned Movement, "1 have not seen a single issue in which Nonaligned
Movement positions actually benefited the Africa group.,,55 This stance was
motivated mainly by the Movement's position in the North-South dialogue and its
numerical influence at the United Nations.56
4.1.2 The Soviet Union's Tactics in the Third World
At the outset, Stalin, with the famous "those who are not with us are against us"
stance, did not trust nonalignment.Y However, long before the Nonaligned
Movement came into being, the Soviet Union resolutely defended the right of all
nations to self-determination58 and welcomed anti-colonialism as an attack on the
back of the capitalist enemy and an opportunity for Communists to infiltrate the
colonial areas. But it conceived no special role for the emerging national regimes.i"
Diverse aid was given by world socialism to several national liberation movements,
which subsequently gave birth to the Nonaligned Movement. 60
After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union adopted a more active diplomatic
strategy in the Third World. It became less exclusively orientated towards Europe in
its policies since the Soviets found that the countries which came into the greatest
opposition with the United States would seek to improve relations with the Soviet
55 D. Thalif: NAM fights against divide and rule at http://www.is.lk/times and
D Thalif: Holbroke told off, in New African, p. 13.
56 See infra, 5.3, p. 126.
57 RS Yadav: NAM in the New World Order, in India Quarterly, p. 49.
58 V Benevolensky: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 110.
59 LW Martin (ed.): Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. xix.
60 V Benevolensky: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 110.
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Union. Moreover, as the number of new nations was also growing rapidly, and the
majority of them chose to remain nonaligned, at best a reevaluation could result in
closer cooperation against "imperialism and colonialism".61
In this regard, Moscow endorsed the pacific coexistence strategy of new nations in
1955, and although excluded from the Afro-Asian conference, because the Soviet
Union was not an Afro-Asian country, it commented favourably on the results of
Bandung. In contrast to the silence from Washington, Soviet President Kliment
Voroshilov and other officials sent greetings to Bandung and, in its aftermath, worked
closely with China to gain a foothold in the new grouping. This support was viewed
in the West as a strategy of exploiting the Movement to destroy the capitalist system
for Soviet interests.62
Despite the Soviet campaign for influence in the Third World, the Nonaligned
Movement appeared to Moscow as more of a threat than an opportunity. By 1961, the
Soviets were somewhat disillusioned with the lack of Third World support at the
United Nations for Soviet positions on the Congo crisis, Lebanon, and the
replacement of the secretary-general with a troika system. A further negative factor
for the Soviets was the early preeminence of Yugoslavia among the nonaligned.P'
Tito had used nonalignment as a strategy to implement an independent foreign policy
in Europe.i" an area which the Soviet Union wanted as a buffer zone for its own
security.
The inclusion of conservative states like Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco and Ethiopia
was also a concern for Moscow. At the Cairo Summit (1964), the Soviet press was
favourable since the Movement was considered as a vehicle to limit Chinese influence
61 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 8.
62 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, p. 192.
63 Ibid.
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in the NAM. Relations between the Soviet Union and China developed into an open
rupture, beginning in 1959. In the 1960s, the Cuban missile crisis was a Soviet
expansion in the Third World. The Soviet Union changed deeply its vision toward the
nonaligned countries in the 1970s, since strident nonaligned criticism of the United
States and the rest of the West on the issues of the Middle East, southern Africa, and
economic reform, which dominated the United Nations agenda, coincided closely
with Soviet long-term goals. The Movement became, in Moscow's view, a positive
mechanism to be used to isolate the United States and to gain acceptance for Soviet
global aims.65
It is also my opinion that Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Movement was a means of
gaining a foothold in the new nations. For instance, after the Algiers Summit of 1973,
the Soviet Union often oriented its positions to give the impression of identifying with
the interests of the nonaligned. In this regard, the Soviet Union, together with the
Movement, supported the idea of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. This Plan would
close down American and British bases at Diego Garcia, and would also block further
Soviet use of naval facilities at Massawa, Aden, Perim Island, Assab, Socotra and the
Dahlak Islands. Yet knowing that agreement is highly unlikely, Moscow has
consistently backed the plan in order to win nonaligned favour and to draw attention
away from Afghanistan."
The Soviet leaders encouraged the nonaligned nations to adopt a political programme
that would conform to Soviet strategic interests in the Third World. For instance, at
the beginning of the Colombo Summit Conference in 1976, Soviet observers
expressed concerns about press rumors, that some states intended to propose the
candidatures of states that were either members of military blocs or maintained broad
military and political relations with the United States and Britain, such as Australia,
New Zealand, Portugal, Pakistan, Turkey, South Korea and China. Those in favour of
this proposal argued that the inclusion of such countries in the Movement would assist
65 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, pp. 193- 194.
66 Ibid., pp. 195-196 and for the Indian Ocean See infra 5.2.2, p. 113.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
84
in the dissolution of the blocs. The Soviet response was that this could lead to a
breakup of the Movement into contradictory groupings.l"
Political circumstances in Africa during the 1970s encouraged Soviet exploitation of
regional conflicts, and the Soviets gained wide-spread approval among African states
because they helped to defend national frontiers in Ethiopia, for instance, and to
support the cause of black majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.
However, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan cost the Soviet Union loss of confidence
and friendship among the nonaligned. This crisis contributed to the re-emergence of
political issues and to the military factors of the Cold War impacting on the
Nonaligned Movement. Moreover, the Afghanistan Crisis was the final blow to
Cuban efforts to implement the thesis of the Soviet Union as a "natural ally" of the
nonaligned nations. Many leaders in the Movement began to equate Soviet expansion
and intervention in Afghanistan with Western imperialism.Ï"
By early 1980 the Soviet Union accused the nonaligned nations of ignoring the
activities of members whose foreign policies, in many respects, contradicted the
principles of nonalignment. The American military agreements with Egypt, Morocco
and Saudi Arabia, and Western military bases in nonaligned states were referred to by
the Soviet Union as evidence that easing the criteria of entry into the Movement had
had a negative effect on the Movement's effectiveness.69 But these bases had not
been established against each country's will. On the other hand, the Soviet Union
vindicated the continued membership of Afghanistan in the Nonaligned Movement
after the entry of Soviet troops into this country. Moreover, the United States
increased its presence in the Third World due to the Soviet Union which used détente
to its advantage to increase its armaments and its presence outside of Europe."
67 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 38.
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In the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, was eager to continue détente and
supported the NAM's goal. He proposed that every permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council should assume an obligation not to draw the newly-
independent states into military blocs. This action would help to remove tension and
promote the peaceful settlement of a number of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin
America. A Soviet specialist had even proposed unofficially that global détente be
secured through "Nonalignment Pacts".71
The question is to discern which strategy was used by the Soviet Union to implement
its policy vis-á-vis the NAM. To succeed in its policy toward the Third World,
Moscow selected the largest and most powerful countries such as Egypt, India,
Indonesia and Algeria. They received large-scale Soviet military and economic
assistance and their leaders were called regularly to Moscow in the 1970s, during the
détente period, where the more compliant were rewarded with Lenin Peace Prizes.
But, the complexity and size of these states made them resistant to Soviet control and
denied Moscow a direct voice or input within the Movement.f
Cuba was vulnerable to Soviet influence because of the Bay of Pigs invasion. With
this country chosen as an instrument, Moscow broadened its base at the Colombo
Summit with the membership of Vietnam, North Korea, Angola, and the Palestine
Liberation Organisation. In addition to these countries, there were Afghanistan,
Grenada, Laos, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Yemen and Syria. This
group represents an evolution in Soviet strategy toward the Nonaligned Movement
away from concentration on the largest states and toward reliance on smaller, but
controllable members. They were called to block consensus on positions damaging to
Moscow foreign policy. For example, Cuba was able, in its chairmanship, to limit
damage to Moscow from the latter's invasion of Afghanistan and to promote support
71 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 182.
72 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, p. 197.
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for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. All 12 countries opposed a General
Assembly resolution calling for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1982.73
In all, Communist expansion led the United States to adopt some policies toward the
Third World. Most of the time, the United States was portrayed as an enemy of the
NAM. However, American strategies toward the NAM changed and sometimes
without necessarily corresponding to the developments within the NAM. For
instance, the Carter administration attempted rapprochement at a time of maximum
Cuban and Soviet influence. On the other hand, the Soviet Union found in the
Movement an ally and used the NAM to express their criticism of the United States
on the issues of the Middle East, southern Africa, and the New International
Economic Order.
4.2 THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT FACING SOME COLD WAR
CONFLICTS
At issue here is a discussion of the duty chosen by the Movement, to tackle some
acute problems provoked by the Cold War. The conflict that most fully engaged the
attention of the nonaligned group in the 1960s was the dispute over Berlin and the
political configuration of Germany. The strategy normally adopted by the nonaligned
countries in dealing with the dangers posed by Great Power rivalry was: first, to
encourage negotiations between the Superpowers and, where possible, to create a
nonaligned communication link between them; second, to strengthen collective
security arrangements at the global and regional levels, and finally, to work for
general and complete disarmament." The degree of success of these strategies as
dealt with in this chapter does not concern the disarmament issue, which is discussed
in the last chapter of this study.
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4.2.1 Germany and Negotiation as a Strategy
The problems of Germany and the city of Berlin arose during the Second World War.
The Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945, which divided Germany among the
victorious allies into four zones of military occupation: British, French, Soviet and
American, also divided the city of Berlin, the capital of all Germany before this
event. 75 Even though the United States, France and Britain had discussed
dismembering Germany into several small states as late as their meeting at Yalta, in
the following months all three would commit themselves to keeping Germany as one
unit." France wanted to keep Germany weak to safeguard itself from another
occupation, while the Soviet Union wanted a strong central government in Germany
able to pay larger reparations to the Soviet Union for Germany's previous attacks.Ï"
The State Department planners had argued that practically there could be no stability
in postwar Europe, if Germany remained divided. Experiences of the interwar years
had seemed to show that the Germans would never accept permanent partition of their
countryr" Thus the United States and Britain were opposed to reparations for the
Soviet Union and the United States stopped paying them from the American zone in
May 1946. This cessation resulted from the fact that the Soviet Union had begun to
organise its zone according to the Eastern European pattern." Moreover, the Soviet
Union rejected the idea of a disarmed Germany. This negative response from
Moscow seemed to confirm the fears of those who had argued that the Soviet Union's
determination to impose spheres of influence reflected offensive rather than defensive
intentions. Consequently, the Americans planned the consolidation of a defensible
Western position in Germany.Ï"
75 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 63.
76 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 53.
77 Ibid., p. 63.
78 JL Gaddis: The Long Peace, p. 53.
79 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. SS.
80 JL Gaddis: The Long Peace, p. 54.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
88
The United States' proposition to merge different zones was accepted, first by Britain,
and secondly by France. This process illustrated that consensus as to Germany was in
the process of disintegrating entirely and the United States had assumed leadership in
Western countries. Thereafter, a constitutional assembly was to be convened and a
federal Germany government to be established for the three Western zones. In return,
agreement was reached that the Ruhr, the major industrial area, should have an
international controlling authority."
Seen from Moscow, these developments were threatening. The Soviet Union was
excluded from the Ruhr and from most of Germany. In June, the Western powers
implemented a monetary reform which made unmistakably evident that Germany was
no longer an economic unit. Western Germany would be integrated into Western
European cooperation. The Berlin blockade was Moscow's response to these events.
All rail, water and highway routes through East Germany to West Berlin were
blocked by the Soviet Union.82 Washington believed that Moscow's basic intention
was to throw the West out of the city. But, for General Lucius Clay, commanding
general of the American zone, if the United States gave in on Berlin, it would
dishearten its supporters elsewhere.V However, the Western countries saved West
Berlin by means of an airlift. 84 Khrushchev was afraid of the West German
chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who wanted to reunite Germany. A unified Germany,
armed with nuclear weapons and supported by the United States, would be a threat to
the Soviet Union.85
The situation deteriorated when the Soviet Union grounded an American spy plane
over the Soviet Union. Khrushchev again made demands to Kennedy for a peace
81 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 57.
82 Ibid.
83 BA Weisberger: Cold War Cold Peace, p. 91.
84 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 72.
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treaty and recognition of East Germany. The American president refused to lose
Western occupation rights over Berlin and the Soviet leader then threatened Kennedy
with the calamitous consequences of nuclear war. The American administration
increased its defence spending and armed forces and rejected the Soviet calls for
talks.86
What position did the Nonaligned Movement take towards this East-West conflict?
The answer is that they did very little. Although the Final Communiqué of the
Bandung Conference in 1955 did not mention the German question, Tito had already
referred to the issue of German reunification during this conference. In his belief, it
was necessary "to give the Germans themselves the opportunity to express their own
views". He predicted that they would find "their own form of democracy, which may
be neither purely Western nor purely Eastern". As chairman of the Belgrade
Nonaligned Summit in 1961, Tito delicately steered clear of this topic.87
On the other hand, The Nonaligned Movement worked out its own view on the
German question. The declaration finally agreed on at Belgrade was circumspect,
since it only called upon the parties concerned not to threaten or resort to the use of
force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin.88
In addition, the Belgrade conference made a separate statement at the suggestion of
Nehru that was directed at the United States and the Soviet Union, that they might, in
an age of nuclear weapons and the possibility of total global destruction, immediately
suspend their preparations for war and begin negotiations for disarmament and
peace.89 Furthermore, the nonaligned states deputised Nehru and Nkrumah to
Moscow and Sukarno and Modibo Keita of Mali to Washington on a peace mission.
86 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 174.
87 RAllison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 80.
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The text of both messages delivered to the Superpowers' leaders was identical and
appealed to them for direct negotiations, since that continuing strained East -West
relations contributed to a general deterioration of the global situation.ï" This message
probably had only a marginal effect on the outcome of the crisis, but Khrushchev
replied to the letter, reaffirming that the Soviet Union would be prepared to negotiate
towards a German peace treaty and a normalisation of the situation in West Germany
on this basis.91 Another serious crisis, which occurred in the 1960s, was the Cuban
missile crisis.
4.2.2 The Cuban Missile Crisis and Mediation as a Strategy
Cuba was a source of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. This
case is one of the most dangerous episodes in the Cold War, in which a nonaligned
country was at the centre. On that Caribbean island, Fidel Castro had overthrown
Fulgencio Batista, a pro-American dictator, and launched a land reform programme.
To the United States, a revolutionary, left-leaning government so near its coast was an
unbearable affront. In 1961, the attack by anti-Castrist exiles organised by the United
States failed in the Bay of Pigs debacle." Cuba then became vulnerable to Soviet
influence because of this invasion. There is reason to believe that Cuba would
initially have preferred a Soviet military guarantee of its security, even at the cost of
expulsion from the Movement. 93
As the United States had missiles in Europe that were capable of reaching the Soviet
Union, the Soviet Union introduced theirs in Cuba, to protect the island from an attack
and to equalise the balance of power in nuclear weapons. The United States planned
either to bomb the missile sites or to pursue some other effort to dismantle them.
90 Two Decades of Non-Alignment, pp. 9-10.
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Another alternative was a naval blockade. This would prevent the Soviets from
landing any further shipments, although stopping ships on the high seas was
tantamount to an act of war." As a result, tension mounted very high between the
two countries, both of which were ready to launch their missiles at each other. For the
Soviet troops in Cuba, the use of nuclear warheads was categorically forbidden
without permission from Moscow."
The steps taken by the nonaligned countries compromised their appeal to Sithu U
Thant, the United Nations Secretary General, to do his utmost to resolve the crisis.
This appeal helped not a little towards warding off disaster.Ï" U Thant, under
pressure from 40 nonaligned states, sent letters to Kennedy and Khrushchev urging
the suspension of the blockade and the stopping of shipments to Cuba for two or three
weeks. The letter pleaded with both governments to refrain from any action that
would provoke war. Many diplomatic contacts were initiated via Anatoly Dorbrynin,
the Soviet ambassador in Washington. Finally, the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle
its offensive arms after the United States had agreed not to invade Cuba. Moscow
dismantled its missiles and, in 1963, the United States missiles were quietly removed
from Turkey."
Despite this praise worthy effort, the nonaligned states were comparatively helpless
during this crisis. India was in fact at war with China. An escalation of the crisis was
averted by Soviet restraint and concessions. Both superpowers were afraid of using
their nuclear arms. The crisis ended with a collective sigh of relief. Both the West
and Moscow had a choice between a compromise and a nuclear war - neither side
chose war. The superpowers refrained from attacking each another because of the
94 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 194.
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certainty of mutual destruction, rather than breaking under the pressures of any
movement, group or individual.
4.2.3 The Middle East and the Palestinian Problem
The Middle East is a classic example of the important role of economic and strategic
considerations in the Cold War. Moreover, this case is of major concern for the
nonaligned nations since it encroached one principle of the Movement, that of self-
determination. The Middle East is in contact with three continents, Africa, Asia and
Europe. The area is important for both the United State and the Soviet Union. The
issue here is to examine how the Middle East became a zone of Cold War
confrontation, and the role of the Nonaligned Movement. Firstly, the United States
had to continue their containment policy and thus needed to join their European
alliance with Asian ones. On the other side, the Soviets wanted to increase their
presence in the Third World. For both, the area was rich in raw material,98 important
after a disastrous war. The Nonaligned realised this and supported the oil embargo to
help sort out the problem in the area due to this Cold War confrontation.
After the Second World War, France granted independence to Lebanon and Syria, two
Middle Eastern countries under its trusteeship; the British did the same in Jordan. But
in Palestine, decolonisation turned tragic, causing a continuing war up to the present.
At that time, Palestine had two different communities in conflict: 1, 2 million Arabs
on the one hand and 560, 000 Jews on the other. These Jews had begun their
immigration at the end of the 19th century, motivated by Zionism, a movement
encouragmg them to return to their homeland'" and in 1917, by the Balfour
Declaration, the British government expressed support for the establishment in
Palestine of national home for the Jewish people.l'" The British who wanted to leave
the area because of Jewish pressure in 1945-46 and due to their economic crisis
98 See infra 5.2.2, p. 113.
99 Y Denis: Le Monde d'Aujourd'hui, p. 62.
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brought about by the Second World War had no alternative for the inevitable conflict
that would arise between two nations in one country.i'"
On February 7, 1947, Ernest Bevin of Great Britain proposed a plan that called for
five years of British trusteeship, during which Palestine would be prepared for
independence and ruled by both Arabs and Jews. From the beginning, the Bevin Plan
was a failure, since the Arabs did not agree to Jewish self-government that would
further Jewish immigration, while the Jews did not accept the proposal because it did
not promise an eventual Jewish state. As a result of Bevin's failure to implement a
British solution to the Palestine problem, the whole problem of Palestine was referred
to the United Nations.l02
The United Nations approved a resolution in November 1947 that Palestine be divided
into a Jewish state, an Arab state and the international zone of Jerusalem, which was
to be placed under United Nations control. This plan was accepted by the Soviet
Union and the United States but England and the Arabs announced their opposition.l'"
On their side, the British announced their opposition to partition for reasons related to
Britain's economic and political influence in the Arab world. Strategically, the Soviet
Union accepted the creation of a Jewish state as an answer to the inclusion of Turkey
within Truman's containment policy. The intention was also to cause friction between
the United States and Britain over the Palestine question. Finally, through their
support of Zionists in Palestine, the Soviets thought that a Jewish-Arab war would
sooner or later accelerate Arab social upheaval which would eventually overthrow the
feudal regimes in the Arab world, I 04 which were pro-West, and would cause Britain to
leave the Middle East as quickly as possible.
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102 IR Alsaeed: The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel, pp. 380-381.
103 Y Denis: Le Monde d'Aujourd'hui, p. 62.
104 IR Alsaeed: The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel, pp. 406-407.
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When the United States announced the Marshall Plan in June 1947, pledging to curtail
Communism in Western Europe through a programme of economic recovery, the new
American move created additional elements to American foreign policy toward the
Palestinian question. Arab oil became an important economic and strategic factor for
implementing the Marshall Plan. It became clear during this time that a solution to
the Palestine problem would involve not only the Arabs and Zionists but also the
question of raw materials and the relations between the East and West. With this
development, a new phase of the Palestine question and Zionist aims emerged, giving
them a Cold War aspect, based on the national interests of both the United States and
the Soviet Union. The establishment of a Jewish state required thus the support of
American interests for the State Department. lOS
When Ben Gurion proclaimed the creation of Israel on May 14, 1948 in the regions
given to the Jews by the United Nations, Arab states that did not want a Jewish state
in Palestine sent their armies into Palestine. This first Arab-Israeli war ended with an
Israeli victory.l'" One result of the Arab defeat was a massive Arab exodus from
Palestine to the other Arab countries. Many Palestinian refugees left their property
behind them, thus giving the Israelis the chance to control nearly 60 per cent of the
country's cultivated area.107
Regardless of cultural and environmental differences between the United States and
Israel, a special relationship between Israel and American Jewry had crystallised after
the establishment of Israel. American Jews preferred to play an effective role in
American politics. Jewish political pressure protected Israel's existence when it was
challenged by Arab forces.108 As Israel soon followed a clearly Western-oriented
course, Soviet-Israeli relations cooled. Even so, Moscow hesitated to improve
105 IH Alsaeed: The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel, p. 385.
106 Y Denis: Le Monde d'Aujourd'hui, p. 62.
107 IH Alsaeed: The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel, p. 476.
108 Ibid., p. 485.
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relations with the Arab countries. The fact that many of the latter pursued reactionary
policies was one explanation.l'"
By the late 1950s, the Middle East was established as an important front in the Cold
War. This front extended to Israel in the late sixties. Firstly, the Arab-Israeli conflict
opened up unique opportunities for Moscow in the Middle East. In the 1950s, the
new Egyptian President, Nasser, saw the formation of CENTO as an attempt to isolate
Egypt. As his dream was to unite the Arab world, he turned to the Soviet Union for
help. Soon Egypt received arms from Eastern Europe, amongst others from
Yugoslavia. 110
Due to this Soviet support, Britain and the United States withdrew their support for
the Aswan water project in Egypt. Consequently, Nasser announced the
nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal Company was an international
company in which Britain and France were the main sponsors. Britain and France
decided to intervene militarily together with Israel. The latter first launched an attack
on Sinai in 1956, and was joined afterwards by France and Britain. These countries
withdrew their troops both because of the Soviet threat of a "rocket attack" and
because of American pressure. However, the American attitude toward the crisis was
ambivalent. On one hand, Washington was not pleased with Nasser's reaction. On
the other, Americans wanted England removed from the Middle East. But neither
could the Americans allow the Soviets a sphere of influence in the region through
opposing the invasion. I I I Thus the British-French fiasco undermined Britain's
position in the Middle East. Moscow's threats represented considerable propaganda
in the Arab countries, and the Kremlin influence was on the increase.112 This is a
nonaligned country in the centre of the Cold War" game". It is also a good example
109 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 90.
110 A and K Dawisha: The Soviet Union in the Middle East, p. 26.
III IR Alsaeed: The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel, p. 521.
112 G dLun estad: East, West, North, South, p. 92.
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of how nonaligned countries tried to take advantage of the situation and get as much
from the great powers through aid.
In response to this situation Eisenhower proclaimed the so-called Eisenhower
Doctrine in 1957. Eisenhower maintained that American troops would be used to
protect nations in the region from countries that were controlled by International
Communism. The United States was to fill the vacuum the British-French withdrawal
had created. When Washington sent troops to Lebanon and Jordan respectively the
following year to support conservative governments there against the after-effects of
Kassem's seizure of power in Iraq, Moscow could only protest.113
In 1967, the Soviet Union decided to exercise greater influence in the region by
developing closer ties with militant, anti-Israeli elements, while the United States was
busy with the Vietnamese question. In the face of American support for Israel, the
Soviet Union provided military supplies to Arab countries. The escalation in tension
began when the Soviet Union - probably to help the Syrian government - spread
rumors that Israel was preparing an attack on Syria. This action contributed to
tensions in the area. In order to prevent such an attack, Egypt mobilised forces in
Sinai. When Nasser closed the Tiran Straits to Israeli ships, Israel suddenly launched
an attack and in the course of six days Egypt, Syria and Jordan were defeated. In the
short term, the war represented a defeat for the Soviet Union.114 As a result of this
Six Days War, Israel occupied the remaining territory of Palestine, until then under
Jordanian and Egyptian control (the West Bank and Gaza Strip). This area included
the remaining part of Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel. The war brought about
a second exodus of Palestinians, estimated at half a million. I IS
The superpowers used these unstable circumstances to further their own positions. In
this regard, Soviet policy was more active in 1973 than in 1967 to eliminate Western
113 G dLundesta : East, West, North, South, p. 92.
114 Ibid., pp. 118-119.
115 Question of Palestine at http://www.un.orglDpts/dpa/ngolhistory.html, on 25/02/2002.
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influence in the Middle East. Until the late 1960s and early 1970s, Moscow was
sorely deficient in military forces suitable for rapid and versatile projection of power
abroad. This deficiency naturally limited the scope and magnitude of the Soviet
Union's involvement in the Third World conflicts. By the 1970s, however, nearly two
decades of massive involvement in mobile forces began to yield results, enabling the
Soviet Union to begin acting as a truly global power in world affairs.116
Even though there is no reason to believe that Moscow wanted a war in the Middle
East, it did nothing to prevent the Arab-Israel war in 1973. Information as to Arab
intentions was not given to the United States, according to an agreement of 1972
between both superpowers during the détente period. After the war had broken out,
the Soviet Union advocated an immediate cease-fire that would have benefited the
Arabs considerably. When Israel did not respect the cease-fire agreement that the
Soviet Union and the United States effected, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene
directly on the side of the Arabs. The United States, which had also increased its
assistance to Israel, placed its troops on alert. Both superpowers were on the brink of
war in the Third World. The conflicts ended when the Israelis stopped their advance
before the Egyptians were defeated cornpletely.l'"
Many Arabs were disappointed with the insufficient Soviet support. Consequently,
Egypt returned to a pro-Western course for a diplomatic solution. As BD Porter
argues, once Egypt turned to the West, Moscow's influence began to raise once again
in the more militant Arab countries. Libya, Syria, and Iraq received large quantities
of Soviet arms and Soviet influence remained strong.i"
On the other side, Kissinger shuttled between the capitals of the Middle East. He
obtained minor Israeli concessions, such as more American aid in exchange for a
partial withdrawal from Sinai. But Kissinger did not address the key issue of
116 BD Porter: The USSR in Third World Conflicts, p. 36.
117 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 120.
118 BD Porter: The USSR in Third World Conflicts, p. 144.
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Palestinian nationalism and the Palestinian people's need for a homeland. The
conflict came no nearer resolution. However, the United States became the main key
player in the Middle East. 119
4.2.3.1 An Independent Palestine as a Solution
For the Nonaligned Movement, the central issue of the Middle East crisis was the
right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including their right to a
homeland. The question of Palestine was a question of world peace since the wars in
the Middle East have increased tensions between the superpowers with the potential
for nuclear confrontation. On the other side, Israel militarily attacked nonaligned
countries and its incursions were slowly splintering Lebanon and Jordan. Iraq nuclear
installations were bombed by Israel. Indeed, all countries within the region face the
constant threat of Israeli militancy.V''
Nonaligned countries have historically had an active role in promoting the concerns of
the Palestinian people to the international community. For instance, at Bandung
conference, the Asian-African Conference declared its support for the rights of the
Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations
resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the
Palestine question.t" This question was discussed by the heads of state at their First
Summit in Belgrade, in September 1961. The Conference reaffirmed the Bandung
Declaration and gave support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab
people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United
Nations.122
119 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 286.
120 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, pp. 261-262.
121 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 110.
122 Two Decades of Non-Alignment, p. 7.
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In 1967, the Arab-Israel war created new problems for refugees. The Nonaligned
countries made new efforts to bring the cause of the Palestinian people to the
international community. The Movement issued a communiqué pledging support for
national liberation movements at a consultative meeting of special government
representatives in Belgrade in 1969 and PLO representatives addressed this
meeting.123 Regarding the war, the 1967 Middle East crisis was defused primarily
through the moderating influence of the superpowers on the belligerents. The
nonaligned nations performed only a secondary role and found themselves unable to
remain impartial during this crisis, since Egypt and Syria were members of the
Movement.l'"
However, in December 1969, nonaligned countries helped to bring the concerns of the
Palestinian people before the United Nations. Resolution 2535, supported in large by
the Movement, was adopted by the 24th General Assembly. It recognised for the first
time that the problem of Palestinian Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their
inalienable rights. This was the beginning of international recognition of the
Palestinian cause and of the centrality of Palestine to the tensions in the Middle
East.125
The record of the Movement as a crisis manager in relation to the Middle East crisis
in 1973 was not encouraging. The political stand of the superpowers effectively
blocked attempts by nonaligned states to push through a ceasefire resolution in the
United Nations. A ceasefire became possible only after the superpowers had reached
an agreement between themselves and jointly moved a resolution in the Security
Council, and both had agreed on the creation of a UN Emergency Force.126
123 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, pp. 264-265.
124 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 82.
125 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 265.
126 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 82.
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In the meantime, the Arab countries used their "Oil Weapon" as a front against the
West. Whenever they had a specific demand on Israel or the West, the Organisation
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would increase the oil price or cut their oil
production. This led the United States and its allies to work harder to appease the
Arabs: Britain stopped supplying arms to Israel; Japan stopped its support of
Israel.127
As agreed at the 1973 Algiers Summit, nonaligned countries joined in the successful
request to place the question of Palestine on the UN General Assembly. In October
1974, the Arab heads of state declared the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people.l'" At the same time, the General Assembly conferred on
the PLO the status of observer in the General Assembly.i'"
The foreign ministers' meeting at Lima in 1975 welcomed the PLO as a full member
of the Nonaligned Movement and suggested that the Palestine question be accorded a
place as a standing item on the agenda at their meeting.l''" In January 1976, the
Security Council discussed the issue of political rights for the Palestinian people for
the first time, with the participation of the PLO. Six countries, four of them
nonaligned members (Benin, Guyana, Panama, Pakistan, Romania and Tanzania),
introduced a draft resolution affirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people
as established by the General Assembly. Although the resolution was blocked by
Western powers in the Security Council, for the first time this organ discussed this
Palestinian issue.131
127 J Brooman: Conflict in Palestine, in CJ Visser: The Role of Terrorism in the Cold War, pp. 166-
167.
128 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 269.
129 Question of Palestine at http://www.un.org./Dpts/dpa/ngo/history.html, on 25/02/2002.
130 Two Decades of Non-Alignment, p. 166.
131 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 270.
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After the Cold War, the Jakarta Conference noted the pressing need to restore to the
Palestinian people, who were waging a struggle against Israel, their right to justice
and self-determination, and their right to establish an independent and sovereign state
in accordance with United Nations resolutions. They stressed that peace in the
Middle East cannot be achieved unless Israel withdraw from all the occupied territory,
including Al Quds (Jerusalem), the Syrian Golan and Southern Lebanon.!"
A series of negotiations culminated in the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and
the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the representative of the Palestinian People, and
both signed, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government in Washington
in 1993. These arrangements led to the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces, the
elections to the Palestinian Council and the Presidency of the Palestinian Authority,
and the establishment of a functioning administration in the areas under Palestinian
self-rule.133
However, the Middle East problem was not finally sorted out. The decision of the
Government ofIsrael in June 1998 to take further steps to expand the jurisdiction and
planned boundaries of Jerusalem complicated this problem. The Nonaligned
Movement condemned this act as well as Israel's illegal decision of December 1981 to
alter the physical and demographic status of the occupied Golan and its institutional
structure by applying Israeli jurisdiction and administration there.134
In all, the nonaligned countries have reacted to international conflict without great
success. Most of the time the Movement has used peaceful settlement of disputes as
one of its principles. The superpowers chose to defuse their tensions mainly without
consideration of the Nonaligned Movement. Only Stalin promised to consider their
appeal in the 1960s. The superpowers' role in the Third World did not prevent
132 Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, p. 4.
133 Question of Palestine at http://www.un.orglDpts/dpa/ngolhistory.htrnl, on 25/02/2002.
134 XII Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 70-
71.
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nonaligned member countries from being involved in the Cold War, the Middle East
being a case. Due to the Movement's involvement, the Palestinian question was
discussed at the United Nations and their right to a homeland was recognised by this
world organisation. However, strong measures were not taken against Israel since the
Movement was confronted by the force of major powers. This problem could remain
unsolved for a long time, since the United States still needs Israel to counter extremist
Muslims in the Middle East. The superpowers found also in the Movement a force
that can influence their decision-making in foreign policy. The Soviet Union backed
the NAM to weaken the Western bloc and used Third World countries like Cuba to
counter American influence. The United States also wanted to benefit from the
developing countries in order to contain Soviet communism. However, American
policy toward the Nonaligned Movement was ambivalent, once wanting to break it
up, since nonalignment was against American involvement in the Third World, and
other times supporting the Movement even during serious tension of the Cold War,
for example during the Carter period, to exclude the Soviet Union from these
countries.
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CHAPTER 5: SUCCESSES AND WEAKNESSES OF THE NONALIGNED
MOVEMENT
The Movement has grown substantially, since the Belgrade Conference in 1961. One
third of the member states are very small and, economically, all of them are
developing countries. Most of them are also very weak militarily and their armed
forces are symbolic. These negative factors mean that a majority of the nonaligned
countries are not of great significance, except possibly a few of the larger states, for
example Egypt, India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and South Africa, in the international
hierarchy of powers. However, they do command the majority of votes in the United
Nations and other international organisations. In the bodies with limited membership,
such as the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the executive of
other international organisations, they command considerable political and moral
weightage.' However, the main power of decision-making on world issues of vital
interest to all countries is monopolised by the big powers'
Due to this weakness, the durability of the Nonaligned Movement can be explained
only by the fact that it has concentrated on problems that are bound to remain the
substance of world politics over a longer period of time. In fact, the Movement has
concentrated on the eradication of colonialism, peace and cooperation among all
nations, economic development and racial equality. The Movement used the United
Nations as a platform to express its policy and to influence decision-making on some
issues. On the other hand, it is important to discern how the Movement functions, to
know how decisions were taken within the Movement and to what extent they could
influence the conduct of the member states. It is also interesting to examine how the
Movement influenced decision-making in other international forums. This will entail
a discussion of the role played by the Movement in changing the international
economic order. Thus the NAM's organisation will be discussed. Even though, in
some cases, the Movement challenged large powers, problems as a result of internal
I MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment, pp. 10-11.
2 P Willets: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 25.
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conflicts handicapped its good running. This chapter examines these issues to see to
what extent the Nonaligned Movement was successful.
5.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT
For AW Singham and Shirley Hune, one of the most remarkable achievements of the
Nonaligned Movement has been its capacity to transform itself from a small protest
movement into a major international social movement in world politics.' In the
system of structural and organisational formations in modem international relations,
the Nonaligned Movement is not an international conference. Unlike a conference, it
does not consider just one problem. The agenda of its meetings include practically all
the main questions considered at the United Nations. Furthermore, the Movement has
no time limits or deadlines for discussing the question." However, for AW Singham,
the NAM is not totally a social movement, since it is a state-centred movement.'
On the other hand, the Movement is not an international organisation. Compared with
classical institutions, the Nonaligned Movement has no charter spelling out its goals,
principles and structure or strictly regulating its functions and the operation of its
organs. Bodies and posts like Secretary-General are absent from the Movement's
structure. Moreover, at the outset, the Movement did not have an established
hierarchy or a strict delimitation of functions among the main political bodies. All the
functions within the Movement are performed by statesmen of the member countries."
At the outset, the Movement had no headquarters and no obligatory membership
fees," and had no person to act on its behalf in international legal relations. The only
3 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 33.
4 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 250.
5 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignment, p. 5.
6 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 63-64.
7 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 250.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
105
permanent organisational form was the Coordinating Bureau, which was introduced at
the fourth summit in Algiers.f At the 1976 Colombo Summit, a standing committee
and a Co-ordinating Committee and a chair of the Movement were created out of
necessity. The Movement agreed to maintain the Co-ordinating Bureau as a
permanent organ."
The question arises here whether the lack of structures did not affect the working of
the Movement. AW Singham and Shirley Hune argue that the founders of the
Nonaligned Movement and their successors had recognised that the Movement would
have been destroyed if it had created a formal structure, such as a constitution and an
internal secretariat. A multicultural, transnational organisation with different
ideologies and purposes could never create a rational administrative structure to
implement its policies that all could accept." There was also a danger that the NAM's
bureaucracy could constrain the flexibility and authority of heads of states and
governments and foreign ministers who represent member states. I I Moreover, the
Movement did not need additional spokesmen, since two-third of the United Nations
were members of the Movement. Many of the members have represented themselves
as spokesmen of the Nonaligned Movement in the United Nations Security Council
on issues of deep concern to the Movement, such as the Palestine and the Namibian
problems.v'
lts organisational forms are derived from the experience of the United Nations and the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), since many countries in the Movement belong
to these organisations - the OAU proclaimed nonalignment to be a major principle of
8 IIKovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 27.
9 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 162 and
http://www.nam.gov.za/backgroundlbackground.h!m. on 23/06/2002.
10 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 33.
Il MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment, p. 59.
12 Ibid., p. 54.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
106
its Charter.13 Resolutions, including those on organisational and procedural matters
that are passed during the NAM's meetings, make up a code of principles that could
be formalised in something like a charter.l" which could specify the roles and
missions of each body of the NAM.
The Conference of the Heads of States or Governments of the nonaligned countries is
considered as the supreme body of the Movement, although its power has not yet been
defined completely in an official document. Every conference analyses the main
international problems and developments, charts the strategic guidelines for the
nonalignment policy, elaborates the joint position of the nonaligned countries at the
United Nations, adopts policy-making documents for the Movement, and decides on
major issues or activities.U
As from 1970, the host country is declared to be the coordinating country and its
leader is elected chairman of the conference until the next summit.l" Nonaligned
administration is rotational, providing all member states, regardless of their size and
importance, with an opportunity to participate in global decision-making and world
politics. This rotating chairship enabled small countries to acquire "big power" status
in world politics.l"
The chairman of the Movement, without any supra-state power, ensures continuity in
the development of the Movement, takes all necessary steps to maintain contacts
among member states and sees to it that the Movement's decisions are carried out. In
addition, a Coordinating Bureau is elected that is presided over by the coordinating
13 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 52.
14 Ibid., p. 64.
15 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 34.
16 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 34.
17 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, pp. 33-35.
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country. The foreign minister of that country chairs the ministerial meetings held in
New York.18
Another important body is the "conferences" and "meetings" of foreign ministers.
Firstly, the term "conference" is used for a summit attended by all foreign ministers of
all the nonaligned countries every 18 months. These conferences make a general
assessment of the world situation, chart the common line of the nonaligned countries
in international political and economic matters, and solve organisational problems.
Their decisions on organisational matters may be very important. For instance, they
recommended that meetings of nonaligned countries be held regularly at ministerial
level at the United Nations headquarters in September. These September meetings
discuss the agenda of the current session of the UN General Assembly and map out
common tactics for the nonaligned countries on the most pressing issues. Their
significance for the alignment of forces in the UN is important, since they are held
almost simultaneously with similar ministerial meetings of the Group of 77, at which
all developing countries are coordinated."
Secondly, there are ministerial meetings attended by a limited number of delegates,
most of which are held in the framework of the Coordinating Bureau of the
Movement. This Bureau has many different duties, such as to follow the
implementation of the decisions adopted by the conferences of nonaligned countries;
to hold Bureau meetings to consider international problems; to prepare the
conferences of heads of states or governments or other meetings of the nonaligned
countries; to coordinate the joint activities of the nonaligned countries in the United
Nations; and contacts with the Group of 77.20 The Group of the Nonaligned
Countries and the Coordinating Bureau in New York stand out for actually being
continually functioning bodies, because the participants in their meetings are
permanently present at the UN headquarters and may gather for a meeting at any time.
18 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 65-66.
19 Ibid., pp.68-69.
20 Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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At Havana, the Bureau seats were increased from 25 to 36 to permit the following
regional distribution: Africa -17 seats, Asia -12 seats, Latin America -5 seats, Europe
- 1 seat. The 26th seat would be shared between Africa and Europe and would be
occupied for one and a half years by each of the members chosen.t'
Participation in the Nonaligned Movement in any capacity is voluntary. The founders
defined the criteria in 1961.22 These criteria are not very strict. Thus the Movement
avoids being an exclusive group. A country may be striving to apply the principles of
nonalignment, while objectively still being bound to a particular bloc structure.v'
This raises the problem whether it is not a weakness of the Movement not to force
member states to observe nonalignment principles. As MS Rajan has pointed out,
some members have not been punished by, for example, suspension of their
membership, even though they have permitted foreign military bases and foreign
armed forces on their soil. For instance, Afghanistan was allowed to remain member
of the Movement even though, Soviet forces occupied the country from 1979 to 1989.
Moreover, the category of guests and observers includes some former-formally
aligned nations, such as Australia, the Philippines, Portugal, Greece, Romania and
Spain. Some members, such as Egypt and Pakistan, became partners in the American
strategic consensus, CENTCOM (Central Commandj.i"
Even though participation is voluntary, reaction to the participation at the NAM
forums of a nonaligned country in which a coup or an armed conflict took place was
acute. For instance, the military junta which had overthrown Salvador Allende was
not invited in 1975. The question of Kampuchea also caused great difficulties in the
late 1970s. The Havana Summit denied the Pol Pot regime, which was overthrown by
21 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 410.
22 See supra 3.5 p. 66.
23 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 42.
24 MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment, p. 72.
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the Kampuchean people, the right to attend its meeting, but failed to come to a
consensus on handing down its seat to the People's Republic of Kampuchea.f
From the outset, the procedure of drawing up and adopting decisions in all organs of
the Movement was based on the consensus principle. The nonaligned countries
understand consensus as "mutual accommodation on the basis of which agreement
can emerge by a sincere process of adjustment among member nations ... a process and
a final compromise formula... general convergence and harmonisation of views
reflecting the broadest consent of the Conference or meeting". 26 Thus, the aim of the
consensus method is to enhance or at least preserve the unity and strength of the
Movement.27 A consensus requires ample opportunity for discussion. In international
politics, however, there is often insufficient time for prolonged discussions. It is
indeed remarkable that the Movement has achieved consensus on so many difficult
problems in world politics over the years. The process worked out by the Nonaligned
Movement is to begin with a working group of officials, then to move the subject onto
the level of ambassadors, then to the level of ministers, and finally to the heads of
state."
The uneven development of the mode of operation is typical of the Movement: some
of its aspects were determined earlier, others later, and still others are just taking
shape. Thus, this organisational form has allowed the Movement to take important
decision on many world issues, such as peace and security, the democratisation of
international relations, a search for a New International Economic Order, etc.
However, the positions of the Movement's members in decision-making in some
organs, such as the Security Council, are weakened by the lack of veto, which is
monopolised by the large powers.
25 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 87.
26 Two Decades of Non-Alignment, p. 222.
27 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of Non-Alignment, pp. 91-92.
28 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 44.
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5.2 STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY
The Nonaligned Movement is not a security system. Yet, one of the mam
preoccupations of the members was indeed the security of their own countries in the
light of their awareness of the growing tensions and instability caused by the Cold
War as a result of ideological, economic, political and military issues. None of the
nonaligned nations had the ability to bring substantial changes in the world.29 Did the
nonaligned countries' reactions as a group to the arms race, nuclear threat and
instability as a whole bring about a significant solution?
5.2.1 NAM and Disarmament
The nonaligned countries, at their gatherings in the United Nations and elsewhere,
have always devoted attention to the question of disarmament. Yet, in their joint
action, disarmament usually did not hold a very prominent place. For example, in one
of two declarations published at the conference at Bandung, disarmament was
mentioned in one sentence followed by the "Bandung principles". Activity in
Bandung, Belgrade and Cairo remained, as regards disarmaments, at the level of
general proclamations, bringing nothing new to the world discussions, since
disarmament was one of the first issues that came up before the United Nations
immediately after its foundation. The two well-armed groups in the Cold War, each
refusing to reduce its armament before equalising force, overshadowed these early
discussions."
The above point of view of Mates, former Yugoslav diplomat and the Secretary-
General of the Belgrade Conference, seems to minimise the role of the Nonaligned
Movement in the matter. As discussed in the fourth chapter, the nonaligned group
recognised as early as during its formative years that the dissolution of blocs and
29 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 141.
30 L Mates: Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy, p. 249.
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alliance systems and the renunciation of the practices associated with them were
closely linked to the issue of Great Power disarmament." At Belgrade in 1961, the
nonaligned defined disarmament as the elimination of the armed forces, armaments,
foreign bases and arms manufacturing facilities, the total prohibition of the
manufacture, possession and use of thermonuclear, bacteriological and chemical
weapons, and the liquidation of launchers designed for weapons of mass destruction."
Already in their first declaration issued at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, the
participants rejected the view that war, including the Cold War, was inevitable.r' The
Conference, in its message to the leaders of the Superpowers, appealed for further
talks" for the immediate conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
In addition, the main communiqué devoted six of its 27 points to questions of
disarmament and demanded that the nonaligned nations should be represented at all
further world conferences on disarmament. They also demanded a stop to the testing
of all nuclear weapons. At the time, the Asians were worried about tests in the Pacific
and the Africans were furious about French atomic tests in the Sahara." Khrushchev
agreed that a group of uncommitted nations could be added to the existing
disarmament committee."
The participants at the Belgrade Conference met in a situation burdened by
considerable tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. The strained
situation, with no significant contacts made between the two superpowers,
deteriorated even further when the Soviet Union announced the resumption of nuclear
testing." As a result of the NAM's effort, a resolution proposed by a number of
31 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 95.
32 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 121.
33 Two Decades of Non-Alignment, p. 5.
34 P Willets: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 24.
35 Ibid.
36 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 96.
37 L Mates: Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy, p. 256.
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nonaligned states was adopted at the 16th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly in 1961, calling for a prohibition on the use of nuclear arms and authorising
the United Nations General Secretary to ascertain the possibility of convening a
conference to establish such a prohibition. After long negotiations, the Soviet,
American and British delegations signed a partial nuclear test ban treaty in August
1963.38
The Nonaligned Movement welcomed the signing of the Soviet-American SALT 2
treaty and the relaxation of European tensions as recorded in the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki in 1975.39 The
treaty signed in Vienna in June 1979 basically codified the agreements reached
between Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok in 1974. Both sides accepted an upper
limit to their nuclear arsenals of 2 400 missiles, to be reduced to 2 250 by 1981. Both
sides accepted a ceiling of 1 200 ICBMs arid SLBMs. MIRVs were drawn into the
agreement, with a maximum number of ten warheads, which they already carried.l''
In their resolutions on disarmament, the nonaligned countries continued to seek world
disarmament. As a result, a Special Session of the UN General Assembly on
Disarmament was convened on its initiative in 1978.41 The Conference on
Disarmament was established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament
negotiating forum of the international community. It has 66 members and its terms of
reference include practically all multilateral arms control and disarmament
problems.V
38 R Allison: The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, p. 95.
39 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 126.
40 I Jeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 322.
41 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 137.
42 Conference on Disarmament at http://www.un.orglDpts/dda/-18, on 25/04/2002.
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After the 1983 New Delhi Summit, the Prime Minister of India, in his capacity as
chairperson, had taken the initiative to convene, a six-nation conference, of Prime
Ministers and Presidents from Greece, Mexico, Argentina, Norway and Tanzania, at
New Delhi in 1985. This conference urged a moratorium on nuclear tests, especially
by the superpowers. They also offered to monitor the moratorium. The Soviet Union,
which had, a little earlier unilaterally announced a moratorium in August 1985,
responded to the appeal by the six nations not to hold any tests until the end of the
year. On the following appeal, the Soviet Union agreed to extend the moratorium
until 1987. But, during this period, the United States failed to respond to the NAM
leader's moratorium.f
The nonaligned countries took on the struggle against the arms race not only because
the destructive power contained in nuclear stockpiles can kill human life many times
over and might well prevent its reappearance for ages to come, but also the NAM
supported disarmament due to its economic spending. The military expenditure could
help developing countries boost their economy. The Delhi Political Declaration stated
that the increase in military spending had sped up inflation, hiked the budget deficits
and further reduced the already decreasing economic aid to developing countries. For
instance, a nuclear aircraft carrier, it was noted at the Conference, cost $4 billion,
which it is more than the GNP of 53 countries. According to UN experts, in 1981
alone the world spent more per minute for military purposes than the sum required to
feed over 2 000 children for one year in the developing countries." For every 100
000 people in the world there were 556 soldiers, but only 85 doctors. For every
soldier, the average world military expenditure was US $20 000, while for every
school age child the average public education expenditure was a paltry US $380.45
43 AW Singham and Hune Shirley: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 94.
44 II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 79.
45 RG Mugabe: The State of the Non-Aligned Movement, in Black Scholar, p. 11.
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5.2.2 Security of the Indian Ocean
All the nonaligned meetings have attached great importance to ending the arms race,
achieving general and complete disarmament under strict international control and
creating peace and nuclear-free zones, including in the Indian Ocean. The Cairo
Conference of 1964 found that these bases in the Indian Ocean were a calculated
attempt to intimidate the emergent states of Africa and Asia and an unwarranted
extension of the policy of neocolonialism and imperialism." Geographically, the
Indian Ocean basin is an aggregate of several subregions, including South Asia, part
of the Middle East, South East Asia and the Australasian continent, the Hom of
Africa, East Africa and the South Eastern region of the African continent.V
Both the United States and the Soviet Union had bases in this area because of their
strategic and economic interest. For instance, these bases help foreign powers to keep
an eye on the Persian Gulf. This region is by far the largest reservoir of oil in the
world. In 1985, the region accounted for 17.41% of world supplies. By 1995, the
figure rose to 26.59 %, reflecting the growing dependence of the world economy on
oil from the Persian Gulf.48 On the other hand, the Indian Ocean is a vast lake with
only three entrances: the Suez Canal which is easily blockaded and has lost its
importance by being too small for the supertankers of today; the straits of Malacca,
which are also vulnerable, as well as being too remote for Western traffic; and the
Cape of Good Hope, around which many ships with vital cargoes for Europe and the
United States sail annually.V
On the basis of these interests, after the conclusion of the Asian war, the Soviet Union
established major bases at Berbera in Aden and Umm Qsar in Iraq, which have given
46 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p.122.
47 Y Nikolayev: Make the Indian Ocean A Peace Zone, p. 5.
48 G Bahgat: Peace in the Persian Gulf, in International Studies, p. 307.
49 L Beebe: Soviet Strategy Toward South Africa, p. 4.
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it commanding facilities in the Persian and Aden Gulf, as well as domination over the
Southern entrance to the Suez Canal. Moscow also earned the right to the submarine
base at Andra Pradesh and the naval facility at Vishakhpatnam in India. In addition,
the Soviets placed a number of deep water moorings in the ocean at either end of the
Mozambique Channel, one off Durban, and at least two in the vicinity of the
American base at Diego Garcia. These provided the Soviet Union with excellent
surveillance points from which to monitor the Western traffic in the Indian Ocean. 50
On the other side, the Americans placed top priority for the military development of
the region in the vicinity of the American base on Diego Garcia Island. The Chagos
Archipelago, including the Diego Garcia Island, was seized by the United Kingdom
from Mauritius and declared a British Possession in the Indian Ocean in 1965; later it
was leased to the United States. The Diego Garcia base had an airfield with landing
facilities for the B-52 strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons, the B-1B. The
base had enormous storages of fuel and ammunition, a major communications centre,
a monitoring station and a storage facility for nuclear warheads. Apart from Diego
Garcia, the United States had about 30 military bases and facilities in the Indian
Ocean area. 51
For the nonaligned countries, the establishment and maintenance of foreign military
bases, particularly against the express will of states, was a gross violation of their
sovereignty. According to N'krumah, "the danger is increased when there are foreign
military bases. These bases are for strategic purposes which are counter to our
national interests. They serve as much as instruments of pressure on the countries
where they are stationed, as for departure points for aggressions against third parties.
The bases of Cyprus, Aden and Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), to name but a few, are
examples. ,,52
50 L Beebe: Soviet Strategy Toward South Africa, p. 4.
51 Y Nikolayev: Make the Indian Ocean A Peace Zone, pp. 27-28.
52 Cuba in the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, p. 45.
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It was Sri Lanka that first raised the question of making the Indian Ocean a zone of
peace. Initially, it proposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region,
which was approved by the Second Conference of the Heads of State and Government
of nonaligned countries held in Cairo in 1964. Later, Sri Lanka supplemented its
proposal of a nuclear-free zone with the idea of creating a zone of peace in the Indian
Ocean. The idea was supported by the Lusaka Summit in 1970. From that time on,
the nonaligned states have devoted a great deal of attention to this question, which is
constantly on the agenda of various forums of the Nonaligned Movement, even up to
now. For instance, the Movement submitted a draft resolution containing a
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace for consideration by the ze"
Session of the UN General Assembly.j '
The next important stage in the struggle for making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace
was the decision of the 29th session of the General Assembly in 1974, taken on the
insistence of the nonaligned countries, concerning the convening of an international
conference on the Indian Ocean. As a result, a Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland
States of the Indian Ocean Basin was convened in July 1979 and attended by 44
delegations from the states of the Indian Ocean region, as well as from China, Greece,
Japan and Panama. The Soviet Union attended as an observer. The participants drew
up a common approach to the solution of establishing a zone of peace. The
participants called upon the great powers not to further strengthen their existing
military bases, nor to acquire new military bases, not to explode nuclear devices,
etc.54
The overall trend from 1961 to 1970 shows that, while a belief in disarmament and
the promotion of peaceful inter-state relations were still honoured as part of the
ideology of nonalignment, this component had clearly declined from a near pacifist
crusade at the beginning of the decade to being of only secondary importance at the
end of the decade. Indeed, the big powers seemed to monopolise the decision-making
53 Y Nikolayev: Make the Indian Ocean A Peace Zone, p. 8.
54Ibid.,pp.12_13.
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on world issues that were of vital interest to all countries.V However, the prestige of
the NAM grew, since it was recognised as a large anti-war and anti-militaristic force-
a positive factor in international relations. The hopes for the prevention of war and
for peaceful coexistence are associated, to a certain degree, with the realisation of the
principles and goals of the Nonaligned Movement and its extensive activity. 56 The
implementation of the initiative of the nonaligned countries to make the Indian Ocean
a zone of peace will depend on their cohesion and clarity of purpose.
5.2.3 Disarmament in the 1990s
The question that anses here is whether this peaceful image of the Nonaligned
Movement corresponded with the Movement in the 1990s. How can the development
of an arms race between member states like India and Pakistan be interpreted against
the background of this Movement?
With the end of the Cold War, the Movement continued to struggle for peace. It
found that there was no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals, or for
concepts of international security based on promoting and developing military
alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence. The opportunity now exists for the
international community to pursue nuclear disarmament as a matter of highest
priority, since the nuclear weapons continue to represent a threat to the survival of
mankind.Y
At the 1995 Cartagena Summit, the nonaligned countries called on the Conference on
Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to begin negotiations on nuclear
disarmament in 1996 and stated that they would introduce a draft resolution to this
effect at the General Assembly. Despite French pressure, they firmly rejected all
55 P Willets: The Non-Aligned Movement, p. 25.
56 Y Alimov: The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 137.
57 XII Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 46.
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kinds of nuclear testing and strongly deplored the resumption and continuation of
nuclear testing. They reiterated their support for a UN fund for the clearance of
mines.58
Nevertheless, two nonaligned countries, India and Pakistan, tested nuclear weapons in
1998. There were persistent concerns about Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Foremost
among these were Pakistan's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or to
endorse the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the risk of nuclear war between
Pakistan and India over Kashmir; and Pakistan involvement in the development of an
"Islamic bomb" - Pakistan's endeavour to project itself as the first Islamic nuclear
power, entitled, in some sense, to assume the leadership of the Muslim World. The
most immediate worry among many nations was that such competition would
encourage other aspiring nuclear countries - including Iran, Iraq, Libya and North
Korea - to pursue clandestine nuclear weapons programmes. 59
As the Movement had no other means to constrain its members, the 1998 Durban
Summit considered as positive the commitment by the parties concerned in the region
to exercise restraint, which contributes to regional security, to discontinue nuclear
tests and not to transfer nuclear weapons-related material, equipment and technology.
The summit further stressed the significance of universal adherence to the CTBT,
including all Nuclear Weapons States, and the commencement of negotiations on
fissile materials in the Conference on Disarmament. 60
58 S Morphet: The Non-Aligned and their 11tb Summit, in The Round Table, p. 458.
59 S Farzna: Pakistan's nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime, in International
Affairs, pp. 30-31.
60 XII Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, p. 45.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
119
5.2.4 Internal Conflicts
Conflicts between member states threatened the unity and security of member nations.
In the 1960s, the Congo crisis of 1960, differences in language, and the content and
form that Pan-African unity should have, were issues of disagreement. In spite of
these differences, the African states saw the need to pursue Pan-African unity through
the OAV, which was based on nonalignment." However, in the 1970s, a conflict
grew out of Angola's accession to independence. The internal struggle for power
between the two major guerilla organisations, Agustinho Neto's Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Holden Roberto's Angolan National
Liberation Front (FNLA), split Africa into two camps. The involvement of Cuba and
the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), who each backed a different
claimant to power, exacerbated tensions between the Third World and the great power
partisans of each formation. The incursions in 1977 and 1978 into Congo's Shaba
province by rebels trained in Angola were a prolongation of this competition.Y
Several Third World governments, such as Morocco, Egypt and Sudan, hastened to
Mobutu Sese Seko' s aid. This involvement in Angola was interpreted as a Cuban,
and hence a Soviet, probe against a vulnerable Western-oriented regime, since the
Cubans were in Angola."
A second conflict with diplomatic ramifications broke out over Western Sahara.
Morocco and Mauritania partitioned this former Spanish colony, while Algeria armed
and gave asylum to the Polisario front, which claimed independence for the territory.
Each side sought support in Africa and from Arab countries.64 The Sahara question,
in particular, was the subject of a long debate in committee in the Movement, with
numerous states aligning themselves behind each camp, while a third group of states
laboured to work out a compromise declaration. At the Bureau meeting held in
61 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 172.
62 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, p. 85.
63 Ibid., p. 112.
64 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, p. 85.
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Algiers in 1976, Algeria clashed with Senegal and Congo (allies of Mauritania and
Morocco) on the question of Sahara. This question was finally left at the discretion of
the Oganisation of African Unity (OAU). The nonaligned countries expressed the
hope that the OAU Summit Conference to examine this question would be convened
at the earliest opportunity with a view to achieving ajust and durable solution.f
The Havana Summit welcomed the Islamic Republic of Mauritania's decision to
withdraw its forces from Western Sahara. At the same time, they deplored the
extension of the armed struggle by Morocco into the southern part of Western Sahara
previously has been administered by Mauritania. However, the delegates were
satisfied with the efforts of the Sixteenth OAU Special Committee to provide and
guarantee the Saharan peoples' right to self-determination.66
Another conflict was the civil war in Lebanon, in which the Palestine Liberation
Organisation and Syria were deeply embroiled and which turned out to be a very
divisive issue. The roots of the Lebanese crisis lay in the anachronistic traditional
political system that had, in the name of pluralism, concentrated power in the hands of
a narrow segment of its population, which happened to be predominantly, though not
exclusively, Marovite Christian. A system based on traditional elite bargaining
dominated by landlords and traditional political bosses had been living on borrowed
time. Increasingly, an urban and radicalised population required a different form of
government. Left to its own devices, the Lebanese political system was bound to face
a crisis of major proportions." Syria's military advance deep into Lebanon in 1976
was a blow to the Palestinians and their allies on the Lebanese left, and this brought
Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Algeria into conflict with Damascus. The cumulative effect of
these three trouble spots was a political malaise that could only weaken the collective
action of the developing countries.68
65 Two Decades of Non-Alignment, p. 253.
66 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 406.
67 Ibid., pp. 367-368.
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The threat to group cohesion posed by these conflicts was greatly exacerbated by
Cuba's role in Africa. In the Hom of Africa, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam took
power in Ethiopia. He was a Marxist eager to break the last American ties with Haile
Selassie who was overthrown in 1974. The Ethiopian Revolution also opened up new
opportunities for the Soviet Union in East Africa. The Somalian leader, Mohammed
Siad Barre, had changed sides and looked for an alliance with Washington and, in
addition, had territorial ambitions for the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. Moscow
and its allies, notably Fidel Castro in Havana, decided they could not stand by and
watch this strategically important country being defected by an ally of the West.69
The Ethiopian leader was now engaged in a war on two fronts: against ethnic Somalis
in Ethiopia's Ogaden region, who sought a union with Somalia, and against Erithreans
seeking independence for their province. When Cuba backed Mengistu, the new
regime came into conflict with Somalia and into indirect conflict with Sudan, Saudi
Arabia and other Arab governments, which were friendly to the Erithreans and uneasy
about a Marxist government in Addis Ababa."
The question that arises is whether this Cuban involvement in Africa was an extension
of Soviet foreign policy. On one the hand, the answer is negative, since Cuba had a
policy of providing support to Africa since the early years of the revolution, including
aid to Algeria in 1963 and Zanzibar in 1964.71 But, as Jorge Dominguez has put it,
"through these events, Cuba has continued to coordinate policy with the USSR in
ways that make it difficult to determine who leads and who follows, even though it
remains clear that neither the Angolan nor the Ethiopian operations could have been
conduced in the absence of either. ,,72
69 IJeremy and D Taylor: The Cold War, p. 308.
70 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition, in International Politics, p. 111.
71 PS Faile Cuban Foreign Policy, p. 83.
72 Jl Dominguez: Cuban Foreign Policy, in Foreign Affairs quoted by RA Mortimer: The Third
World Coalition in International Politics, p. 111.
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This Soviet use of proxies managed to weaken the NAM by dividing members on
important strategical and political issues and foreign policy. For example, Somalia
led the critical attack against Cuba at the is" Summit Conference of the OAU in
Khartoum in 1978, and even called for Cuba's expulsion from the Nonaligned
Movement. On the other hand, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique and
others similarly objected to the presence of French troops in Chad, Congo (formerly
Zaire) and Mauritania. Finally, most of nonaligned countries agreed at Belgrade that
the issue of Cuban troops in Africa was a state-to-state matter. Angola or Ethiopia
had the right to make their own decision as to the nature and extent of support they
were to receive from countries outside Africa.73
These conflicts became aggravated in 1979. First, Somalia and Ethiopia went to war,
and then Cambodia and Vietnam did the same. The FLNC again marched into Shaba.
The guerrilla wars in Western Sahara and Eritrea continued. Moreover, the coups in
Kabul and Yemen destabilised relations with the regional neighbours (Pakistan, Iran,
North Yemen, Saudi Arabia) and heated up the international climate in general. 74
The Iran-Iraq war was a major concern for the Nonaligned Movement in the 1980s.
In the late 1970s, Iran still occupied three small pieces of territory along the Iran-Iraq
border that were supposed to be returned to Iraq under the treaty of 1975. Moreover,
the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Iranian Revolution, listed
Iraq amongst the countries where the government was to be overthrown and replaced
by an Islamic regime. As the 1975 agreement was violated, the Iraqi Army invaded
Iran. Two member states of the Nonaligned Movement opposed each other in this
conflict. In addition, this costly war weakened the broad Middle East coalition that
had developed over the years against Israeli oppression and in support of the
Palestinian people.f
73 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, pp. 187-189.
74 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, p. 113.
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A NAM Committee of Good Offices was set up to sort out this issue and made about
15 trips to the capitals of Iran and Iraq in 1980, without success." This was a
demonstration of the failure of the Movement and of the United Nations, since both
protagonists did not heed the Movement's plea to respect its principles, namely those
of not acquiring or occupying territories by use of force. Moreover, both belligerents
were to respect the resolution of conflict by peaceful means in respect of these
principles." It was not until 1990 that both Iraq and Iran finally agreed to settle their
differences on the basis of the 1975 agreement and carry out the terms of UN
Resolution 598.78 This is all examples of how the Third World became the
battleground for the Cold War. It was difficult to escape the Cold War. Moreover,
the nonaligned countries lacked political will and means to implement their decisions.
Furthermore, nonalignment was a difficult position to adopt, due to the economic
situation in the South.
In the 1990s, the Cold War disappeared. It is interesting to examine the nature of the
NAM's struggle for peace in this changing world. The good climate between East and
West did not mean an end to all conflicts. We have already mentioned the tension
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In 1990, these two countries were on the
brink of war. The antagonism between India and Pakistan went back to the period of
independence in 1947 and flared up from time to time. Even though the United States
and the Soviet Union would have liked to have good relations with India and
Pakistan, the United States was linked to Pakistan through SEATO and CENTO,
while the Soviet Union tried to establish close relations with India in particular.
Indian-Soviet relations were strengthened in the 1970s because of Pakistan's good
relations with China and the danger of a civil war in which India supported the
independence of East Pakistan.Ï"
76 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 236.
77 MS Rajan: The Future of Nonalignment, p. 97.
78 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 969.
79 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 118.
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A further conflict that erupted in the 1990s was the invasion and annexure of Kuwait
by Iraq. The United States and a number of Western European, Arab and other
countries sent troops to the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union also cooperated against
Iraq, Moscow's former ally.80 This collective security cooperation to liberate Kuwait
can be viewed as a focal point in distinguishing peace-keeping operations in the Cold
War and in the post-Cold War era."
Two other conflicts degenerated into a humanitarian disaster. One was that in
Somalia. In response, the Movement established a Task Force on Somalia that was
active in addressing the issue at the United Nations. The NAM Chairman sent Special
Envoys on fact-finding missions to Somalia, charging them to participate in the
endeavour to bring about a just and comprehensive political settlement to the
internecine dispute, but unfortunately, this did not reach a long-term peaceful
solution.82
Another humanitarian disaster in which the Movement actively tried to help was that
which befell Bosnia and Herzegovina from the early to mid-1990s. At one time,
Indonesia, as Chairman of the NAM, offered its good office to facilitate a peace
process based on direct negotiations among the leaders of the states involved in the
conflict on the basis of the principles that the NAM has always stood for. According
to NS Sutresna, the leaders concerned were apparently prepared to avail themselves of
this offer, but soon thereafter the United States took the initiative of launching a peace
process.r'
80 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 152.
81 M Chetty: A New Role For the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era, p. 40.
82 NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned
Movement, pp. 16-17.
83 Ibid., p. 17.
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As M Mandelbraun argues, American interventions in Somalia and in Bosnia-
Herzegovina can be seen as characteristic of interventions in the post-Cold War era.
A characteristic of these interventions authorised by the United Nations, was that they
represented a shift from the military interventions in the Cold War era. While
military interventions during the Cold War era were undertaken in terms of the East-
West conflict, these intra-state conflicts were largely due to internal conflicts between
tribes over the question of sovereignty or of leadership. 84
The peace-keeping operations were undertaken on behalf of the international
community and under the auspices, or with the consent, of the United Nations by
other "international forces", which had the necessary military power and political
weight. Today because of its failure in Somalia, the United States reluctantly is only
as the remaining superpower, with different combinations of allies that participate in
these operations. Thus, for P Jevremovic, the Nonaligned Movement does not stand a
chance of being a corrective or, even less so, an alternative to such development. It
did not manage to play such a role in previous situations either, such as in the Iran-
Iraq War or in the dispute between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara, which
were violent conflicts between members.f
At the Jakarta Summit in 1992, the nonaligned countries supported the Agenda for
Peace of the UN Secretary-General and the proposed preventive diplomacy of the
United Nations in averting local conflicts by eliminating their deeper socio-economic
and political causes. However, at their Eleventh Summit meeting in Cartagena (1995)
as well as at the ministerial conference in Cairo in mid-1994, the nonaligned nations
expressed reservations, about the trend of converting peace-keeping operations into
other types of military actions that are not authorised in conformity with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 86
84 M Mandelbaum: The Reluctance to Intervene, in Foreign Policy, quoted by M Chetty: A New
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InDurban in 1998, the Movement reiterated its concern over the staffing structure of
the Development of Peace-keeping Operations of the UN Secretariat in which NAM
member countries were insufficiently represented. The summit stressed that, on the
basis of equitable geographical representation, personnel from nonaligned countries
be sufficiently represented amongst the personnel for the new posts to be created in
lieu of phasing out gratis personnel. 87
The Movement's support for peace-keeping operations rests on the fact that the NAM
does not have the enforcement powers or the institutional capacity to enforce peace on
disputants, or to undertake peace-keeping itself.88 Thus, the further evolution of the
NAM and its adjustment to changed international relations will be closely connected
to the development of the United Nations.
5.3 ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE
The mam concern of the nonaligned group of states in the 1960s had been the
eradication of Great Power conflicts and the elimination of colonialism. By the early
1970s, the period of détente and the successful decolonisation of much of the world
had reduced the urgency of these objectives. As there was détente between the
superpowers, the nonaligned states turned their attention to the fundamental source of
their insecurity - their economic dependence on the developed Northern states, their
weakness in international economic and monetary systems and the general
backwardness of their economies.t" It is of interest to discuss these economic
problems of the newly independent states and the methods used by the Third World to
seek global interdependence.
87 XII Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 35.
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5.3.1 Colonial Influence
During the colonial era, the economies of the colonies were integrated parts of the
colonial power's economy. A glance at a pre-1960 map of Africa, for example,
reveals that the road networks of, for example, the Ivory Coast, and the Gold Coast
stop considerably short of the common frontier between them. Communication
between the two colonies was extremely difficult and, even in 1972, there still was no
road between Abidjan and Accra, while telephone communication between these two
capitals, so close to each other, was still conducted via Paris and London.9o
In general, colonies had simple dual economies, with a wide subsistence agricultural
sector and a narrow monetary sector consisting of a few cash crops or mineral
commodities for export. Yet, this dependence varied from region to region due to the
pre-colonial situation. For instance, a dominant feature of the pre-colonial sub-
Saharan economies was "household self-sufficiency". A household produced enough
from the field surrounding the hut for the need of the house. This subsistence
economy was characterised by a lack of regular production of marketable surplus, a
lack of specialisation on a significant scale, and a static technology. At best, trading
was known only in some parts of ancient West African empires, such as Ghana, Mali
and Songhai, and in some portions of Eastern Africa, such as Kilwa and Zimbabwe.
The subsequent growth of an exchange economy in the colonial period resulted in a
dual economy in which a monetary economy gradually evolved, but in which
subsistence survival continued to occupy a large part of the African population."
On the other hand, by the time of their colonisation the Asian countries, already had
evolved their own production mechanisms and trading devices. Due to the decaying
Asian socio-economic fabric and a forceful Western onslaught, the European
metropole emerged as the new centres of industrial production, while the traditional
90 D Kimche: The Afro-Asian Movement, p. 2.
91 RR Ramehandani: NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post Cold War era, pp.
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Asian industrial centres were reduced to the role of peripheral market places. Unlike
Africa and Asia, the Latin American region was largely peopled by immigrants from
the Iberian Peninsula and displayed the backward characteristics of those
economies.V
As a result of an unequal exchange, which favoured the metropole in that it enjoyed
more favourable terms of trade, the pre-colonial indigenous economic frame
disintegrated and growth became unbalanced, rendering the colonial possessions
critically dependent on the industrial development of the metropole. For more than
two centuries, Asian and African countries suffered the consequence of the system.
The formation of the Group of 77 and the Nonaligned Movement is a result of the
Third World's awareness of the exploitative nature of the colonial system that their
countries were subjected to in the past, and the related mechanism of a dependent
pattern of development under which most of them continue to suffer to this day, since
the technologically advanced mechanisms and the accompanying processes continue
to be located largely in the North.93
5.3.2 First Steps for a NewInternational EconomicOrder
North-South conflicts in international economic relations were not a contentious issue
on the global agenda in the 1950s and 1960s, due to the fact that developing states
appeared to enjoy rising levels of economic growth and were politically stable. Third
World elites were consequently optimistic about the future because of the existence of
a fairly stable economy that was characterised by rising levels of trade and aid.94
However, due to the expulsion of Asian, African and Latin American countries from
the postwar institutions dealing with trade in postwar regimes and growing income
and trade gaps between rich (North) and poor nations (South), the Third World
92 RR Ramehandani: NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post Cold War era, p. 51.
93 Ibid., p. 36.
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proposed an array of new policies to increase their share of global trade.95 Demands
for a new economic world order became increasingly prominent. The developing
countries used the United Nations as a platform to discuss this issue, and the arrival in
the 1960s of more African states definitively shifted the weight in the General
Assembly voting to the developing world."
As a result, as early as in 1964, the nonaligned countries became instrumental in
bringing about the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and the Group of 77.97 The formation of UNCTAD represented an
important step toward collective bargaining between the industrialised North and the
underdeveloped South.98 What the 77 developing nations wanted were greater
opportunities for development finance, tariff reductions, expansion of their market
opportunities, stabilisation of raw material prices." an increase in the amount of
development aid from the advanced industrialised states, and a stronger voice in the
specialised agencies - the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, etc. - that
had been created to deal with monetary and developmental issues.IOO
On the other hand, the Western industrial powers had agreed to the UNCTAD
Conference with reluctance and they did not wish to establish a distinct new
organisation for trade and development. They preferred to rely on an instrument such
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, technically a multilateral
treaty designed to regulate and harmonise trading relations), which had given little
explicit attention to development issues. As consensus was to be used in UNCTAD
95 C Murphy: The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology, pp. 59-60.
96 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, p. 15.
97 G Lundestad: East, West, North, South, p. 283.
98 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 300.
99 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, p. 16.
100 Y Arafat: The Tyranny of the Minority, in Canada and the World Backgrounder, p. 12.
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for decision-making, the North protected its bargaining power, through the obligation
to reach consensus, while the South gained a new bargaining forum.'?'
As a result of a ministerial conference of the Group of 77, the Algiers Charter was
drawn up in October 1967. Regarding raw material, the text called for the creation of
regulatory stocks of key commodities in order to avoid the extreme price fluctuations
that brought disaster to Third World revenues. The second major sector dealt with
trade in manufactured and semi-finished products. The major demands were for the
generalisation of preferences and for a more rapid transfer of technology to the
developing countries. The third major issue was development finance. The Third
World called for the developed countries to pledge a fixed level of development
funding (1% of gross national product) and international action to ease the burden of
Third World indebtedness. Algeria was particularly convinced that the Conference of
77 was a critical opportunity for the developing countries to once again get
themselves moving as a collective force in international politics.lo2
Following Algiers, the UNCTAD II held in New Delhi in 1968 was a disappointment
for Third World countries. Only one accord, regarding a gradual application of a
generalised system of preferences for Third World manufactures, was reached. Over,
the next several years, various European states enacted legislation granting such tariff
advantages. The United States put such a system into application only in 1976. The
net result was an increase in the sense of a cleavage between North and South.I03
5.3.3 United Front on North-South Issues (1970-1976)
After the disappointment ofUNCTAD II, the Lusaka Summit of 1970 called upon all
nonaligned nations to establish new means for collective political and economic
101 RA Mortimer: The Third World Coalition in International Politics, pp. 16-17.
102 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
103 Ibid., p. 29.
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action in a world dominated by big powers. The summit therefore adopted the thesis
that, in order to achieve greater autonomy and impact on the international system, the
nonaligned nations must attain greater self-reliance.104 By the late 1960s, the African
leadership was also stressing the need for greater self-reliance in economic matters.
The then Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, stated in radical terms that, "in order to
maintain our independence and our peoples freedom we ought to be self-reliant in
every possible way and avoid depending upon other countries for assistance't.l'"
The Lusaka Summit Declaration was the first to insist that "the poverty of the
developing nations and their economic dependence ... constitute a structural weakness
in the present world economic order" and that "the persistence of an inequitable world
economic system inherited from the colonial past and continued through present neo-
colonialism poses insurmountable difficulties in breaking the bondage of poverty't.i'"
The summit specified vanous forms of mutual planning, trade, and technical
cooperation among developing countries themselves. For instance, they planned to
identify products and countries in which production could be stimulated and expanded
with a view to increasing existing income and trade exchange. Secondly, they
decided to facilitate transit traffic for the diversification and expansion of the external
trade of landlocked countries. They also decided to exchange information on the
needs and resources of different developing countries in respect of technical know-
how, research, consultancy services, experts and training facilities.107 As a result, a
Centre for South-South Technical Cooperation was officially inaugurated in Jakarta in
January 1998 to facilitate activities and programmes of technical cooperation between
104 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of the Third World Solidarity, p. 297.
105 Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, inRR Ramchandani: NAM and Third World Development
Dilemma, p. 86.
106 Two Decades of Non-Alignment, p. 48 and Resolutions of the Third Non-Aligned States, p. 21.
107 Resolutions of the Third Non-Aligned States, pp. 22-23.
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NAM and other developing countries.l'" In order to prepare a common Third World
position for UNCTADIII, the summit called for the convocation of a second
ministerial meeting of the Group of 77. Thus, the nonaligned group began to fix a
working relationship between the two Third World frameworks.i'"
In the 1970s, a number of factors contributed to making North-South relations a
contentious issue in international politics. With the advent of the 1970s, developing
and nonaligned states increasingly faced tougher domestic problems. The number of
poor living near the poverty line appeared to be increasing within the developing
states, aid from the North was decreasing and conventional development strategies,
such as import substitution, had failed to achieve the growth rates initially envisaged,
particularly within Latin America. A contributing factor to the increasing problems
faced by developing and nonaligned states was the advent of a global economic
recession. The roots of the recession lay in the combination of a number of factors,
such as the decision of the United States to opt out of the fixed rate system agreed to
at Bretton Woods, which ushered in an era of flexible exchange rates. Another factor
was the OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s, whereby increasing oil prices had a negative
effect on global economic growth rates.i'"
Meanwhile, UNCTADIII met in Santiago in 1972 and, aside from a vague agreement
to create a special aid programme for the 25 most disadvantaged countries, the various
contentious issues were referred back to the committees and study groups. The
United States in particular insisted that institutions such as GATT and IMF retain
their traditional decision-making power and led opposition to the establishment of a
link between the creation of international monetary liquidity in special drawing rights
(SDRs) and developmental crcdits.i!' Thus UNCTADIII failed to change North-
108 NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in M Gills: South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned
Movement, p. 16.
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South relations, but it marked an important step in Third World solidarity in the
1970s.
Consequently, the nonaligned group met in Georgetown in 1972. This meeting was
ready to mobilise a more radical posture on the issues facing the Third World. An
Action Programme for Economic Cooperation, which stressed the need for the states
nonaligned to implement the ideal of "self-reliance" both in and among developing
countries, was adopted. This programme affirmed permanent sovereignty over
natural resources and direct control over strategic economic activities. In this vein,
Algeria set forth to nationalise all foreign oil companies.l'f
The changing orientation of the Movement, from East-West conflict to North-South
conflict on economic issues, corresponded with a change in the leadership. With the
advent of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the introduction of oil power in the
international system, Arab and Muslim countries began to play a more dynamic role
in the Movement. 113 As Algeria became the chair of the Movement in 1973 and
under its leadership, the Third World was able to take advantage of the disarray and
divisions among major Western industrial countries over oil prices and supply to take
the diplomatic offensive within the United Nations and to seek more serious attention
to their concems.!'"
Regarding oil costs, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
hiked the prices in 1973 to push Western powers to agree their demands. For the first
time, the hike was determined outside the Western counsels. This had a worldwide
impact. The industrialised countries reeled under the pressure. Their growth rate was
arrested and the world economy drifted into a deep recessionary lapse. us However,
112 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 315.
113 Ibid., p. 322.
114 Ibid., p. 317.
lIS RR Ramehandani: NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 90.
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the annual growth rate of South-South trade improved marginally from 6.41 % during
1960-1973 to 6.43 % during 1973-1980. It appeared, then, that the econonomies of
the South were finally on the way to break their dependency-oriented external trade
and growth links with the economies of the North.116
As a response to the energy crisis of 1973 and the general international cnSIS, a
Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly was convened at the
initiative of the Algerian President, Houari Boumedienne. With the support of OPEC
and the Soviet bloc, a resolution was adopted (April 1974) calling for the
establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). In December 1974,
during the regular 29th session of the General Assembly, the "Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States" was adopted. Thus, the United Nations became a major
battleground for a new order. 117
The Declaration and Programme of Action on the establishment of a new international
economic order adopted at the United Nations was based on equity, sovereign
equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all states
irrespective of their economic and social system, to correct inequalities and redress
existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the
developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic
and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations. The
Declaration emphasised the right of every state to full permanent sovereignty over its
natural resources and each state is entitled to exercise effective control over its natural
resources and their exploitation using means suitable to its own situation, the
transference of technology and financial resources to developing countries and the
promotion of a more active United Nations role in creating a new world economic
order.!"
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The essential task for the Third World following the Sixth Special Session was to
begin to implement their demands for a new international economic order. This task
was difficult since the distribution of power, mainly in financial institutions, did not
favour for the Third World, and the General Assembly therefore was the logical place
to renew pressure for change. The Nonaligned Movement held over 35 formal
meetings at various levels and different groupings to permit broad participation
between the Fourth and Fifth Summit conferences. A powerful weapon that could be
used by the developing countries to change this state of affairs was to defend their
natural resources by participating actively in the fixation of their prices on the
international market and to grasp the fact that it was only by combining their forces to
strengthen their negotiating power that they would ever succeed in obtaining their
rights to just and equitable treatment.U"
In the mid-1970s, the Nonaligned Movement became more defined as a voting group
in the United Nations, and groups such as the member states of the European
Community, the Nordic countries and Japan were increasingly reluctant to directly
oppose or risk offending the nonaligned.F" France was the first major Northern
country to endorse the idea of a new international economic order. Moreover, it
proposed a producers-consumers dialogue as an alternative to the United States policy
of confrontation. The European Community (EEC) signed the Lome Convention in
February 1975 with 46 associated African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states
whereby an agreement was reached to increase aid to ACP countries and give them an
important role in aid management. The agreement provided for preferential access for
ACP products to EEC markets, without reciprocal advantages for EEC products, and
created a compensatory finance scheme to stabilise the exports earnings of associated
states for 12 key commodities.121
119 AW Singham and Shirley Hune: Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, p. 136.
120 RL Jackson: The Non-Aligned, the UN and Superpowers, p. 105.
121 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 350.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
136
On the other hand, the United States also began to change its posture on linking issues
of energy and the new economic order. By the autumn of 1975, the North-South
conflict was evolving into a dialogue. In the Third World, some of the moderate
Third World leaders, such as that of Sri Lanka, who desired a less conflicting
approach, felt that the participation of the United States was essential to implement
their demand for a new order. The industrial states, led by the United States, made a
political commitment, even though in some instances this was solely to study the
issue.122
5.3.4 Impasse in North-South Dialogue (1976-1992)
By 1974, the North-South conflict had replaced the East-West conflict. During this
period, the NIEO issue was an arena in which states with divergent politico-social
systems and ideologies, as well as divergent approaches to economic development,
could unite in a united Third World front against the industrialised North. Yet, by
1977, increased Third World diversity in the economic, political and ideological
sphere led to conflict over the means to achieve a new order. One major issue that
threatened solidarity was the increasing economic gap between OPEC and the non-oil
developing countries (NOLDCs) and the potential conflict over the price the
NOLDCs had to pay for oil. Some Third World leaders called in vain for lower prices
for the LDCs and higher prices for the northern states.123
Another potential source of Third World fragmentation was the relative success of
OPEC and the NICs in comparison to the least developed countries. The NICs and
OPEC represented the rise of the semi-periphery as major actors in the world
capitalist system. The first group suffered from petroleum price fluctuations when
exporting their manufactured goods. The Northern states attempted to integrate the
NICs and OPEC into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
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(OECD) in order to maintain the existing international system with moderate changes,
rather than engaging in structural transformation.i'"
A further source of conflict was differences in development strategies toward the
North-South conflict. In the 1970s, a number of socialist countries, such as Ethiopia,
Somalia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Kampuchea and Afghanistan, emerged as an important
component of the Third World. Some leaders and theoreticians in the Third World
assumed that, by eliminating capitalism at home, they would disengage from the
international capitalist system, while another group opted for increased integration
into the world capitalist system as a method to enhance their economic development.
On the other hand, the lack of consensus between the developed countries on the
question of the purposes and the management of the international economic order
remained.125
By the end of 1980, the many demands resulted in a few significant changes for the
developing countries. New programmes of assistance were initiated for the very
poorest developing countries. A commodity fund was established in 1980.126 The
gap between demands and results was illustrated by the fact that, whereas the
developing countries had proposed a 6 billion dollar fund, the programmes that
eventually materialised had 750 million dollars at their disposal.l'" All attempts to
change the decision-making locus on international economic issues from IMF, GATT
and the World Bank to UNCTAD or the United Nations General Assembly were
vigorously opposed by Western countries.l/"
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After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration returned to the
Cold War as the most important issue confronting policy-makers in Washington.i'"
The Reagan administration removed the issue of North-South relations from the
agenda in the 1980s, following the collapse of North-South dialogue at the Cancun
Summit of 1981. The Reagan administration's strategy involved measures such as
enhancing the role of private markets by restarting the Overseas Investment
Corporation, as well as interacting with developing states on a more bilateral basis.
This strategy involved attempting to shift the focus of multilateral negotiations from
the United Nations and UNCTAD to conservative financial institutions, such as the
IMF.130 Other industrialised countries also chose the developing country they would
co-operate with on the basis of which developing country happened to have the
resources they needed. Thus, the poorest of the developing countries became even
poorer because of their isolation. At this time, the developing countries were unable
to react because of their lack of unity and their debt burden.i " For instance, in 1987
the World Bank estimated that the accumulated debt of all the developing countries
has risen to $812 billion and that the debt service payments alone accounted for 61.2
% of the overall payments of debt.!32
5.3.5 Dialogue as a Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era
Global poverty remained the critical challenge for much óf the developing world and
was at the forefront of the NAM's agenda since the 1992 summit. A 1997 UNCTAD
study showed that the differences in income per capita between the seven richest and
seven poorest countries worldwide had nearly doubled between 1965 and 1995, from
20 to 39 times.!33 With increasing debts, many nations of the South were back where
129 DC Thomas: The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, p. 441.
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they had started and the dialogue became more pressing than during the Cold War,
when developing countries had profited by playing one superpower up against the
other. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were eager to buy friends
wherever they could find them. Countries such as Ethiopia, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Angola and El Salvador were happy to be friendly with whichever
superpower would build them a hydroelectric dam or arm their military with the latest
weapons.l "
There were new fears that the emerging new world order might further fortify the
Northern global economic domination by subjecting much of the South. These fears
in the Southern states were based on the shifting paradigm from land-based
colonisation to a more sophisticated, knowledge-based. Under the impact of the
global technological bind, the world system was now more prone to the "global
market" and global knowledge signals emanating from the North because the neo-
economic liberalism did not, on its own, promise the structural transformation of the
South. It was essentially under pressure from widening technological frontiers that
the Second World, led by the former Soviet Union, collapsed in 1991. That is why,
during the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) during the Uruguay trade
rounds of the 1994 GATT Conference at Marrakech in Morocco, the South was very
concerned about the insensitivity of the industrialised countries towards its
disadvantaged position.l " However, the increasing participation by developing states
in the Uruguay Round signalled that they recognised that a weakening of GATT
would impact adversely on their interests.l "
The North had consistently been raismg tariffs on products such as footwear,
garments, food items, etc., - the products that mostly were exported by Southern
countries to the Northern markets. The South also resented dumping attempts by the
134 Y Arafat: The Tyranny of the Minority, in Canada and the World Backgrounder, p.lS.
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North and the growing power of the Multi-National Corporations. For example, it
was estimated that, in 1997, the sales of the world's top six firms, at $716 billion,
exceeded the combined GDP of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.137 The
implications of Trade World Related Property Rights (TRIPRs) and Trade Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs) had, therefore, assumed special significance for the
South, since the Southern countries feared that the granting of TRIPs would make
technology transfer from North to South more difficult and inequitable than under the
traditional intellectual property system.138
The Tenth Summit in Jakarta heralded a new process of dealing with all global issues.
Development issues, with their equally significant economic, political and social
aspects, were singled out because of their importance. A new orientation, that of
dialogue and cooperation with the North, prevailed over the previous radicalism.
However, the nonaligned countries were sceptical of the North's reaction, since, while
a significant number of developing countries had carried out a structural adjustment
process and had opened their economies with a view to putting them in line with the
new conditions for investment and world commerce, a lack of reciprocity was
observed in the developed countries.F"
From their expenence of the impact of globalisation and interdependence, the
developed countries have begun to realise that the problem of poverty would later find
a way of transferring itself to the developed world. The developed world needed the
developing world to have vast new markets. Consequently, at the end of the 1993
Tokyo summit, the positive response of the leaders of the Group of 7 to the
Nonaligned Movement was an offer of cooperation and constructive dialogue. Their
subsequent summits led to a virtual resumption of the North-South dialogue. Thus,
working with the Group of 77 and other like-minded countries, including the
137 RR Ramehandani: NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era, p.
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developed countries, NAM initiated a draft resolution entitled Renewal of the
Dialogue on Strengthening International Cooperation for Development through
Partnership. The adoption of that resolution by consensus proved that the
international community supported the basic strategy of NAM for achieving a more
equitable international economic order."?
The Movement decided to continue its consultative process on external debt at a high
level, and they formulated policy guidelines that were presented by the NAM
Chairman to the leaders of the Group of 7 on the eve of their Tokyo Summit in July
1993. In addition, as a result of the Chairman of the Movement's appeal to James D.
Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, in 1995, a Trust Fund was established to
which the World Bank initially contributed US $500 million for reducing the overall
debt burdens of highly indebted poor countries to sustainable levels. The developed
countries concerned reaffirmed their support for this proposal and the next task was to
raise the funds to transform the proposal into reality.i'"
The 1998 Durban Summit stressed that, due to new, evolving economic, investment
and institutional arrangements among major world economies, South-South
cooperation should become a more dynamic part of ensuring the equitable
participation of developing countries in the emerging global economic order.
Increasing globalisation, liberalisation and interdependence were all making that
cooperation more imperative than before. Varying development experiences in
developing countries, as well as similar needs and problems to be solved, offered an
opportunity for greater bilateral, regional and interregional cooperation among
developing countries. South-South cooperation would also strengthen the
harmonisation of position of developing countries in the regional and global system
and would afford them a measure of collective strength.142
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The Nonaligned Movement was formally established in Belgrade in 1961, but, well
before that, the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung took place. The participants
in this conference were heterogenous and deeply divided in their foreign policy. For
example, Turkey was a member of NATO, a military organisation of Western
countries. Japan was far more industrialised than the rest of Bandung and China was
the most populous state in the world. The Bandung Conference also was attended by
both socialist countries, such as the People's Republic of China and the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, and by capitalist countries such as Japan.
This conference brought together the leaders of two continents of non-white people,
who identified and addressed the problems of the world at that time, such as peace
and economic cooperation, cultural cooperation, colonialism and the democratisation
of international institutions. From Bandung, thus rose an inexorable tide of sentiment
in favour of independence, since various parts of the world were still under colonial
domination, and the participants decided to claim their rightful place within the
community of nations.
This conference was a major factor in the adoption, by the United Nations, of the
Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Another
achievement was the adoption of a new ethos of peaceful coexistence that would
govern the relationship between and among nations great and small. These came to
be known as the ten principles of international relations and they were formulated to
apply to all principles of international relations and to apply for all time and to all
nations.
The Nonaligned Movement was formally organised and sustained by these principles.
This came six years later, when the leaders of 25 newly independent countries, from
not only Asia and Africa, but also Europe and Latin America, established the NAM at
the Belgrade Summit of 1961. Half of the Bandung countries were left aside, since
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the Movement decided to keep aloof of the Cold War rivalry by adopting a policy of
nonalignment. Countries with military alliances with Great Powers were excluded.
Since then, the Movement has grown to its present strength of 113 members and,
among its guests and observers are some former aligned nations, such as Australia,
the Philippines, Portugal, Greece, Romania and Spain. Moreover, some member
countries, such as Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia concluded military agreements
with the United States. Nearly all the countries that succeeded the former Soviet
Union, including the Russian Federation, the legal successor of the Soviet Union,
manifested an interest in the Movement.
This study therefore examined the creation of the Nonaligned Movement as a result of
the emergence of a competitive and conflicting interaction between the Western
powers and the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Two antagonistic blocs
were organised economically, politically and even ideologically. The idea of the new
nations emerging in Africa and Asia was to keep a distance from the two major blocs.
Standing outside these two alliances gave them a stronger feeling of not being
dominated by powerful centres of military and economic might. The interposition of
the nonaligned countries restrained the intensity of superpower confrontation in the
Third World.
The Movement adopted a senes of strategies to defuse Cold War tensions.
Delegations were sent to Washington and Moscow to defuse the Berlin crisis and to
re-initiate contacts between the American and Soviet leaders in respect of
disarmament. They were not very successful; however, the pressure on the Secretary-
General of the United Nations during the Cuban crisis helped to decrease the tension
between both superpowers and compelled them to make concessions.
Another area of concern for the Nonaligned Movement was its effort towards
complete disarmament, since the Cold War and its aftermath were characterised by
the arms race. There has been a substantial reduction in weapons through various
bilateral agreements between the superpowers. Many resolutions regarding
disarmament were sent to the General Assembly of the United Nations. A General
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Assembly of the UN was held on disarmament as a result of a plea by NAM and,
consequently, a Conference on Disarmament is operational. However, the growth of
new weapons systems in both nuclear and conventional weapons is continuing. It
therefore becomes pertinent for the Nonaligned Movement to exert more pressure so
that future limits on proliferation will be imposed on the development of nuclear
weapons and that clandestine nuclear development will be stopped. In recent years,
however, the endeavour for global disarmament has suffered a delay with the testing
of nuclear devices by two members of the Movement, India and Pakistan. Moreover,
some countries have authorised the establishment of foreign military bases on their
soil or entered into military alliances. It is in my belief that this signals a failure by
the Movement. It should take strong measures such as a suspension, to force its
members to respect membership principles.
The peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful coexistence by member nations also
has failed since many member countries, such as Iran and Irak, Somalia and Ethiopia
and countries in the Middle East went to war and mediation by the Movement was
unsuccessful. However, the struggle by the Palestinian community for self-
determination and territorial integrity will continue to be one of the primary
international political issues of the Movement.
NAM has continued to deal with all international problems discussed at the United
Nations. As the political-military pressures of the Cold War were decreasing at the
beginning of the 1970s, economic development began to receive greater attention. A
united Third World front was forged around North-South conflict. The Nonaligned
Movement and the Group of 77 have attempted to implement the demands for a New
International Economic Order and change the locus of decision-making concerning
international economic issues from GATT, IMF and World Bank to UNCTAD and
the United Nations General Assembly. By the early 1980s, about the only
achievement that could be cited as the result of this effort was the establishment of the
Common Fund for Commodities, a much watered-down version of the original idea.
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The process of globalisation has opened up new forms of a neo-colonial division of
labour between the North and the South due to wide gaps in the qualitative and
quantitative advancement of research and development in the industrialised and Third
World countries. The new approach of dialogue and cooperation taken by the
Movement in the post-Cold War era seems to be more successful than the
confrontational position taken in the 1970s. As a result, the Common Fund and Trust
Fund were adopted when tension was low between North and South. Another
possible solution to alleviate economic problems followed by the South was to
increase South-South cooperation.
A further role played by the Nonaligned Movement in the post-Cold War era was the
struggle in respect of human rights. The member countries stressed their commitment
to promoting and protecting all aspects of human rights, including human dignity, and
to securing a decent standard of living and well-being for all.
Another area of concern of the Nonaligned Movement was environmental issues. The
protection of the ozone layer and the control of climate change became common
international issues after the Cold War. Developing and nonaligned states
participated in the negotiations that led to the signing of a treaty at the United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992. The role of the Group of
77, which includes the Nonaligned Movement, during the Kyoto Protocol, was that of
urging the developed countries to take the lead in cutting their greenhouse gas
emissions, even though the United States overshadowed this issue. Thus, the
Movement needs collective efforts to improve the position of developing countries in
the global system and in dealing with other issues of common concern, such as
international terrorism, drug trafficking and Aids.
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ADDENDUM
Membership of the Nonaligned Movement
The year given in parenthesis after each country indicates the first summit conference
that they attended as a full member of the Movement. The total is 113 members, of
which all except Palestine are members of the United Nations.
Afghanistan (1961) Ecuador (1983) Mali (1961) Singapore (1970)
Algeria (1961) Egypt (1961) Malta (1973) Somalia (1961)
Angola (1976) Equatorial Guinea Mauritania (1964) South Africa
Bahamas (1983) (1970) Mauritius (1973) (1995)
Bahrain (1973) Eritrea (1995) Mongolia (1992) Sri Lanka (1961)
Bangladesh (1973) Ethiopia (1961) Morocco (1961) St. Lucia (1983)
Barbados (1983) Gabon (1963) Mozambique Sudan (1961)
Belize (1983) The Gambia (1973) (1976) Surinam (1979)
Benin (1964) Ghana (1961) Myanmar (1961) Swaziland (1970)
Bhutan (1973) Grenada (1979) Namibia (1992) Syria (1961)
Bolivia (1979) Guatemala (1992) Nepal (1961) Tanzania (1964)
Botswana (1970) Guinea (1961) Nicaragua (1979) Thailand (1995)
Brunei Darussalam Guyana (1970) Niger (1973) Togo (1964)
(1992) Honduras (1995) Nigeria (1964) Trinidad and
Burkina Faso India (1961) North Korea (1976) Tobago (1970)
(1973) Indonesia (1961) Oman (1973) Tunisia (1961)
Burundi (1964) Iran (1979) Pakistan (1979) Turkmenistan
Cambodia (1961) (1995)Iraq (1961) Palestine (1976)
Cameroon (1961) Uganda (1964)Jamaica (1970) Panama (1976)
Cape Verde (1976) United ArabJordan (1964) Papua New Guinea Emirates (1973)
Central African Kenya (1964) (1992) Uzbekistan (1992)Republic (1964)
Kuwait (1964) Peru (1973) Vanuatu (1983)Chad (1964)
Laos (1964) Philippines (1992) Venezuela (1989)Chile (1992)
Lebanon (1961) Qatar (1973) Vietnam (1976)Colombia (1983)
Lesotho (1970) Rwanda (1970) Yemen (1961)Comoros (1976)
Liberia (1964) Sao Tomé and Yugoslavia (1961)Congo (1964) Principé (1976)
Cête d ' Ivoire Libya (1964) Saudi Arabia Democratic
(1973) Madagascar (1973) (1961) Republic of the
Congo (1961)
Malawi (1964)
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Zambia (1964)
Zimbabwe (1983)
Cuba (1961)
Cyprus (1961)
Djibouti (1979)
Malaysia (1970)
Maldives (1976)
Senegal (1964)
Seychelles (1976)
Sierra Leone
(1964)
• Argentina was a member from the 1973 summit until an announcement in
September 1991 that it had withdrawn.
• Myanmar (Burma) was a founder member in 1961, withdrew in October 1979
after the Havanna Summit and rejoined in September 1992 at the Jakarta
Summit.
• North Yemen was a founder member in 1961 and South Yemen joined at the
Lusaka summit in 1970, North and South Yemen united on 22 May 1990.
• Yugoslavia was a founder member in 1961. The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is still regarded as a member. The NAM
countries decided at the Jakarta Summit in September 1992 that they would
conform to any decision of the subsequent UN General Assembly.
Yugoslavia's membership was suspended and it was not represented at any
Nonaligned meeting thereafter.
Source: The Annual Register 1995. London: CartemilI, 1995, p. 386 in G Mills:
South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement, p. VII.
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